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Abstract 
This thesis explores the implications of Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophical and literary 
representations of women through a close reading of selected chapters from The Second Sex 
alongside selected stories from When Things of the Spirit Come First. Just as Beauvoir argues that 
women cannot be represented through discourses of class, history, biology and psychoanalysis, this 
thesis will show how women cannot be fully represented or understood as complete individuals 
within the contexts of their social roles either. To this end, the focus of this thesis will be the 
independent woman, the mother and the daughter. In this thesis, I have paired the short stories 
‘Marguerite’ and ‘Anne’ from When Things of the Spirit Come First with the chapters ‘The 
Independent Woman’, ‘The Mother’ and ‘The Mystic’ from The Second Sex. Linking the stories in 
When Things of the Spirit Come First with The Second Sex highlights the importance of literary 
writing to the understanding of Beauvoir’s philosophy. 
In this thesis I argue that Beauvoir’s literary work should not be seen as subordinate to, or as 
separate from, her philosophical work. Her representation of women in literary terms in both 
philosophical and literary texts has ensured that women are recognised and made visible to 
philosophy as philosophical, political and ethical subjects. I argue that Beauvoir’s philosophy has 
brought forth the voices of women in everyday situations into dialogue with canonical philosophies 
and that those voices have subverted the authority of such philosophies. Indeed, Beauvoir has 
opened the way for ordinary women to enter the language of philosophy, just as her work in The 
Second Sex opened the way for future feminists to enter and challenge the language of the patriarch. 
The texts I have chosen and the method of analysis I have used to understand these texts will extend 
our understanding of the importance of the literary to Beauvoir’s philosophical framework. The 
implication of this understanding is that Beauvoir’s literary representations of women can be used 
as a means to think through the multiple, ambiguous domains of oppression experienced by women 
in the everyday. 
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Introduction 
This thesis explores the philosophical and literary representations of women in the work of Simone 
de Beauvoir. This is achieved through an examination of the way Beauvoir represents embodied 
and situated women in selected chapters of The Second Sex (TSS) read alongside selected stories in 
When Things of the Spirit Come First (WTS). In this thesis I will argue that Beauvoir’s literary work 
should not be seen as subordinate to, or as separate from, her philosophical work. Her 
representation of women in literary terms in both philosophical and literary texts has ensured that 
women are recognised and made visible to philosophy as philosophical, political and ethical 
subjects. I argue that Beauvoir’s philosophy has brought forth the voices of women into dialogues 
with systematic philosophies and that those voices have subverted the authority of such 
philosophies. Indeed, Beauvoir has opened the way for women to enter the language of philosophy, 
just as her work opened the way for future feminists to enter and change the language of the 
patriarch. The texts and method of analysis I have chosen to study in this thesis, I will argue, allow 
for the possibility of extending our understanding of the way philosophical and literary 
representations of the roles women are expected to assume can push the current boundaries of the 
language we use to describe such roles.  
The major question I am answering in this thesis refers to the dialogic, inter-textual nature 
of Beauvoir’s body of work. I ask what does it mean to read Beauvoir’s work inter-textually and 
what will such a reading bring to our understanding of Beauvoir’s philosophical project on the 
oppression of women. I argue that such a reading will clarify misreadings of Beauvoir as a liberal 
philosopher and instead demonstrate that she is a radical and revolutionary philosopher whose work 
does shine a light on the path forward for women. However, it is a path that requires a vigilant 
commitment to being alert to the temptations of situations predicated on bad faith: in other words, 
women need to closely examine whether the offer of that comfortable middle-class existence is 
actually a invitation to be complicit in patriarchal oppression.    
From The Second Sex, I have selected the chapters ‘The Independent Woman’, ‘The 
Mother’ and ‘The Mystic’ to study in depth alongside the stories ‘Anne’ and ‘Marguerite’ from 
When Things of the Spirit Come First. I have limited my study to these primary texts because 
together they offer a rich and deep close reading experience that brings forth the many nuances in 
Beauvoir’s voice thus revealing different philosophical strategies of address to her readers. While 
each of the stories in When Things of the Spirit Come First can be read as an independent unit, the 
stories are tied together thematically and as such the distinction that exists between them is more a 
difference in focus around the issue of bad faith and Catholic spirituality and ritual. The stories 
‘Marguerite’ and ‘Anne’ are representative of a particularly strong thread of critique that emerges 
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across Beauvoir’s work that centres around the question of how women can establish authentic 
relationships founded in freedom with each other within the constraints imposed by the patriarchy. 
The focus on these particular stories also provides insight into the foundational motivations for the 
philosophical direction Beauvoir takes. ‘Marguerite’, for instance, is the only piece of fiction in 
which Beauvoir writes in the first person. It effectively initiates a claim for the phenomenological 
method she adopts in The Second Sex; it announces that her freedom becomes possible when she 
renounces God and rejects the social apparatus that supports such beliefs and knowledges.  The 
sudden death of her young friend Zaza forms the basis of the story ‘Anne’, and it too is a 
foundational moment for Beauvoir’s existentialism because her death is unfathomable and ordinary 
explanations for it are not satisfactory for Beauvoir so it sets her on the path of philosophical 
inquiry. ‘Marguerite’ and ‘Anne’ are stories that communicate Beauvoir’s experiences with 
ordinary reality: the events point to the necessity that the veils of irrational belief fall in order that 
the ground is cleared for the future.  These two stories also deal with the tension produced between 
the mother and daughter in the patriarchal world: a tension that is key to understanding the 
foundation of Beauvoir’s philosophy in that freedom for women begins when they start the process 
of disentangling themselves from the patriarchal mother. While it may appear that the father is the 
most obvious figure of oppression to disengage from, the mother that upholds the values of the 
patriarchy, is a pernicious figure that is perhaps more difficult to overcome. This is because the 
mother provides the first material, bodily and emotional experience for the daughter and as such 
represents the origin of the daughter’s consciousness of the world. 
Starting from the position that Beauvoir’s literary work is constitutive of her philosophical 
work, I will read the fiction with the aim of establishing theoretical links between the texts in order 
to better understand the philosophical importance of Beauvoir’s independent woman of The Second 
Sex. The literary work will not be read with a view to formulating a judgment of its literary status 
vis-à-vis the literary or philosophical canon, but as an analysis of the way the literary construction 
of the text becomes the means of creating philosophy. The subject of each of the five intertwined 
short stories in When Things of the Spirit Come First is a correlate of the female stereotypes 
Beauvoir uses as the basis of her argument for the recognition of female oppression. While 
Beauvoir is widely acknowledged to have lead the way to a phenomenological approach to 
understanding female oppression on the basis of sexual difference in The Second Sex, her theory 
about the role of literature bringing the reader to consciousness of their freedom in her essay 
‘Literature and Metaphysics’, for instance, provides an opportunity to consider the embodiment of 
Beauvoir’s independent woman through her phenomenological method of writing fiction.  
The study of the fiction requires a different method of analysis than does the study of an 
argument. The fiction is constructed as a communication with the reader that attempts to engage the 
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reader’s imagination in an experience of a shared reality based on empathy. This differs from 
writing that attempts to objectively describe reality in that the reader of fiction effectively embodies 
the fiction through the imaginative experience of reading, whereas in the reading of objective 
material the reader is forced into an emotionally distant position that diminishes the sense of bodily 
experience. While it could be said that this process amounts to solipsism in terms of the potential 
for philosophical analysis, if we understand the relationship between the writer and reader to be one 
that is organised around a shared reality, then we can think about the reader not only as an imagined 
individual consciousness, but also as belonging to an imagined collective consciousness. Where 
argument is contained within its location in the text, literary techniques such as narration and 
character for instance, transcend the text by becoming a part of the lived phenomenological 
experience of the reader: the metaphysical questions and concerns that are the impetus for the 
fiction act as seeds planted in the subjectivity of the reader that allows for philosophical questioning 
to flourish. Putting the two texts into a dialogue with each other has the potential to generate new 
insight into the problem of understanding the embodied consciousness of women under oppression.  
The focus on the literary and philosophical aspects of Beauvoir’s works as it relates to the 
freedom and oppression of women, will generally situate it in the fields of feminist philosophy, 
philosophy and literature, existentialism and phenomenology. Scholarly work on When Things of 
the Spirit Come First has slowly emerged since its publication in English in 1982 (having first been 
published by Gallimard in French in 1979). A sample of some early reviews highlights the 
autobiographical connection to Beauvoir, and points to its connection with Beauvoir’s future 
philosophical work. In The New York Times (‘A Conversion to the Real World’, 7 November 
1982), Beauvoir’s future biographer, Deirdre Bair assesses the book on the basis of its literary merit 
(she thinks there are flaws) but primarily on its content (she thinks it is an accurate reflection of the 
cultural milieu of the time) and she thinks it is a “perfect” bookend to Beauvoir’s canon: 
The importance of this book today lies in its demonstration of how early in her career 
Simone de Beauvoir recognised and expressed the ideas that would figure throughout her 
writing, particularly the question of the forces that determine women’s lives (p. 388). 
In The Nation (‘Lisa & Marcelle & Anne & Chantal’ 2 October 1982), Carol Asher provides some 
philosophical context to the work:  
The common theme of these five stories, each of which has been given the name of its 
heroine, is the existentialist tragedy of placing essence before existence—that is, attempting 
to dispel the ambiguity and freedom of one’s life by setting up an Absolute (God) or 
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absolutes (social customs) on which one relies, making “things of the spirit come first” (p. 
314). 
Asher also acknowledges the biographical elements and concludes: 
More than her other fiction, even than Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, the stories show the 
refined brutality of Catholic schoolgirl society. They give a window on the closed universe 
out of which de Beauvoir thrust herself to live her unconventional and politically committed 
life (p. 315). 
Ann Hulbert in The New Republic (‘Femininity and its discontents’ 20 September 1982) describes 
the stories focused on the “delusory spiritual experiences of the five girls that prevent them from 
discovering a true self equipped to live in the world” (p. 41). Lorna Sage in The Observer (‘The 
agony and the ecstasy’, 11 July 1982) describes the stories as developing “real power” and 
recognises the grip Catholic upbringing holds over Beauvoir arguing she is “caught in the double 
bind of believing, with an absolute conviction, that all sublimities are in bad faith, and that 
demystification is a kind of holy duty” (p. 29). Marion Glastonbury’s New Statesman review 
(‘Breaking Out’, 6 August, 1982), however, is fairly dismissive of the work and thinks the source 
material “has been put to infinitely better use—documented in Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter and 
analysed in The Second Sex” (p. 23). These early views recognise the connection of the stories to 
Beauvoir’s later work in The Second Sex, particularly in relation to the connection of the influence 
of the Church with the development of Beauvoir’s understanding of bad faith and the barrier it 
presents to women’s pursuit of freedom. 
This thesis aims to fill a gap in the scholarly literature on the relationship between 
Beauvoir’s philosophy and literature and, more particularly, the gap in scholarly work on When 
Things of the Spirit Come First (1983) as well as add to the already existing scholarship on 
Beauvoir’s representation of female embodiment. In The Novels of Simone de Beauvoir (1988), 
Elizabeth Fallaize is concerned with an analysis of five novels and two short story collections by 
Beauvoir in order to understand how Beauvoir’s use of narration communicates the central meaning 
in her literary texts (p. 1). Fallaize asks: “Given the interaction of form and meaning, how do these 
strategies function and themselves affect the meaning of the texts?” (ibid.). Fallaize pairs her 
discussion of When Things of the Spirit Come First (1983) with Beauvoir’s other short story 
collection The Woman Destroyed (1967) because:  
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Opening and closing Beauvoir’s fictional production in this way, and separated by more 
than 30 years, the broadly similar form of the two works offers a unique opportunity to 
consider developments in Beauvoir’s use of narrative strategies (p. 143).  
Fallaize analyses the narrative strategy in each story to help us understand how to identify the 
differences between the protagonists in relation to their shifting positions towards various 
articulations of illusion and reality, freedom and duty, self-worth and self-abnegation.  
Sally Scholz offers a specific reading of When Things of the Spirit Come First (1983) in her 
journal article ‘Writing for liberation: Simone de Beauvoir and women’s writing’ (2001) that 
analyses the protagonist of each of the stories from the point of view that each embodies an aspect 
of writing. Scholz focuses on the way writing is represented in the text instead of plot because  
each story features a woman as a writer and it is through an analysis of the various modes 
and styles of writing presented that we come to a better understanding of Beauvoir’s own 
thoughts about language, writing and women (p. 335).  
Scholz says that for Beauvoir, writing is an important means for women to “speak out of the 
situation of oppression... The woman who writes as a way to disclose the world writes with a 
language and in a style that directly and indirectly confronts her own situation as well as the 
situation of all women” (p. 346). However, Scholz is concerned that Beauvoir’s argument from The 
Second Sex, that independence is won through literary artistic expression, is problematic because 
“not all women have the ability and desire to write... (and) not all women have the material reality 
to afford them the leisure to write” (p. 347). Scholz’s argues that writing is the primary means 
through women are to achieve independence; however, I will argue that Beauvoir is not so 
prescriptive and instead argues that independence can only proceed with the arrival of the 
recognition of the open future.  
Sarah Fishwick draws on When Things of the Spirit Come First (and other fictional works) 
and The Second Sex extensively in her monograph The Body in the Work of Simone de Beauvoir 
(2002). Fishwick (2002) writes about the female body in a survey of Beauvoir’s fictional work and 
in The Second Sex. She structures the work with a thematic approach to her analysis. Fishwick 
examines the female body in The Second Sex as a theorisation, whereas she uses three types of body 
to think about the female characters in the fiction: the ‘Productive’ and ‘Non-Productive’ Body; the 
Desiring Body; and the Performing Body. Fishwick provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
various theoretical positions on the social constructivist versus biological debate in relation to 
Beauvoir’s theorisation of the body in The Second Sex. The protagonists from When Things of the 
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Spirit Come First are used as examples of the types of bodies investigated by Fishwick. Fishwick 
utilises the short story collection, along with other fictional works by Beauvoir, to explore 
Beauvoir’s theory of female embodiment in The Second Sex. My project differs from Fishwick’s in 
that I am not testing the representation of the characters in When Things of the Spirit Come First 
against Beauvoir’s theorisation of female oppression in The Second Sex, rather I am thinking about 
both texts in terms of representation of women. That is, I am not prioritising theory or philosophy 
over literary representations.  
In Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Lived Experience (2002), Eleanore Holveck devotes 
the chapter ‘Marguerite’s Choice against the Spiritual Life: From the Eternal Feminine to the 
Platinum Blonde’ to an analysis of the philosophical antecedents of When Things of the Spirit Come 
First. Holveck is interested in tracing Beauvoir’s early philosophical influences—for example, 
Jacques Maritain, Leon Brunschvicg, Paul Nizan, as well as Rimbaud and Goethe— through 
linking characters, scenes, and situations as expositions or evidence of Beauvoir’s philosophical 
thinking at the time. Holveck’s work is of interest to my project because she is specifically 
connecting Beauvoir’s works of fiction with her philosophy through the framework offered by 
Beauvoir’s literary theory in her essay ‘Literature and Metaphysics’ (2014). In many ways, my 
project is theoretically framed around Beauvoir’s literary theory found in ‘Literature and 
Metaphysics’, however, I am not specifically concerned with adding to the literature on Beauvoir’s 
philosophical influences.  
The edited collection Beauvoir & Sartre: the riddle of influence (2009), offers two chapter 
of relevance to my thesis: ‘Simone de Beauvoir’s “Marguerite” as a possible source of inspiration 
for Jean-Paul Sartre’s “The Childhood of a Leader’ by Eliane Lecarme-Tabone and ‘Anne, ou 
quand prime le spirituel: Beauvoir and Sartre interact—from parody, satire and tragedy to 
manifesto of liberation’ by Adrian van den Hoven. The value of these chapters is that each is 
focused specifically on the stories; however, the prime motivation of each chapter is to explore the 
relationships of influence between Beauvoir and Sartre’s work.  
The chapters are ordered to suggest an unfolding of question, answers, challenges and 
refusals related to the way women experience the dominant roles they are expected to assume 
through patriarchal thinking. We begin with Beauvoir the inquirer whose questions bring forth the 
feminist philosophical inquiry. We move to Marguerite who is Beauvoir’s mirrored younger self 
who begins to answer Beauvoir’s questions and reflect the paths both taken and not yet taken in the 
philosophical journal. Then we move to the mother’s problematic relationship with the world and 
her challenge to philosophy and writing. Finally, we complete the cycle with the daughter 
incapacitated by a lack of self-determination and her immanent refusal to be a woman for anyone. A 
more detailed description of the chapters follows. 
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Chapter 1 will create a conceptual and theoretical map for an interpretation of 
representations of women as they appear in a reading of The Second Sex with When Things of the 
Spirit Come First. In this chapter I will consider how the foundations of Beauvoir’s philosophy is 
built through the phenomenological concept of lived experience. I will examine how her adherence 
to this concept forms the basis for her methodological approach to writing literature that renders it 
philosophical. Here I will argue that lived experiences are represented through the literary mode of 
writing to offer an affective engagement with Beauvoir’s underpinning philosophical project. In 
essence, Beauvoir’s literary method is a challenge to received notions of the epistemic superiority 
of systematic philosophies to account for the realities of everyday life, particularly the lives of 
women.  
Chapter 2 will read ‘The Independent Woman’ from The Second Sex with the story 
‘Marguerite’ from When Things of the Spirit Come First. It is important to remember that these 
stories are intertwined and that the story ‘Marguerite’ appears at the end of the cycle. However, it 
serves our purpose to introduce her at the beginning of this thesis because, when we get to know 
her, we can think about her connection with the other women in the future chapters. Here, 
Marguerite is shown as breaking away from the oppressive Catholic ethics that shapes the lives of 
each of the characters. Marguerite is marked as an independent woman through her embrace of the 
real, lived world of materiality in her pursuit of sexual adventure. This chapter will explore the way 
work and sexuality complicate the capacity to represent the independent woman in concrete terms 
without contradiction.  
Chapter 3 will explore Beauvoir’s representation of the mother through the chapter ‘The 
Mother’ from The Second Sex and the story ‘Anne’ in When Things of the Spirit Come First. The 
figure of the mother in the form of Mme Vignon will be examined in relation to the figure of the 
independent woman within the framework proposed by the following questions. If becoming the 
independent woman represents the realisation of a situated, yet ontologically based conception of 
freedom, can this be accomplished within the constraints of a situation that is structured through the 
patriarchal appropriation of female reproductive biology? A study of the character of Mme Vignon 
and her relationships with the other characters in the story will provide insight into the complexity 
of Beauvoir’s theory in The Second Sex that point to the mother as an embodiment of the illogicality 
of patriarchal law. In The Second Sex Beauvoir deconstructs the patriarchal argument for its 
authority over female reproduction to reveal the contradictions that undermine woman’s capacity to 
pursue projects that engender subjectivity and freedom. Through the analysis of Mme Vignon, the 
true horror of woman’s position vis-à-vis her role as the carrier of the law in The Second Sex, is 
revealed. Far from arguing that the female body is inferior to that of the male, Beauvoir shows how 
woman is forced to bear the burden of the patriarch’s flaws. 
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Finally, in Chapter 4 the problem of the mother is further explored through the story ‘Anne’ 
but from the point of view of the daughter struggling to define herself through her own embodied 
experience but lacking a language of her own to do so. This chapter begins to unravel the 
relationship between the mother and daughter alongside a reading of ‘The Mystic’. This is focused 
on the problem that faith presents to the development of a language of freedom in the face of the 
patriarchal mother.  
This thesis will now proceed to Chapter 1 where we will begin to develop a sense of the 
importance of Beauvoir’s own lived experience as a woman striving for independence to the 
development of her philosophy and literary writing. 
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Chapter One 
Writing Philosophy and Literature 
Introduction 
How might we imagine the body of the independent woman through the philosophy of Simone de 
Beauvoir? Is it even possible to imagine an embodied independent woman in Beauvoir’s terms? In 
The Second Sex (2011) Beauvoir represents the independent woman as a complex, contradictory 
figure. She is both the goal to which the oppressed woman should aspire in order to be released 
from the conditions of her oppression, but she is at best only a partial solution to the problem of the 
oppression of women. Beauvoir’s estimation of woman’s potential for authentic freedom under the 
structures of patriarchal capitalism is bleak in that she does not envisage it possible for woman to be 
free simply by occupying the spaces made available to them within those structures: the mother, the 
wife, the beauty, the obedient worker and so on. In order to obtain independence, woman is 
required to engage in a struggle against such predetermined situations in the effort to establish her 
own place within the world.  Beauvoir argues that woman must cultivate and discipline her mind to 
work toward the production of creative work as the means of transcending the negative aspects of 
her immanent situation. Let us not forget that Beauvoir’s argument is framed by her faithfulness to 
the existentialism of the mid-20th century and as such defines freedom strictly in terms that demand 
that subjectivity be won through a conscious engagement with one’s situation.  For woman, it is not 
enough to win freedom through measures such as obtaining the vote or participating in the paid 
workforce, for instance, even though these are important steps in the process of overcoming 
oppression.  These measures assist women to independence but they are not in and of themselves 
those that define the independent woman; this is because it is not enough for a woman to claim 
independence by standing in the footprints made by men. Woman is required to carve out her own 
position, to mark her existence in the world with a signature that is recognizably her own. So, as we 
shall see, Beauvoir’s independent woman represents something other than “having it all” in that it 
requires woman to take responsibility for what she already has in the place that she finds herself and 
to take responsibility for a creative reworking of that situation.  
To become an independent woman on Beauvoir’s terms means undertaking an ongoing 
process towards freedom that has no predetermined destination in sight. There is no blueprint for 
this process of becoming an independent woman and this is not a weakness of Beauvoir’s argument, 
rather it is the whole point. Existentialism is premised on the idea that “existence precedes essence” 
and this is reflected in Beauvoir’s ground breaking idea from The Second Sex (2011) that “One is 
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not born, but rather becomes, woman” (p. 283). While the woman that one may eventually become 
may resemble any number of the stereotypes used by Beauvoir in The Second Sex to show how the 
lived experience of woman is represented under patriarchy, it is the ‘becoming’ aspect of her claim 
to which Beauvoir’s independent woman refers. To be an independent woman means to consciously 
engage in a continual process of active resistance against discursive, socially constructed definitions 
of the body that claim to determine what it means to be a woman. The narrative of woman in a 
patriarchal society is mapped out through a series of biological ‘stages’ that represent the destiny of 
all women: namely menstruation, pregnancy and menopause. While it may appear that resistance is 
futile against the sheer force of the development of the body, there exists the possibility for 
alternative narratives about woman’s experience of the relationship with her body in its unique 
material form. So even though Beauvoir’s independent woman is represented as an intellectual, her 
resistance is not confined to the domain of her mind in opposition to her body, but rather her mind 
works to shape the materiality of her situation that logically includes the materiality of her body. It 
can be said that the body of the woman precedes the becoming of woman in the form of myth 
(including science); however, the presence of this already-there body is virtually invisible to the 
lived experience of woman hence the need for the disciplining of the mind to critically cut through 
the ideology that shrouds the body of woman in mystifications.1 
This chapter will lay the foundation for an interpretation of the representations of the 
independent woman in a reading of The Second Sex with the early short story collection When 
Things of the Spirit Come First (1983).  In this chapter I will consider how the relationship between 
the role of the writer and the role of the philosopher represents a position of ambiguity occupied by 
Beauvoir through which she develops the parameters for her analysis of the problem of representing 
the female body in her literary and philosophical work. This chapter will introduce Beauvoir’s 
phenomenological approach to philosophising about the lived experience of woman and the 
questions this raises about the possibility of representing an embodied independent woman.  Here I 
will argue that the relationship between the writer and the philosopher as it pertains to Beauvoir’s 
body of work, works as a model to understanding Beauvoir’s conception of the independent 
woman. I will also begin to explore how the independent woman is key to the interpretation of 
Beauvoir’s literary and philosophical writing.  
1	Sally Scholz (2001) argues ““Mystification” is the term Beauvoir uses to indicate the situation of 
women … Most women, according to Beauvoir, are convinced that their condition on the margins of 
culture is natural. Numerous myths and social structures are employed by patriarchal culture to sustain the 
impression that woman is destined to domestic and family life” (p. 336).
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1.1 A writer and philosopher 
In this section we shall think about why we should be interested in the scholarly discussion 
surrounding Beauvoir’s entry into the philosophical canon. How is the question as to whether she is 
properly a writer or a philosopher relevant to our understating of Beauvoir’s conception of the 
independent woman? Firstly, I argue for its importance because the discussion sets out some 
parameters for a consideration as to how women are included and excluded from the domains of 
truth-making. To write fiction and to write philosophy is to write in the midst of a binary between 
the real and unreal, myth and science, imagination and reason: in other words, a space in which the 
expression of the reality of one’s lived experience is in a perpetual encounter with the 
objectification of that experience through patriarchal discourse and scientific objectification of 
women. To be caught in this binary is to constantly struggle for the authority of one’s own 
embodied experience. Secondly, I argue the binary between writer and philosopher offers an entry 
point into Beauvoir’s reasoning as to how the philosophical is constituted in her work through her 
decision not to identify herself as a philosopher per se.  Yet, paradoxically as we shall see as this 
thesis progresses, it is the writing with, and inversion of, the concepts provided by philosophers 
such as Hegel and Marx that enables Beauvoir to recognise how the freedom she finds in the 
givenness of her situation, is actually a mystification of patriarchal capitalism.2 Finally, it should be 
noted that Beauvoir herself did not seek recognition in the canon: rather it has occurred through 
scholarly revision of her work since her death. This in itself is a testament to the desire of feminist 
philosophers to change the nature of western philosophy: not just to include a female in the ranks, 
but to challenge its foundations through the inclusion of feminist philosophies that formulate 
questions, not only to interrogate patriarchal society, but philosophy itself. Beauvoir’s rejection of 
the title of philosopher can be read as holding philosophy to account. 
So, while it is the case that Beauvoir is now accepted as a philosopher3 the problem of the 
woman philosopher and intellectual is still an issue for the contemporary woman seeking her own 
2	This point will be developed in an ongoing way as I engage more thoroughly with the primary 
texts in the later chapters. I provide an example below where Beauvoir structures her description of 
a stage of her life as a young woman in terms that are resonant with Hegel’s ideas in Philosophy of 
Right. I will discuss the use of resonance later in this chapter in relation to a discussion about the 
interpretation of the fragments of Heraclitus by Charles Kahn (1979). I support the reading of 
capitalism by Mark Fisher in Capitalist Realism: is there no alternative? (2009) where he argues 
that capitalism “is more like a pervasive atmosphere, conditioning not only the production of 
culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier 
constraining thought and action” (p. 16, italics in the original). 3	See Debra Bergoffen (2014) entry in the recent Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy where she 
argues, “Simone de Beauvoir is one of these belatedly acknowledged philosophers. Identifying 
herself as an author rather than as a philosopher and calling herself the midwife of Sartre's 
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independence through independent thought. Beauvoir is certainly the model for the independent 
woman in that she has constantly worked at developing her mind and her ideas in order to remake 
her world anew out of the ashes of her privileged middle class Catholic upbringing. For instance, 
her desire to create a future for herself not contingent on marriage and class induced a sharp sense 
of her difference from other young women with whom she studied at the Sorbonne. It was a 
situation characterised by the ambiguity that would eventually form the basis of her philosophical 
questioning in Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter: 
My parents, helping to push me, not into marriage, but into a career, were breaking with 
tradition; nevertheless they still made me conform to it; there was never any question of 
letting me go anywhere without them, nor of releasing me from family duties (Beauvoir 
1982, p. 174).  
Beauvoir here shows patriarchal values structuring the woman’s entry into economic activity by 
keeping her enmeshed in the rituals of class. Even from a relatively privileged class position the 
move to economic independence occurs within the strictures of that class. As this break with 
tradition becomes a reality Beauvoir realises that she is a prisoner of something in addition to her 
family and the rituals and customs of middle classes: 
Cut off from my past, I felt out of place; my life seemed out of joint, and I had still not 
discovered any really broad new horizons. Up to now, I had made the best of living in a 
cage, for I knew that one day—and each day brought it nearer—the door of the cage would 
open; now I had got out of the cage, and I was still inside (1982, pp. 174-5). 
The idea that she could escape from a cage yet still remain inside it, recalls Hegel’s categorisation 
of the structure of ethical life in Philosophy of Right (2010) where we trace the progress of the 
individual towards freedom from family through to civil society and then the state. However, this 
passage for Beauvoir from one realm to the next is one that, far from delivering her the freedom she 
desired, instead reveals the extent to which her capacity for freedom is constrained. However, it is 
only in the movement induced through breaking with tradition that the nature of the shackles 
becomes comprehensible. Beauvoir’s account of the experience of creating her own future shows us 
one of the reasons why economic independence is not necessarily that which houses, nor through 
which one derives the total authority of one’s own experience: that is, while economic 
existential ethics rather than a thinker in her own right, Beauvoir's place in philosophy had to be 
won against her word. That place is now uncontested”. 
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independence is important as a means of escaping some forms of oppression, this kind of 
independence does not in itself provide the solutions to other kinds of oppression, such as the 
objectification of the female body for instance.4 This is because economic activity is not a neutral 
zone or a “level playing field” through which one is free to remake oneself in the spirit of the “self-
made man”, rather it is realm of activity that is systematically founded on hierarchies of inclusions 
and exclusions that work to advantage the freedom of some over the freedom of others. The 
independent woman, then, is not prevented from participating in economic activity or civil society; 
however, in order to obtain and retain authority over the meaning of her lived experience, the 
independence gained through such participation will always be contingent upon her adherence to 
socio-political and cultural values that structure her situation. Life, upon the rejection of God for 
instance, opens a void in which Beauvoir’s place in the world is no longer guaranteed: 
I had been driven out of the paradise of childhood and had not found my place in the world 
of men. I had set myself up in the absolute in order to gaze down upon this world which was 
rejecting me; now, if I wanted to act, to write a book, to express myself, I would have to go 
back down there; but my contempt had annihilated it, and I could see nothing but emptiness 
all around me. The fact is that I had not yet put my hand to the plough. Love, action, literary 
work: all I did was roll these ideas round in my head; I was fighting in an abstract fashion 
against abstract possibilities… (Beauvoir 1982, p. 229). 
Sally Scholz (2001) argues that Beauvoir “links the project of writing with freedom both for 
the individual writer and for others as the writer’s project discloses the world and opens up the 
future” (p. 335).  Scholz says this proposal is controversial in that it leads to charges that Beauvoir 
is elitist in designating the independent woman as a literary writer: “many readers see in Beauvoir’s 
suggestion a justification for her own life’s work” (p. 335). So how does Beauvoir justify her 
4	This point recognises that there are many feminisms. In One Dimensional Woman (2009), Nina 
Power argues that capitalism has no need to discriminate against women as workers provided the 
job is done and profit is extracted (p. 5). She argues that the “inclusion of women into the labor 
force has brought about unprecedented changes in the way we understand the ‘role’ of women, the 
capacity of women to live independent lives and the way in which women participate in the 
economy more generally. Of course, women have always worked, that is to say, raised children, 
tended to the home, grown crops etc., and how different the history of the world would have been 
had this been from the start regarded as labor to be rewarded. Nevertheless, as Marx notes, it is only 
when women enter work ‘outside the sphere of the domestic economy’ that transformations in 
relations between the sexes, the composition of families and so on, really start to happen” (p.17 
emphasis in the original). 
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project as a writer as being something that has significance for all women?5 Why does she not 
simply specify individual choice as the determining characteristic for independence, for instance?  I 
argue that for Beauvoir, writing has the capacity to mobilise women en masse. In speaking about 
why she writes for and about the oppression of women in language that is clearly a legacy from 
Beauvoir, feminist Sheila Rowbotham in Women, Resistance and Revolution: A History of Women 
and Revolution in the Modern World (2014) says: 
I am not (however) speaking for anyone. What I write is simply a contribution to a 
permanent communication, which comes from me personally but only exists because of 
other women. An individual woman who appears as the spokeswoman for the freedom of all 
women is a pathetic and isolated creature. She is inevitably either crushed or contained as a 
sexual performer. No woman can stand alone and demand liberation for others because by 
doing so she takes away from other women the capacity to organize and speak for 
themselves (p. 12). 
Beauvoir’s work on the relationship between philosophy and literature is underpinned by her 
conviction that it was the best way to engender communication across situations of difference and 
this includes situations predicated on class differences. Beauvoir opens her 1964 essay ‘What Can 
Literature Do?’ (2014) with “For me, literature is an activity carried out by men, for men, in order 
to disclose the world to them, this disclosure being an action” (p. 197). For Beauvoir, literature is a 
search for truth, and the work of communication literature does, and its capacity to reveal the truth 
of the world means it opens the way for freedom. She argues “situations are not closed to each 
other. We are not monads. Each situation is open onto all the others and it is open onto the world, 
which is nothing other than the swirling [tournoiement] of all these situations which envelop each 
other” (p. 199). To write, then, is to bring situations in to play with each other through the 
communicative action of literature.  
5 In her interview with Alice Jardine (1979) Beauvoir is asked where she stands in relation to 
contemporary French feminisms that are derived from the philosophies of Lacan and Derrida. 
Jardine says that “From our first conversation in 1973, it became clear that Beauvoir had not 
essentially changed her position since The Second Sex. Although I sensed a certain hesitation or 
ambivalence in her conception of women’s relationship to language and literature, her attitude to 
those who posit woman as “elsewhere” remains strong and unflinching” (p. 225).  On the question 
of the possibility of a distinctively ‘feminine’ language posited by Hélène Cixous and Catherine 
Clement, Beauvoir argues “I believe we must use language. If it is used in a feminist perspective, 
with a feminist sensibility, language will find itself changed in a feminist manner. It will 
nonetheless be the language. You can’t not use this universal instrument; you can’t create an 
artificial language, in my opinion. But naturally, each writer must use it in his/her own way. If the 
writer is a woman, feminist or not, it will give the language something that it would not have if it 
had been used by a man” (p. 230) 
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Beauvoir has written in various genres; however the core of each of her texts is essentially 
concerned with the problem of how the self-determining individual can ethically negotiate the 
encounter with the circumstances of oppression in his or her particular situation without 
contributing to the oppression of others.  Beauvoir approaches the problem of how to take 
responsibility for one’s own freedom in the face of oppression from within the conceptual and 
thematic framework offered by existential philosophy.  Her main intellectual task is the focus on 
finding ways to unravel the apparent contradiction within existentialism as to how to reconcile the 
concept of freedom as entailing an ontological requirement that an individual must choose with the 
development of an ethics that refuses to dictate or prescribe how that choice should be made. So, 
while Beauvoir has made significant contributions to both literature and philosophy through her 
writing on existentialism and ethics in both disciplines, the problem of how to judge her work as a 
whole arises precisely because she chooses to traverse the boundaries of each discipline and thus 
elude definitive capture by the gatekeepers of each.   Is she a philosopher or a writer; should her 
work be judged by the standards of philosophy or literature? Or should we develop a new category 
through which to examine her work?6 
Beauvoir has also contributed to this situation through her own proclamations on the issue.  
Beauvoir’s claim that she is not a philosopher is often quoted from a 1985 interview with Margaret 
Simons (1999) on the question of Sartre’s influence on her work: 
Anyhow, Sartre was a philosopher, and me, I am not; and I never really wanted to be a 
philosopher.  I like philosophy very much, but I have not constructed a philosophical work. I 
constructed a literary work. I was interested in novels, in memoirs, in essays such as The 
Second Sex. But this is not philosophy. On the philosophical plane, I was influenced by 
Sartre. Obviously, I was not able to influence him, since I did not do philosophy” (p. 9). 
However, as Heinämaa (2003) shows, that particular statement from Beauvoir cannot be taken as an 
absolute rejection of the role of the philosopher because Beauvoir also stated:  
While I say that I’m not a philosopher in the sense that I am not the creator of a system, I’m 
still a philosopher in the sense that I’ve studied a lot of philosophy, I have a degree in 
6 In Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference (2003), Sara Heinämaa argues that a major 
reason for the “neglect of Beauvoir’s philosophy is the psychologising attitude that dominates 
interpretations of women’s intellectual works.  Women’s artistic and scientific achievements have 
traditionally been studied in the context of their personal lives… they have been seen merely as 
reflections of women’s emotional attachments and social relations” (p. 2). 
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philosophy, I’ve taught philosophy, I’m infused with philosophy; and when I put philosophy 
in my books it’s because that’s a way for me to view the world…” (p. 5).  
If philosophy is a way for Beauvoir to “view the world”, then perhaps we can think of her 
relationship between literature and philosophy as a relationship of action wherein philosophy 
generates the action of viewing that produces the impetus for communication through literary work. 
In other words, philosophy and literature are entwined in Beauvoir’s work, because together they 
can be used as tools for revolutionary change. 
1.2 Beauvoir’s body of work 
In this thesis I will not argue for a new framework of analysis per se through which to examine 
Beauvoir’s body of writing, because a hybrid framework consisting of philosophical and literary 
analysis potentially diminishes the existing explanatory and analytic power of each. Each discipline 
achieves its power through its own internal methodological structures that produce its distinctive 
identity, so these structures cannot be simply merged.  Nor is it possible to use both methods of 
analysis side by side, because this will tend to produce an incoherent view of the work.  This is 
because philosophy and literary analysis are doing different things: broadly speaking philosophy 
seeks to understand the reality of the world, whereas literary analysis looks to understand the reality 
of the text.  But we could also say that philosophy and literary analysis perceive the text as different 
kinds of objects. While I will revisit the problems raised here about the relationship between 
philosophy and literature as the thesis progresses, at this stage of the thesis, I propose to simply 
approach Beauvoir’s work from a philosophical perspective that recognises the body of work as the 
product of her philosophical engagement with the world.  In doing so, I argue that Beauvoir’s 
manner of being philosophical and doing philosophy is an outcome of an engagement that is not 
only political, but also phenomenological and, as such, it is appropriate to consider her literary texts 
alongside her philosophical texts as forming a coherent philosophical engagement in understanding 
the reality of the world.  However, in designating Beauvoir’s approach as phenomenological it is 
not to say her work is simply an account of her experience of her life in which philosophical claims 
are used to justify that experience. Nor does Beauvoir use her experience as a model to didactically 
assert the correct way of living an ethically good life. Instead, I am suggesting that Beauvoir’s 
intention is to produce the literary work as the means through which to engage the other in a project 
that aims to secure the freedom of the other.  The literary work becomes the medium through which 
the voice of philosophy is heard.  However, I do not mean this in the sense that this is the way for 
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the philosopher to communicate his or her own voice to the other, but that the literary work enables 
the voice of philosophy to become immanent to the other.  
The literary work can be experienced as a ‘voice of philosophy’ because it communicates, 
not simply a message, but a particular state of being. I am using the idea of the voice because it is 
suggestive of sound and sound has the character of travel in the sense that sound travels as it is a 
movement from one place to another. And I argue that this is also the case for the literary work, in 
that our reception of its disclosures is shaped through the sense of arrival that the voice produces: 
that is, our experience of literature is more than our experience of the words alone. The movement 
of the words in the process of communication appear to heighten the sense of the meaning of the 
words, that is, words are experienced through the intellect, but also experienced by other means: 
this could include the senses and the unconscious. I identify this voice as a philosophical voice, 
because a part of what is disclosed through the literary work is the impulsion toward a questioning 
of one’s situation.  I argue that Beauvoir intends this voice of philosophy to be manifested in the 
other as an experience of truth that attests to the actuality of his or her own existence and that this 
experience frames the possibility of a self-determined open future.  In the case of the independent 
woman, this voice supplants the voice of the punishing super-ego embedded in patriarchy, during 
the experience of reading at least, and ultimately offers a means through which to recognise the 
presence of patriarchal values in the structure of one’s situation.  
The originality of the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir is often lost in the recurring 
debates about whether or not she is properly a philosopher or a writer of fiction and this is relevant 
to the understanding of the independent woman because, for the woman to have authority over her 
embodied experience, the originality of her voice must be recognised.  To say that originality can 
only exist in one specialised, tightly policed domain of communication is to exclude large areas of 
human experience from claims about how reality is constituted. Beauvoir’s practice of working 
across a range of genres of writing tends to raise questions about whether the subject of the writing 
can be legitimised by the conventions of the genre in which it is placed.  For example, can the 
ethical theory put forth in The Blood of Others be legitimated as philosophy given that it is 
embedded in the conventions of the novel?7  Is the theory of the existence of the other found in She 
Came to Stay, for instance, a legitimate theory given its location?8 The problem, in part, arises 
7	See Eleanore Holveck  (1999), “The Blood of Others: A Novel Approach to The Ethics of 
Ambiguity” where she argues the lived experience of the main female character, Helene Bertrand, in 
the novel provides the basis of the feminist work in The Second Sex rather than the more abstract 
theory found in The Ethics of Ambiguity.  8	See Kate Fullbrook & Edward Fullbrook (1993), Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre: The 
Remaking of a Twentieth-Century Legend on the influence of Beauvoir’s metaphysics in She Came 
to Stay on the development of Sartre’s metaphysics in Being and Nothingness. They argue that 
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because Beauvoir’s methodology entails a kind of writing that is out of place when measured 
against prevailing conventions of philosophical writing.  The disciplinary mandate to impose a 
system upon new ideas in order to legitimate the reality they express means that multiple meanings 
of the world are repressed or subdued through dominant sets of disciplinary constraints and 
conventions that shape the means of expression.  Such constraints upon expression, then, have the 
appearance of a political repression of alternative meanings rather than a fidelity to a particular 
method of philosophical truth.   While Beauvoir’s method of doing philosophy through writing in 
literary genres as opposed to writing systematic philosophical treatises emphasises a subjective 
view of meaning, she does not jettison the objective or abstract point of view; instead her method is 
a process that seeks an understanding of lived concrete reality in universal terms.  For Beauvoir, 
subjective lived experience is the foundation of any philosophical system and, in using the creative 
capacities concomitant with the embodiment of the role of the writer, she takes her own experience 
as the starting point for disclosing how philosophy is made in, and is the result of, the lived 
experience of everyday life. 
1.3 Phenomenological method and philosophical influences 
The source of Beauvoir’s method is located in the phenomenological tradition.  Broadly speaking 
phenomenology is the “study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first person 
point of view” (Smith 2013) originating in the work of Edmund Husserl.  Scholars tend to attribute 
various combinations of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as the primary influences 
upon the development of Beauvoir’s phenomenological method and this thesis will engage with 
these scholars in due course.  However, as a precursor to those discussions, it will be useful to 
establish a sense of the way Beauvoir’s method operates through some general observations about 
her phenomenological approach that do not proceed from the question of influences.  This will be a 
productive way to arrive at a holistic impression of Beauvoir’s manner of working in order to 
generate new measures of the legacy of her work.  Questions of philosophical influences help locate 
the work in relation to the history and traditions of philosophy and, in doing so, also presumably 
aim to settle questions as to whether Beauvoir’s work can be rightly considered as philosophy. 
However, the matter of precisely determining her philosophical influences will not in itself define 
the nature of Beauvoir’s own influence on the development of a different form of philosophical 
enquiry. Beauvoir’s approach to creating philosophy out of lived experience opens the field of 
philosophical enquiry to others who have historically been excluded from the practice of 
Beauvoir’s work precedes Sartre’s and that Sartre developed his philosophy through an 
interpretation of Beauvoir’s work. 
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philosophy.9 In relating the influence of Beauvoir upon her own entry into the field of philosophy, 
Eleanore Holveck in Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Lived Experience: Literature and 
Metaphysics (2002) describes the way Beauvoir’s work cut through her working class background 
in Pittsburgh USA: 
 
Maybe Simone de Beauvoir was not a housemaid herself, but she came to visit us. And she 
wrote about us with appreciation. From the time that the young Marguerite in When Things 
of the Spirit Come First threw in her lot with café musicians and a bleached blonde whore, 
Beauvoir showed an appreciation for proletariat women. Beauvoir’s approach to philosophy 
as lived experience is most suitable to working-class women in the United States; it is here, 
after all, a political leader, named herself a philosopher, Sojourner Truth (p. 12). 
 
The first problem encountered when attempting to characterise Beauvoir’s philosophy is a 
tendency to categorise and divide her writing according to genre.   This method gives rise to the 
temptation to piece together a semblance of a systematic philosophy across the body of work. Given 
that Beauvoir eschewed writing this kind of philosophy, it is unlikely that this method will generate 
an accurate account as to what it is that Beauvoir precisely does in doing philosophy.  An 
alternative method might be to treat her individual works as self-contained fragments that were not 
necessarily envisaged as forming a connecting whole; rather they may be seen as the outcome of the 
effort of doing philosophy within a phenomenological framework that, by way of illustration, 
references the philosophical practice of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus.10 This could 
mean thinking about Beauvoir as a philosopher engaged and committed to a disclosure that takes 
place within a continuous unfolding of the lived experience of time. Charles Kahn’s approach in 
The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (1979) to translating and interpreting Heraclitus’ fragments is 
useful for beginning to think about different approaches to interpreting Beauvoir’s philosophy in its 
literary form.  In giving his reasons for the particular way he has ordered Heraclitus’s fragments, 
Kahn says that it is impossible to reinterpret the fragments in order to determine the absolute 
meaning of the words:  
 																																																								
9 See Nancy Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism (2001) for her discussion of the 
emergence relationship between women and philosophy in The Second Sex. 
10 Beauvoir’s philosophical method can be discerned in relation to Heraclitus in a number of 
aspects: the focus on ambiguity in human activity grounded in everyday life as opposed to abstract 
principles that seek to define that life; the emphasis on becoming; and the desire that the work of 
philosophy be productive of justifiable change in the real world: see Daniel W. Graham, 
‘Heraclitus’ in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://www.iep.utm.edu/heraclit/ > 
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(Heraclitus) will speak to us only insofar as we are able to articulate his meaning in our own 
terms.  The text is there, as a kind of object-language. But it is we who must provide the 
hermeneutical metalanguage within which today’s interpretation can be formulated.  The 
text will not bring forth its own contemporary commentary (1979, p. 88). 
Kahn creates an interpretive framework based upon the linguistic density and resonance he finds in 
the fragments.  These phenomena become the interpretive basis through which he orders the 
fragments, although paradoxically, Kahn argues that the particular order of the fragments is actually 
not necessary to understand Heraclitus because even though his arrangement of the fragments is 
“conjectural and controversial. It also turns out to be dispensable, in the sense that anyone who 
accepts the other two principles (linguistic density and resonance) may reach the same over-all 
interpretation of Heraclitus” (p. 89).  Kahn’s interpretive strategy can be summarized as follows: 
By linguistic density I mean the phenomenon by which a multiplicity of ideas are expressed 
in a single word or phrase. By resonance I mean a relationship between fragments by which 
a single verbal theme echoed from one text to another in such a way that the meaning of 
each is enriched when they are understood together. These two principles are 
complementary: resonance is one factor making for the density of any particular text; and 
conversely, it is because of density of the text that resonance is possible and meaningful 
(Kahn 1979, p. 89 emphasis in the original). 
So while we may approach Beauvoir’s work from the point of view that it exemplifies a 
choice to be either a writer or a philosopher, it could be more fruitful to think about Beauvoir 
engaged in a process of being a writer in order to become a philosopher—a philosopher for whom 
the mastery of language in its broadest sense is necessary to formulate the fullness of philosophical 
insights into ordinary human experience. As a writer, Beauvoir is skilled in the use of literary 
technique to communicate her philosophical ideas in other ways that exceed the prescriptiveness of 
the didactic tract. The example of Kahn’s approach to finding the philosophical meaning in the 
literary text is useful in relation to Beauvoir’s body of work in that it provides an alternative way of 
construing particular meanings across her work that need not necessarily rely on questions about the 
chronological development of the idea. Instead, we could take Kahn’s use of resonance, for 
instance, and look at the kinds of metaphors Beauvoir uses to describe the relationship between self 
and other in both philosophical and literary texts. This could lead to a more nuanced understanding 
of Beauvoir’s perception of the other.  In all probability there is an unlimited number of ways in 
which to interpret Beauvoir’s work as a whole, and Kahn’s approach is but one example; however, 
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his point that we need to create our own hermeneutical framework to bring forth the work into 
contemporary discourse, is a good one. 
So, if we are to think of Beauvoir as a writer in the process of becoming a philosopher 
through the work she produces, how does she characterise the philosophical nature of the writing?  
Beauvoir argues in her essay ‘Literature and Metaphysics’ (2014) that 
it is not by chance if existentialist thought today attempts to express itself sometimes by 
theoretical treatises and sometimes by fiction; it is because it is an effort to reconcile the 
objective and the subjective, the absolute and the relative, the timeless and the historical (p. 
274). 
This statement captures something of the spirit of the task of what it means to be a philosopher in 
Beauvoir’s terms: that the work of the philosopher should be concentrated upon elucidating 
philosophical issues by way of reference to contemporary discourse.  This means that the 
philosopher needs to do more than reflect upon traditional philosophical problems in order to keep 
standard readings of the history of philosophy afloat. Rather, the philosopher has a responsibility to 
extend their sphere of concern to identifying new ways to express the problem of bringing together, 
yet not necessarily resolving, the recurring philosophical problems that characterise the formation 
of human relations.  The work of the philosopher in Beauvoir’s view involves bringing forth an 
expression of human relations that is derived from the processes of doing philosophy.  The effort to 
reconcile the philosophical tensions Beauvoir identifies is not simply the work of the individual 
mind of the philosopher to find ‘solutions’ to these problems; rather the work in finding the 
appropriate expression for that which appears irreconcilable is the work of creating and extending a 
community committed to enacting the philosophical principles of existential freedom. Beauvoir 
achieves this by bringing women into this community through her literary work and philosophy. 
1.4 The committed writer 
It would be remiss not to mention the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre in connection with Beauvoir’s 
work given their lifelong philosophical partnership. This section will consider Sartre’s influence in 
terms of the committed writer and their differing interpretations about the way writing can produce 
changes in the world. The committed writer is important to the notion of the independent woman 
because the committed writer works within a collective exercise of political activism against 
oppressive powers. While Beauvoir and Sartre differ in the way they do philosophy, they are united 
under the concept of the committed writer.  The committed writer produces work not only for its 
aesthetic value, but also for its political effect upon the world.  Committed writing is a form of 
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action that seeks to bring into consciousness the conditions that support oppression and address the 
effects of oppression.  According to Sartre in What is Literature? (2001), the committed writer has: 
chosen to reveal the world and particularly to reveal man to other men so that the latter may 
assume full responsibility before the object which has thus been laid bare. It is assumed that 
no one is ignorant of the law because there is a code and because the law is written down; 
thereafter, you are free to violate it, but you know the risks you run. Similarly, the function 
of the writer is to act in such a way that nobody can be ignorant of the world and that 
nobody may say that he is innocent of what it’s all about. And since he has once committed 
himself in the universe of language, he can never again pretend that he cannot speak (p. 15). 
In Simone de Beauvoir and the Limits of Commitment (1981), Anne Whitmarsh argues that even 
though Beauvoir and Sartre are both known for their political activism, “the paradoxical truth is that 
until the second world war both Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre eschewed political action and 
indeed that, although they believed themselves to be situated on the left, they felt no commitment to 
politics, only to literature” (p. 3). There is a suggestion in this of an almost evolutionary character to 
their movement in political action. Operating within the framework of the existential mandate for 
choice, responsibility and authenticity, Beauvoir and Sartre demonstrate how acting within these 
principles structures the concrete becoming of the committed writer.  Writing is an action upon the 
world that aims to change it; however, there are some differences in attitude between Beauvoir and 
Sartre towards the use of language that is important in showing Beauvoir’s originality. 
It will now be useful to examine a key work each from Beauvoir and Sartre in an attempt to 
arrive at an understanding as to what the philosophical position of each towards the issue of the 
relationship of writing to philosophy may mean for the development of new methods of doing 
philosophy.11 Each of the two essays under consideration here is written during the same historical 
period, that is, during the rebuilding of France in the post-war of the mid-1940s.  Each writer is 
responding to various claims by various critics that the writing each is trying to produce represents 
a kind of contamination of existing forms of literature. For example, in the introduction to 
‘Literature and Metaphysics’ (Beauvoir, 2004a), Margaret Simons refers to critic Dominique Aury 
and Maurice Blanchot’s criticism of Beauvoir’s The Blood of Others for being a “thesis novel” (p. 
264).  According to David Caute (Introduction, Sartre 2001), Sartre faced a barrage of criticism for 
his literary work from French Communists who described him as a “‘hermetic philosopher’, a 
‘nauseous writer and a demagogue’ (p. xix). French Marxist philosopher Roger Garaudy spoke of 
11	Simone de Beauvoir, ‘Literature and Metaphysics’ (2014) and Jean-Paul Sartre, What is 
Literature? (2000). 
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his ‘literary fornications’” (ibid.).  The criticism raises the question of judgment: who judges the 
value of the literature if it is infused with philosophy; who judges the value of the philosophy if it is 
embedded in literary terms?  The combining of literature and philosophy indicates, on the one hand, 
a kind of anarchy in that each writer is choosing to write outside the established rules; however; 
charged with making their own rules for philosophy and literature puts them beyond the modifying 
power of the established rules of critical judgment.  While a radical step for each, it is particularly 
significant for Beauvoir in being a woman choosing to work on her own terms – a point that will be 
explored further in relation to the inception of The Second Sex later in the thesis. 
Beauvoir conceives the committed writer in the form of the author of the metaphysical 
novel.  She is answering criticisms that the metaphysical novel cannot succeed as either literature or 
philosophy because each form of writing has its own conventions and, as such, to combine them in 
the one form will result in the failure of both.  Beauvoir defends her argument that the novel can be 
an appropriate vehicle for the production of thinking philosophically, or an “adventure of the mind” 
(2004b, p. 272), by showing the importance of the writer’s attitude to whether or not a novel 
succeeds as metaphysical.  One of the main objections to the philosophical novel is that the 
introduction of any pre-established thesis or doctrine will inevitably cause the novel to fail on the 
plane of the imaginary.  Beauvoir argues that the metaphysical novel is not a deviation from the 
novelistic genre but rather its main aim is to grasp the relation of humans to the totality of their 
world and to communicate this situation to the reader.  Reality is not accessible solely through the 
intellect so the form of the novel is necessary to realise the fullness of the metaphysical situation 
through the inclusion of a temporally-based emotional register to the writing that can be 
experienced imaginatively.   
Beauvoir argues that both pure literature and pure philosophy individually fail to convey the 
“living unity and its fundamental living ambiguity” (2004b, p. 276) of the situation in which the 
author is writing.  The author is required to have a strong imagination and an inventive approach to 
produce a metaphysical novel that should be the basis of and/or outcome of a metaphysical 
experience testing the truth of itself through the writing.  The metaphysical novel is the 
communication of this experiment and as such can be seen as the communication of a truthful 
rendering of a shared reality. That Beauvoir’s particular phenomenological method is rooted in her 
own lived experience as it is shaped through her philosophical relationship with Sartre means that 
the reality expressed through the novel is, in part, Beauvoir’s way of sharing and, in the process, 
creating her philosophy.  
Before proceeding to a discussion of Sartre’s work in What is Literature? it should be noted, 
however, that Sartre’s understanding of the committed writer in this text is not his last word on the 
topic; rather it is the launching point for the ongoing theoretical work that attempts to identify and 
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justify a method to locate the essential meaning of the relation between individual and his or her 
situation in the linkages forged by the writer between literature and history.  In ‘Understanding the 
committed writer’ (1992), Rhiannon Goldthorpe describes Sartre’s method through the metaphor of 
a spiral as a way of showing the non-linear development of his approach to thinking about the 
meaning of the committed writer: 
The tracing of the spiral is fascinating, frustrating, and exemplary—fascinating because 
of the commitment and tenacity of Sartre’s arguments, frustrating because those 
arguments reach no conclusion, exemplary because the inconclusiveness is itself 
inherent in the problem and in the method of analysis: Sartre’s open-ended writing itself 
enacts an open dialectic (p. 140). 
Goldthorpe argues that Sartre’s method of thinking about the committed writer progressively 
develops in complexity through his later texts (p. 141). However, the open-ended style of his 
writing should not prevent us from taking his argument from this text to be meaningful in itself.  
While we may trace Sartre’s thinking as a progression, the end point of the work, or the summation 
of that work, should not necessarily supersede the importance of the earlier foundational work. This 
earlier work opens up the possibility to recognise the capacity to make changes in the real world.  
That is, the work of the writer is not confined to the imagination of its readers, but rather uses the 
imagination of the reader to promote changes in the real material conditions of the world of the 
reader.  
The committed writer, for Sartre in What is Literature (2000), is discussed in terms that 
distinguish the attitude towards the use of language by the prose writer from that of other artists 
such as poets, painters and musical composers as it relates to its potential to reshape the world.  
Sartre argues that the prose writer is better placed than other artists to convey the fullness of reality 
because the writer utilises words in their significatory function whereas other artists take the word 
as an object to be used in the creation of imaginary objects.  The prose writer uses words to 
construct sentences that together communicate meaning whereas the poet, for instance, uses the 
materiality of the word to make a phrase-object.  The problem with the poet’s use of language is 
that it invites the reader to stand outside language to view the object from a god’s eye perspective 
with the result that we are ever further removed from the initial emotional impetus for the creation 
of the work of art.  Sartre argues that we are always within language in the way we are within our 
bodies:  
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Language is our shell and our antennae; it protects us against others and informs us 
about them; it is a prolongation of our senses, a third eye which is going to look into our 
neighbour’s heart (p. 12). 
In this sense, then, the prose writer uses words as a form of action that arises through the disclosure 
of the world of our neighbour, but also a disclosure of the neighbour’s world to our neighbour and 
others.  Once the prose writer chooses not to present an impartial view of the world he or she is 
committed to the full responsibility of always choosing the correct words in order to precisely 
communicate the nature of the situation before him or her. 
For Sartre, the committed writer, in essence, forgoes the refuge of both innocence and 
silence in the face of knowing the proper place of the writer in relation to language and as such is 
always required to speak from that place: to name what is yet to be named, to find new language to 
describe contemporary situations, and to make clear what is opaque in the relations between objects 
in the world.  The nature of the commitment is one of assuming the responsibility for being a 
trustworthy ‘knower’ of the world.  This knowing seems to be primarily obtained through the 
practice of writing within a consciousness of the nature of the temporal world.  Sartre thinks that it 
is crucial to the building of new post-war realities that the priorities given to the preservation of the 
meanings of the literatures of the past be reordered through a greater value being placed on the 
work of the contemporary writer.  It is important that the contemporary writer does write about the 
contemporary world as it is, or as he or she experiences it as it is, because the writing is less likely 
to be focused on the abstractions used to create the semblance of a historically accurate past.  While 
the kind of writing endorsed by Beauvoir and Sartre may use fiction to convey the meaning of the 
present, the fiction enables the present to be grasped as a concrete reality through which the reader 
embodies that reality. The reader experiences the situation presented through the literary work to be 
his or her own, however, this is not simply a case of the fiction mirroring the readers own existing 
situation, rather the fiction extends the reader’s sense of the reality of his or her situation.12 
Embodiment takes the form of a pause in the certainty that appears as an effect of the experience of 
abstract linear time. The experience of reading literary fiction dissolves that certainty through the 
body as it is reorientated within the concerns, emotions and desires made real by the fiction.  The 
experience of reading Sartre’s 1938 novel Nausea, for example, may provide a reader with a real 
12 In Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology 
(1962), Maurice Natanson (1962) argues that it is a commonplace to “speak of a novel presenting a 
microcosm; but the meaning of this commonplace is far from clear, precisely because the meaning 
of “microcosm” is far from clear” (p. 88). Natanson argues that what “we ordinarily take for 
granted in daily life is rendered explicit by the constructive activity of fictive consciousness. Far 
from the literary microcosm reflecting the world, it reveals to us the experiential foundation of our 
world” (p. 96).  
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embodied sense of what it means to be immanent, or to simply be there without any meaning, that 
may not be apparent in ordinary, familiar everyday life. The fiction has the capacity to make 
ordinary life feel strange in order to understand one’s situation as multi-dimensional. 
Beauvoir speaks about the committed writer as someone who does not simply deliver some 
pre-digested view of reality to the reader for its value as entertainment; rather, the committed writer 
sets up the conditions for a genuine communication with the reader to take place.  While the author 
relies on literary techniques to orientate the reader to viewing or experiencing reality in a particular 
way, it does not necessarily follow that such techniques limit the nature of the communication.  The 
genuine author of the metaphysical novel does not write about abstract, logical principles and form 
these into doctrines of truths about reality; experimentation where the reality and truth of the 
experience is tested by the writing process itself: 
If he wants the reader to believe in the inventions he proposes, the novelist must first believe 
strongly enough in them himself to discover a meaning in them that will flow back into the 
original idea, a meaning that will suggest problems, new twists, and unforeseen 
developments. Thus, as the story unfolds, he sees truths appear that were previously 
unknown to him, questions whose solutions he does not possess (Beauvoir 2004b, p. 272). 
The setting to work of the communication through the work of art seems to be for the purpose of 
ensuring that communication does not become caught up in some endless self-referential loop 
between author and reader.   The author’s task is to open a permanent channel of communication to 
a not yet disclosed future, that is, the communication established between the author and reader is 
not confined within that relationship.  The dialogue between author and reader should open up the 
possibility for thinking about multiple futures.  This is not the author of a didactic novel instructing 
his or her readers as to how best behave in any pre-given situation.  Rather, the author of the 
metaphysical novel sets in motion a process of enquiry between author and reader on the question 
of freedom that potentially leads to an understanding of reality in its prismatic form. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to show how Beauvoir’s theory of female embodiment in The 
Second Sex is based in Beauvoir’s phenomenological method of describing lived experience that 
emerged out of her belief that systematic Western philosophy could not account for her experience 
as woman. I have introduced Beauvoir’s concept of the independent woman and have linked its 
inception to Beauvoir’s ideas about the metaphysical relationship between literature and 
philosophy. Beauvoir’s work is caught between writing and philosophy and this forms a paradigm 
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in which to situate thinking about the problem of the independent woman. This chapter has argued 
that woman both embodies and resists embodiment of patriarchal cultural and societal norms and 
values and the resultant ambiguity obscures the way woman’s freedom is actually limited within the 
social and cultural structures that define patriarchal capitalism.  This is why Beauvoir argues that to 
be an independent woman requires that the woman discipline her mind to critically question the 
socio-political pressure under which her situation is constructed. While Beauvoir was not always 
politically active prior to World War II, her early writing in When Things of the Spirit Come First, 
nevertheless demonstrates her political consciousness of the oppression of women that is derived 
from her own lived experience. Interpreting Beauvoir’s philosophy through the richness of her 
literary work offers the possibility that it will disclose other dimensions to her philosophical view of 
the world in which woman is situated.  
In the following chapter we will think through the way Beauvoir represents the independent 
woman in literature and philosophy. 
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Chapter Two 
Marguerite and The Independent Woman	
Introduction 
In this chapter I will think about the problems women face in the process of becoming independent 
through a reading of the short story ‘Marguerite’ from When Things of the Spirit Come First and the 
chapter ‘The Independent Woman’ from The Second Sex. Beauvoir thinks about these problems not 
through any abstract understanding as to what it means to be a free woman, but through 
characterisations of women who embody the contours of their everyday situations. If a woman is to 
become free she must grasp and understand her situation as that which constitutes her particular 
existence. For Beauvoir, there is no blanket remedy to overcoming oppression in women’s lives 
because we all exist in a situation. This is an important concept because the situation shapes one’s 
capacity for action towards freedom.  For Beauvoir, a situation is not only something outside of 
us—our external environment, our sociological position, our political and cultural milieu, for 
instance—but also something that exists as a part of ourselves—for example, through our attitudes 
and beliefs that are shaped by ideology.  
Beauvoir’s idea of freedom is one that is embodied and intimately connected with one’s 
concrete community. This means that there can be no recourse to abstract freedom in order to 
bypass one’s concrete situation; rather freedom must be fashioned out of one’s circumstances as 
one finds them. However, this should not be read as “making do with what you have” because that 
path may lead to a life lived in bad faith. To live in bad faith is, in part, to turn away from 
oppression and thus allow it to operate without challenge where there is the possibility for 
challenge. This is a way that ideological mystification can define a situation: it works through your 
belief that your situation is natural and unchangeable, it works with the idea that you are 
meaningfully a part of a grand plan of nature and through nature, a part of the grand plan of God, 
for instance.  Beauvoir wants us to see that the communities we belong to, and the circumstances 
that arise from them, are the results of human actions and therefore capable of being changed. 
In the story ‘Marguerite’ Beauvoir’s concentrates on the way Marguerite is constituted 
through her situation by focusing on the way Marguerite moves between domestic and public 
spaces. For Marguerite, the domestic is home to the bad faith of the spirit that she struggles to throw 
off through her movements through the sexually charged public spaces of Paris at night. Beauvoir’s 
‘Independent Woman’ from The Second Sex is, in effect, Marguerite’s corollary. Marguerite is the 
blueprint for thinking about what it means to break from the constraints of everyday living in bad 
faith. Beauvoir argues that the “free woman is just being born” (TSS, p. 751). However, rather than 
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this claim being a statement about the sociological situation of women in the late 1940s, it easily 
refers back to Marguerite about whom we might say that she is an independent woman imagined 
through Beauvoir in order that she be born. In other words, ‘The Independent Woman’ is not 
disciplinarily closed off from the literary ‘Marguerite’ because the adventure towards independence 
and the future that is embodied in Marguerite is made concrete and thus accessible to the 
philosophical imagination. 
The character Marguerite is more than a set of personality traits that serves the plot of the 
story, for instance; rather she is the descriptive outcome of Beauvoir’s phenomenological 
engagement with her own situation as a young woman growing up in a similar environment to that 
of Marguerite. The construction of Marguerite as a character is, in effect, the literary rendering of 
the universality of that situation. As can be seen in her theoretical writing on the constitution of the 
authentic writer in ‘Literature and Metaphysics’ (2004b), Beauvoir argues that the fusion of the 
literary and philosophical is the means through which the author is able to transform everyday lived 
experience into a representation imbued with universal meaning. For example, Beauvoir argues that 
The more keenly a philosopher underscores the role and value of subjectivity, the more he 
will be led to describe the metaphysical experience in its singular and temporal form. 
Kierkegaard not only resorts, like Hegel, to literary myths, but in Fear and Trembling, he 
recreates the story of Abraham’s sacrifice in a form that approaches the novelistic one, and 
in Diary of a Seducer, offers the original experience in its dramatic singularity (p. 274). 
That the short story is written prior to the theory in ‘Literature and Metaphysics’ does not diminish 
an interpretation of Beauvoir’s underlying intent in writing the fiction; rather I suggest that the 
fiction is the inception for the theory. That is, in dramatising her original experience through literary 
writing, Beauvoir lays the foundation for theory to emerge.  
The primary aim of this thesis is to explore how Beauvoir’s representations of the embodied 
woman reveals the work of the ideology of the patriarchy underlying the conceptualisation of 
freedom as it applies to woman. The overarching problem Beauvoir puts forward in The Second Sex 
is to answer the question “What is a woman?” (p. 5) to which Beauvoir responds that:  
Merely stating the problem suggests an immediate answer to me. It is significant that I pose 
it. It would never occur to a man to write a book on the singular situation of males in 
humanity. If I want to define myself, I first have to say, “I am a woman”; all other assertions 
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will arise from this basic truth. A man never begins by positing himself as an individual of a 
certain sex: that he is a man is obvious (ibid.).13 
The paradoxical differences that exist between woman and man in relation to how each perceives 
the relationship between self and sex becomes evident when we examine Beauvoir’s representation 
of the embodied independent woman in The Second Sex and in ‘Marguerite’. In both texts there is a 
noticeable lack of uniformity or “wholeness” in such representations. This suggests that the 
independent woman as she is often imagined to exist does not actually exist other than in the 
popular imaginary. Instead, the independent woman is shown to be a concept, or a notion of that 
which is possible to imagine, but difficult to locate in everyday life.  
2.1 The independent woman and work 
The chapter ‘The Independent Woman’ is, in many ways, a response to the social, political and 
legal constraints on women in France; particularly in terms of the way these institutions restrict 
women’s access to activities that serve to engender a formal kind of female autonomy. However, 
Beauvoir problematises this discussion by showing that, even though it is necessary to reform such 
institutions, the struggle for independence also entails transcendence at the level of the body 
because the body is the site through which patriarchal enculturation takes place. So, while Beauvoir 
argues that in order to begin the process of becoming free, a woman needs to be economically 
independent of the male (TSS, p. 721), it is not enough to have any kind of job to declare that 
freedom has been won: 
In today’s work, without even mentioning women who work on the land, most working 
women do not escape the traditional feminine world; neither society nor their husbands give 
them the help needed to become, in concrete terms, the equals of men.  Only those women 
with political convictions, active in trade unions, who are confident in the future, can give 
an ethical meaning to the thankless daily labor; but as women deprived of leisure time and 
inheriting a tradition of submissiveness, it is understandable that they are just beginning to 
develop their political and social awareness (TSS, p. 722). 
13 See Toril Moi, What is a Woman? And Other Essays (1999) for her challenge to the sex/gender 
distinction used by many feminists to theorise the body and subjectivity. She argues, “no amount or 
rethinking of the concepts of sex and gender will produce a good theory of the body or subjectivity. 
The distinction between sex and gender is simply irrelevant to the task of producing a concrete, 
historical understanding of what it means to be a woman (or a man) in a given society. No feminist 
has produced a better theory of the embodied, sexually different human being than Simone de 
Beauvoir in The Second Sex” (pp. 4-5). 
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The woman who has “gained economic and social autonomy as a profession” (TSS, p. 723) is 
considered by some feminists to have succeeded in achieving equality with men (ibid.); however 
Beauvoir argues that even the professional woman must overcome the fact of being a woman in a 
patriarchal society. She argues that the professional woman’s 
commitment to and focus on her profession depend on the context of her life as a whole. 
And, when she starts her adult life, she does not have the same past as a boy; society does 
not see her with the same eyes; she has a different perspective on the universe. Being a 
woman poses unique problems to an autonomous human being today (TSS, p. 723) 
Beauvoir argues that to be a professional autonomous woman should not require woman to 
renounce her femininity, that is, a woman should not have to renounce that which distinguishes her 
from men. This is to say that a woman should not need to live like a man in order to be a full 
subject. If she succumbs to the temptation to hold onto her femininity as it is construed in 
patriarchal terms, then it will become impossible for her to determine her own future. Beauvoir 
argues that for 
a woman to accomplish her femininity, she is required to be object and prey; that is, she 
must renounce her claims as a sovereign subject.  This is the conflict that singularly 
characterises the situation of the emancipated woman. She refuses to confine herself to her 
role as female because she does not want to mutilate herself; but it would also be a 
mutilation to repudiate her sex (TSS, p. 723).  
To appear feminine in a professional guise also comes at a high cost to the woman in both labour 
and monetary expense “because the idea of femininity is artificially defined by customs and 
fashion, it is imposed on every woman from the outside… the individual is not free to shape the 
idea of femininity at will” (Beauvoir TSS, p. 724). Where a man in a similar occupational situation 
does not need to worry unduly about the clothes he wears because he relies on women to ensure his 
appearance is suitably maintained (TSS, p. 724), the woman is responsible for managing her own 
appearance. Beauvoir argues that the woman “knows that when people look at her, they do not 
distinguish her from her appearance: she is judged, respected, or desired in relation to how she 
looks” (TSS, p. 24). The business of appearing feminine within a patriarchal framework is one of 
the major obstacles to becoming an independent woman in the way she is required to represent 
herself to others as an embodiment of patriarchal value, yet at the same time she is always at risk of 
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losing her status as a sovereign subject.  In other words, her status as a sovereign subject is always 
provisional and possibly dependent on her capacity to elude the patriarchal gaze.14 
This point links to one of Beauvoir’s major arguments in The Second Sex: that to become an 
independent woman requires that she must also express her sexual powers alongside her intellectual 
powers. Beauvoir does not think that a woman should renounce the feminine in order to become 
independent; however, the structure of relations between male and female means that the 
independent woman is more likely to suffer an “inferiority complex” (TSS, p. 725) through this 
relationship. Beauvoir observes that if the independent woman 
intends to remain fully woman, it also means she intends to approach the opposite sex with 
the maximum of odds on her side. It is in the area of sex that the most difficult problems 
will arise. To be a complete individual, equal to man, woman has to have access to the male 
world as man does to the female one, access to the other; but the demands of the other are 
not symmetrical in both cases (TSS, p. 725, italics in the original). 
The inferiority complex experienced by the independent woman reveals the lopsidedness of the 
relationship of demand between the male and female worlds and it manifests as a burden the 
patriarchy demands the independent woman should bear. Inferiority is the cost of the attainment of 
subjectivity and it forces woman into a netherworld of continual doubt about where precisely she 
belongs: she appears not to occupy any territory of her own; rather she becomes the territory of 
others. As an independent woman in the popularly imagined mode of the working-woman, she is 
the embodiment of a fragmented self imposed upon her through her contingent entry into the 
patriarchal version of subjectivity. 
Beauvoir argues that in seeking to become an independent woman, the woman, unlike man 
whose subjectivity is automatically granted as a wholeness by virtue of being a man, is forced to be 
a divided being (TSS, p. 725).  Within the context that being truly independent requires the woman 
to express her sexuality, Beauvoir describes how difficult it is for the woman to express both her 
sexuality and her intelligence from the position of wholeness15 that is designated as the privilege of 
14	In The Second Sex chapter ‘Social Life’, Beauvoir discusses the role of fashion in constraining 
women’s claim to sovereign being: “The goal of fashion to which she is in thrall is not to reveal her 
as an autonomous individual but, on the contrary, to cut her from her transcendence so as to offer 
her as prey to male desires: fashion does not serve to fulfill her projects but on the contrary to 
thwart them” (p. 572). 15	I am using the term “wholeness” in a descriptive sense here. It follows from Beauvoir’s claim in 
The Second Sex that a man never has to question what it means to be a man the way she needs to 
question what it means to be a woman. 
42 
the man in a patriarchal society. Beauvoir argues that the independent woman has a stake in 
presenting herself as a feminine woman capable of seduction; however: 
she will never be more than an amateur in the elegance department; feminine charm 
demands that transcendence deteriorating into immanence no longer be anything more than 
a subtle carnal throb; she must be a spontaneously offered prey: the intellectual woman 
knows she is offering herself, she knows she is a consciousness, a subject; one cannot 
wilfully kill one’s gaze and change one’s eyes into empty pools; a body that reaches out to 
the world cannot be thwarted and metamorphosed into a statue animated by hidden 
vibrations (TSS, pp. 725-26). 
The independent woman thus suffers the burden of responsibility to maintain her freedom through 
an apparently irreconcilable conflict between the expression of her body and her mind.  
2.2  The Independent Woman and freedom 
Opening the ‘Independent Woman’ with a discussion of some of the positive changes to French law 
regarding the social duties of women (including the right to vote), Beauvoir argues that these legal 
abstractions are meaningless if:  
there is no corresponding economic autonomy; the kept woman—wife or mistress—is not 
freed from the male just because she has a ballot paper in her hands; while today’s customs 
impose fewer constraints on her than in the past, such negative licenses have not 
fundamentally changed her situation; she remains a vassal, imprisoned in her situation (TSS, 
p. 721).
Beauvoir continues that, in addition to obtaining abstract civil rights in law, concrete freedom needs 
to be won through work (ibid.). This goal is not as easy to obtain as it may seem; that is, even with 
changes to the law to ensure equal opportunity to women in the workplace, for instance, the law 
itself is unable to construct the situation necessary for the law to become a concrete reality in the 
lives of women. This is the job for the woman herself in that she is charged with recognizing and 
transcending the constraints that characterize her existing situation in order to institute a new 
situation that is the expression of a legitimised concrete freedom.  
Interestingly, the first woman we meet in this chapter, and the only woman to whom 
Beauvoir attributes direct speech, is a cleaning lady Beauvoir overhears while mopping a floor: “I 
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never asked anyone for anything. I made it on my own” (ibid.), she says to nobody in particular.16 
Through this example Beauvoir is arguing that all workers are conscious of the benefits and 
advantages paid work brings to realising one’s freedom. The cleaner’s metonymic statement 
references the American self-made man myth that refers to the idea that freedom in America is 
based on the idea that everyone is equal and by virtue of democracy, everyone has an equal chance 
of becoming as “self sufficient as a Rockefeller” (ibid.). However, Beauvoir argues that: 
Today, the majority of workers are exploited. Moreover, social structures have not been 
deeply modified by the changes in women’s conditions. This world has always belonged to 
men and still retains the form they have imprinted on it. It is important not to lose sight of 
these facts that make the question of women’s work complex (ibid.). 
Beauvoir endorses a socialist system as one that will guarantee that freedom will flow from the vote 
to work and back again (ibid.); however, she will later modify that view based on her visits to 
various communist/socialist states.17 In any case, the major point to be made here is that social 
structures create intersubjective spaces that include the workplace and the structure of these spaces 
serves agreements made between men that are based on the exclusion of women.  
The cleaner’s words function to articulate the unspoken agreement about the purpose of 
work in capitalist America:18 that work is the entry to a particular realm of experience through 
which there is one goal and that is to make oneself one. The cleaner says that she “never asked 
anyone for anything” meaning that even though she is in a low paid job, she has entered into the 
16	Eleanore Holveck in Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Lived Experience: Literature and 
Metaphysics (2002), characterises Beauvoir’s approach to philosophy through a story of “the 
laughing housemaid” from Plato: “According to legend related by Plato in the Theaetetus (174AA), 
Thales of Miletus, the first philosopher of Western European culture, was looking up at the stars so 
intently one day that he fell into a well. A servant woman laughed scornfully at him for this, 
wondering how he could claim to know anything about the sky, when he could not even see what 
was directly in front of his feet” (p. 2). 	
17 In an interview with Alice Jardine (1979), Beauvoir says, “In 1949, I believed that social 
progress, the triumph of the proletariat… socialism would lead to the emancipation of women. But I 
saw that nothing came of it: first of all, that socialism was not achieved anywhere, and that in 
certain countries which called themselves socialist, the situation of women was not better than it 
was in so-called capitalist countries. Thus, I finally understood that the emancipation of women 
must be the work of women themselves, independent of the class struggle. That is the major change 
in my position between 1949 and today” (p. 235). 
18 While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that America is significant to 
Beauvoir’s philosophical thinking. She travelled to America in 1947 and her written account of that 
trip is to be found in America Day by Day (1999). See also, Alexander Ruch (2009) in ‘Beauvoir-
in-America: Understanding, Concrete Experience, and Beauvoir’s Appropriation of Heidegger in 
“America Day by Day” for an interesting discussion about this work and its philosophical value for 
feminist thinking. 
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spirit of work and through its energising and presumed capacity for self transformation, has made 
herself what she appears to be: that is, an independent woman. The overriding characteristic of 
work being represented through this example is that being employed means you can create an 
understanding of your self as being complete without the need for any assistance from the 
community. The cleaner goes on to say, “I made it on my own” and here we may wonder to what 
the “it” in this phrase refers. In the context of the whole passage, “it” refers to the situation of self-
sufficiency the cleaner believes she possesses. In other words, she believes her status as an 
independent woman is the product of her own labour; she is the author of the “I” that speaks in 
service to her labour.  
Beauvoir argues that in addition to economic independence, freedom requires that women 
are free to exercise decisions about how they express their sexualities: 
A woman who works hard, who has responsibilities, and who knows how hard the struggle 
is against the world’s obstacles needs—like the male—not only to satisfy her physical 
desires but also to experience the relaxation and diversion provided by enjoyable sexual 
adventures (TSS, p. 727).   
This adds a further complication to the goal of becoming an independent woman because the 
expression of sexuality is constrained by patriarchal laws and customs that determine a woman’s 
primary destiny is to become a wife and mother.19 The laws that constrain woman’s decisions about 
reproduction such as the laws that criminalise abortion are not immediately linked to the franchise, 
nor are they directly connected to her role as a worker. The effect of the law is to produce a split in 
the identity of woman, a split that engenders a sense of deficiency that presents as a lack of 
equilibrium in women. Beauvoir argues that the reason for this is that:  
The advantage man enjoys and which manifests itself from childhood onward is that his 
vocation as a human being in no way contradicts his destiny as a male. The fact that the 
phallus is assimilated with transcendence means that man’s social and spiritual successes 
endow him with virile prestige. He is not divided. However, for a woman to accomplish her 
femininity, she is required to be object and prey; that is, she must renounce her claims as a 
sovereign subject. This is the conflict that singularly characterizes the situation of the 
emancipated woman (TSS, p. 723). 
19	The issues surrounding the relationship between motherhood and the independent woman will be 
discussed in detail in chapters three and four of this thesis. 
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Women are doomed to always be striving for some kind of ‘balance’ to redress the imbalance 
produced by competing and contradictory laws. Beauvoir talks about the small number of women 
who have achieved a measure of economic and social independence through their work and argues 
that these women serve as an example of  
a continuing debate between feminists and antifeminists. The latter maintain that today’s 
emancipated women do not accomplish anything important, and that besides they have 
trouble finding their inner balance. The former exaggerate the emancipated women’s 
achievements and are blind to their frustrations (TSS, p. 723).  
Beauvoir’s observation here points to the difficulty in finding a political solution to a problem that 
is generated as a result of a gendered social situation that is enforced by the irreconcilable effect of 
laws that constrain the choices allowed to women. Beauvoir says that economic freedom is only a 
step on the way to complete liberation because 
Even the woman who has emancipated herself economically from man is still not in a moral, 
social, or psychological situation identical to his. Her commitment to and focus on her 
profession depend on the context of her life as a whole.  And, when she starts her adult life, 
she does not have the same past as a boy; society does not see her with the same eyes; she 
has a different perspective on the universe. Being a woman poses unique problems to an 
autonomous human being today (p. 723). 
The argument as to why the independent woman needs to exercise her sexuality becomes clearer in 
the discussion about Marguerite and its links to patriarchal repression through religion and the value 
of devotion to capitalism and patriarchy. 
2.3 Marguerite and independent adventure 
The short story ‘Marguerite’ is the final story in the cycle of the collection in When Things of the 
Spirit Come First (1983). The title of the collection opens the story-- “In my family it was always 
held that the things of the spirit come first” (WTS, p. 159)—thus establishing something about the 
kind of situation against which Marguerite struggles. Marguerite’s struggle is one that can broadly 
be described as occurring within the context of an opposition between idealism and materialism. 
Marguerite’s family is focussed on setting and achieving immaterial goals that tend to negate, or 
even foreclose, the possibility of an unfettered experience of material reality: “Papa devoted his life 
to the study of literature and Mama to the practice of the Christian virtues, while Marcelle and 
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Pascal were dedicated to the worship of beauty and the inner life” (WTS, p. 159). The cultivation of 
the life of the mind is enshrined in the organisation of the family’s activities around a highly 
select—indeed, expurgated—set of books found at home and at school that are used to aid and 
promote spiritual progress towards an ever-increasing devotion to God.  The sense of being an 
embodied being in the world is carefully hidden or disguised in the language devoted to the primacy 
of the spirit. The notion of spirit substitutes for mind for the women in these stories and as such 
performs as an intermediary within the experience of material embodiment by pre-empting and 
modifying the female experience of their own sexuality. 
While the story ‘Marguerite’ can be seen as a prelude to the problems surrounding the 
becoming of an independent woman in The Second Sex, it is not of lesser importance because it 
appears early in Beauvoir’s career. Indeed, the collection of stories in When Things of the Spirit 
Come First can be taken as evidence representing Beauvoir’s difference from other existential 
philosophers writing at the same time: for example, Sartre and Camus.20 Beauvoir’s existentialism 
is distinguishable from the others because she is focused on the specific problems female 
embodiment reveals about patriarchal culture. The specific problem with female embodiment in a 
patriarchy is somewhat in the background of the story ‘Marguerite’ in that it is not discussed in an 
explicitly philosophical way. Rather the female body is like a silent, invisible, indeterminate 
character that provides the story with momentum through its function as the foundation upon which 
the action in the story is given its meaning. In other words, there is no action without the body, and 
Beauvoir shows how the story of the female is centred upon the issue of whether woman has control 
of her body or not. The question that arises here is: are the actions of Marguerite a result of the 
degree of control she has of her body?  ‘Marguerite’ clearly demonstrates that the body is both an 
object and subject that requires constant awareness and vigilance concerning any particular balance 
of these distinct elements on the part of the woman in order to recognise the obstacles to her 
freedom. In The Body in the Work of Simone de Beauvoir, Sarah Fishwick (2002) argues that 
Beauvoir’s fictional depictions of female erotic corporeality do not merely illuminate the 
role played by female others in the mediation of denigratory or restrictive cultural attitudes 
towards female bodily/sexual conduct… Beauvoir’s representation of key episodes which 
invoke the female desiring body also foreground the role played by popular literature in the 
transmission of cultural codes and stereotypes governing female sexuality (p.117). 
20 Terry Keefe (1986) provides a good discussion comparing the early fiction of Beauvoir, Sartre 
and Camus in French Existentialist Fiction: Changing Moral Perspectives. However, while he does 
well in focusing on the approach these authors adopt towards expressing existential moral values 
through their fictional characters and situations, he does not bring out the gendered differences that 
distinguish Beauvoir’s project from that of Sartre and Camus. 
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While Fishwick’s argument follows from an analysis of the character of Marguerite’s sister 
Marcelle, and in particular, Marcelle’s sexual relationship with her husband Denis, Marguerite’s 
own relationship with Denis can be read as a rejection of the role of the romantic heroine desired by 
Marcelle. 
The story of Marguerite is the story of a young girl testing the limits of the cultural codes 
determining appropriate erotic behaviour for women. She does this through a series of sexual 
adventures through which she attempts to gain her independence through an expression of sexual 
freedom. If we think about the female body through the way Beauvoir represents it in ‘Marguerite’ 
we begin to get a sense of the problem, but also the solution, for the embodied female in patriarchal 
society.  In the previous paragraph I raised the idea that the female body appears as a kind of silent 
character in the fictional text. I will argue that the female body does not appear as having an essence 
in the text and the reason for this is that for Beauvoir there is no essence to define the body so that it 
is recognisable within universally agreed parameters; instead, in The Second Sex, Beauvoir defines 
the body as situation. Beauvoir argues that that the “body is not a thing, it is a situation: it is a grasp 
on the world and a sketch of our projects” (TSS, p. 46).21  In The Second Sex Beauvoir explores in 
detail the connection between women’s oppression and the scientific descriptions of the biological 
body that fail to contextualise the female body within the lived culture. Beauvoir argues that men 
use biological descriptions of women in order to justify  
the disquieting hostility woman triggers in him. The word “female” evokes a saraband of 
images: an enormous round egg snatching and castrating the agile sperm; monstrous and 
stuffed, the queen termite reigning over servile males; the praying mantis and the spider, 
gorged on love, crushing their partners and gobbling them up… (TSS, p. 21) 
These metaphorical images of the female body that represent the male fear of domination and 
annihilation by the female are not specifically represented through males in the stories of When 
Things of the Spirit Come First; however the horror at being a woman seen through a masculinist 
lens emerges through our engagement with the idealisation of the male each female character 
performs.  The focalisation of the male gaze through a male character is relatively absent in the 
21 This refers to Beauvoir’s statement from The Second Sex that “The body is not a thing, it is a 
situation: it is our grasp on the world and a sketch of our projects” (p. 46). See Julie Ward’s 
‘Beauvoir’s Two Senses of the “Body” in The Second Sex’ (1995) where she argues that, on claims 
for the credibility of biological descriptions of women, Beauvoir argues “one cannot make neutral, 
aperspectival claims about female biology since the physical capacities of either sex gain meaning 
only when placed in a cultural and historical context—this, I argue, is what Beauvoir means by 
saying that the body is to be seen as a situation” (1995, p. 225)  
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stories; instead the presence of the patriarchal attitude is to be found through the structure of the 
situations of the women.  
In ‘The body as a basis for being: Simone de Beauvoir and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’ (2001) 
Suzanne Cataldi argues by way of comparison with Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of 
Perception, that Beauvoir’s “method of examining disabilities is also essential to Beauvoir’s project 
of disclosing certain phenomena of oppression” (p. 89, italics in original). However, where 
Merleau-Ponty concentrates his examples on those with physical or neurophysiological 
impairments,  
Beauvoir’s phenomenology of female experiences, perceptions, and possibilities sets forth a 
complex and studious account of disadvantaged bodies—of bodies whose ‘disabilities’ or 
‘pathologies’ are attributable more to women’s situation, to our social and historical 
disempowerment, than to our bodies (Cataldi 2001, p. 89 italics in original). 
In this sense we can see how the account of lived experience as deployed by Beauvoir in 
‘Marguerite’ is an account of how Marguerite becomes conscious of the way culture influences the 
way she experiences her body through both pleasure and pain. For example, Marguerite is shown to 
be an enthusiastic participant in the spiritual culture which governs the structure of her family life 
as a young girl, taking on the role of the punisher towards her own body: 
I certainly had a natural aptitude for the mystic life; I would often lock the lavatory door and 
whip myself with a little gold chain; I also rubbed my thighs with pumice-stone, which 
made red places that Mama dressed with ointment (WTS, p. 160). 
The body is a means through which one achieves the appropriate level of communion with God and 
does not itself belong to its bearer. In Marguerite’s world where the body is governed by the dictum 
that obedience to the spirit is primary, the body is not given free reign to perform this devotion; 
rather, the body is considered to be the obstacle to achieving the kind of freedom communion with 
the spirit is meant to bring. Within the context of the performance of the culture of the conservative 
Catholic faith, Marguerite’s body is the site upon which sacrifices are to be made and enjoyed: “I 
loved imposing mortifications on myself—it was a positive game for me” (WTS, p. 160).  
49 
2.4  Marguerite and first person futures 
Before we continue our exploration of Beauvoir’s representation of female embodiment through 
Marguerite, it is appropriate at this point to note that these representations arise through 
Marguerite’s retelling of those experiences that have lead to a certain intellectual independence. 
Elizabeth Fallaize (1988) argues that the narration in ‘Marguerite’ is a “fairly formal first-person 
narrative” (p. 152)22 that serves to connect the remaining threads of the other stories in the 
collection. Faillaize says that the use of the first person in this formal style is rare in Beauvoir’s 
fiction and she believes the reason for her use of it in ‘Marguerite’ is Beauvoir’s desire to  
‘show’ how she had come to abandon spiritualism—in other words, her narrative is 
addressed to a reader… This is no journey of self-discovery, but a formally composed 
account with a single flow of narrative time, and in which the first lines anticipate the last 
(p. 153). 
Her desire to ‘show’ rather than ‘tell’ the story to a reader forms a core part of Beauvoir’s theory of 
the relationship between philosophy and literature. To ‘show’ suggests to ‘reveal’ or ‘disclose’ and 
in Beauvoir’s thinking this refers to the responsibility of the author to take action to produce an 
authentic text that is predicated on the authentic experience of the author. The authentic writer must 
represent the world differently from the scientist or priest for instance, because these perspectives 
are wrought through the adherence to absolutes rather than the lived experience that is the bedrock 
for those views.  
So what kind of judgment does Marguerite enact in this story?  The story told by Marguerite 
is a satirical tale that exposes the hypocrisy underlying the authority handed down by the Catholic 
Church.  In ‘Robin Morgan, Jane Alpert, and Feminist Satire’ (2014), Elizabeth Hedrick argues that 
satire is traditionally a gendered mode of communication whereby women have been the object of 
ridicule from “ the ‘privileged moral stance’ of the satiric writer, that of a ‘perceptive outsider 
possessed of manly vigor and violence’” (p. 123). Hedrick also argues that:  
22	The formality of the narration lies in the use of the “I” pronoun. While we are firmly held within 
Marguerite’s point of view, there is nevertheless an omniscience to the narration in that it attempts 
to encompass a universal view of the dilemmas confronting a woman seeking independence. 
Fallaize (1988) argues that the first person narration in ‘Marguerite’ is unique amongst all of 
Beauvoir’s fictional woman characters (p. 154). In relation to the way Marguerite tells the stories of 
the other characters in the collection of When Things of the Spirit Come First as a whole, Fallaize 
argues that “Marguerite seems to be not only aware of the dramas of all three characters, but is 
actually conscious of the need to bring them all into play at the end of her narrative, as if she herself 
had read (or written) the preceding stories” (1988, p. 153).  
50 
Feminist satire as a general category has to do with the fact that ‘satire’ as a concept—one 
that signifies a mode with a long and complex history—is often subsumed in feminist 
analyses under larger more diffuse critical categories, such as ‘comedy’ or ‘humour’. More 
importantly, this analytical grouping reflects a recurrent, if often implicit, preference on 
behalf of feminist critics for gentler over sharper comedy, a persistent aversion to the idea of 
linking the harshest forms of satire with professedly feminist views” (p. 124). 
I argue that the story ‘Marguerite’ is a devastating critique that the church, and by association, the 
patriarchy, function to nullify any emerging subjectivity in women by imposing rituals that actively 
seek to objectify women through their own action and, in doing so, produces women of bad faith. In 
Beauvoir’s story we are not treated to any gentle humour that may be found in Horatian satire that 
keeps open the door to a potential reconciliation between church and the emerging independent 
woman; rather we are treated to Beauvoir’s utter condemnation of the church: the church does not 
represent a higher power possessing infinite wisdom and absolute knowledge of justice, rather the 
church consists of men and women acting as oppressors. Beauvoir’s satire falls into the Juvenalian 
category that “adopt(s) a harsher tone, aiming ‘to resist oppression, to punish those who aid 
corruption of manners, virtue or politics, and to embody high standards of bravery in the face of the 
enemy’s hordes’” (Howard D. Weinbrot quoted in ibid.). If The Second Sex is a landmark feminist 
text that discloses the underlying deceptive ideologies that prop up the patriarchy, then Marguerite 
is the warrior that upends the barriers.  In other words, the voice of Marguerite is not the voice of 
the bourgeoisie, but the voice of the radical. This is just as Beauvoir is not the voice of the 
bourgeoisie, but the voice of the radical that initiates the dismantling of the bourgeoisie woman. 
Beauvoir uses satire to reveal how the denial of an autonomous female sexuality allows for 
the objectification of woman that negates any notion that under patriarchy her body is her own 
territory.  The following passage from the story illustrates the way that Marguerite’s body is the 
source of multiple and often contradictory knowledges about the world that, while provoking her 
intellectual curiosity, does not provide answers that actually address her particular situation. 
Speaking about her experience of the kind of learning provided by her school Marguerite says: 
we were well protected at the Institut Joliet: yet at an early date, because of the Hail Mary, I 
knew that children were formed in their mother’s womb; but I thought they came out by the 
navel; and I saw marriage as a kind of blood transfusion between the spouses. My 
theoretical knowledge grew a little more exact when I secretly began reading Zola, Anatole 
France and Maupassant. But it is no good looking for direct, lucid information in 
unspecialised books. There were astonishing contradictions about the duration of the sexual 
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act, for example: in Zola it took five minutes to make a woman pregnant, while in Pierre 
Louys on the other hand it was a question of whole voluptuous nights. This left me deeply 
puzzled. Yet, after all, these problems did not take up too much of my attention: I was 
intensely eager to learn about the world in general and I did not like any field of knowledge 
to be forbidden, but I was not really depraved – indeed, in practice I was innocent. I 
remember Mama taking me to a cinema to see a documentary about the North Pole (I was 
about fourteen), and the man in the next seat fondled and kneaded me with both hands: all I 
did was to clutch my bag against me with all my strength, being convinced that he meant to 
rob me. Another time, when the assistant in a small draper’s shop led me behind a counter 
and undid his trousers a little way, I did not understand either. This is the advantage of a 
Christian upbringing – I might have let myself be raped without thinking there was any 
harm in it (pp. 161-162, my emphasis). 
Beauvoir raises a crucial point through this passage by showing the way things are unknowable 
when they are not named; the way Marguerite is made an object in her situation through 
deliberately shielding her, or prohibiting her from entering into a language of sexuality and law—
the result is a powerlessness that arises from the foreclosure to this language as opposed to 
powerlessness as a result of any “weaker” female biology relative to the men in this example. 
Marguerite is unable to understand her position in the world because she is not allowed access to 
the language to accurately describe the power relations in the world and thus assert her 
independence.  
In this world constituted by the values and knowledge that have arisen through the anxieties 
of the patriarchy, women are constituted as being ignorant due to their exclusion from such 
knowledge production. Marguerite’s satire marks her as a heroic figure through her bravery in 
exposing the foundations of patriarchy to ridicule; however, even though she is the central 
protagonist in her story, the greatness of her feats in this epic journey appear to be muted because 
she characterises herself as a fool. Marguerite’s greatest feat is to have transcended her situation in 
the face of this exclusion in language. In ‘Writing for Liberation’ (2001) Sally Scholz argues that 
the  
myths that enslave women to material realities and that are in part upheld by language, can 
be challenged insofar as relationships are “concretely lived” rather than determined by the 
needs of man (Beauvoir The Second Sex 1952, p. 244). In other words, language is changed 
by the critical use of it; for literature this means that writing and living are bound together 
(p. 343).  
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Marguerite’s capacity as a narrator to satirise her situation as being a struggle against the hypocrisy 
of self-deluded, yet powerful persons, enables us to understand that it is difficult to win 
transcendence against even the stupidest of people. Beauvoir shows that it is no easy task 
confronting and overcoming hypocrisy and stupidity, for the fight against it is as great, if not 
greater, than a fight against an equal. The epic journey for women begins when she can expose the 
fallacy of the foundations of patriarchal knowledge about her through attentiveness to the details of 
her lived experience.23 Finally, Beauvoir’s use of satire to critique the church and the ruling 
patriarchy also effectively skirts the boundaries of lawfulness in that satirical fiction is a protected 
form of speech. Beauvoir’s use of satire, then, would suggest that she intended to disrupt the 
foundations of the ruling patriarchy in France, or at least, the result of her writing has revealed the 
need to disrupt the patriarchy in order to foreground women’s voices.24 
When Marguerite finally allows herself to abandon her belief in religion, the world is 
revealed as a void, empty of meaning, with nothing in its place or even that a place had ever 
existed: 
 
I was lying on moss with the top of a birch-tree waving to and fro overhead; I was not 
thinking at all, but in the midst of a great silence it appeared to me that the world had 
suddenly grown empty. Nobody ordered the trees or the sky or the grass to exist, and I 
myself was drifting at random among these formless aspects of the void; I got up, unable to 
bear this distress, and ran back to the house, back to human voices (WTS, p. 163) 
 
During this period Marguerite also abandons her previous rituals of caring for her body and notes 
with disdain the social rituals of her female cohorts engaged in attending socially approved 
meetings and dances: “they were ugly and dismal, but these future teachers were so afraid of the 
solitary life waiting for them in the provinces that love affairs began” (WTS, p. 164). In these 
strongly contrasting situations, Beauvoir shows how Marguerite’s body is central to the judgments 
she makes of others. In this case, Marguerite seemingly abandons her body through the 																																																								
23 Eleanore Holveck (2002) says, “Authentic free choice exists when one acts to create one’s chosen 
values and takes full responsibility for them. Marguerite sees the bourgeois values of her family and 
friends bursting before her like bubbles, like a spell fading. This insight leads her to act differently; 
she acts against the moral codes of her friends who go on to lead typical bourgeois lives” (p. 61). 
24 See Kate Fullbrook’s chapter ‘Simone de Beauvoir and the intellectual market place’ (1998) for a 
discussion about the publisher Gallimard’s reasons for rejecting When Things of the Spirit Come 
First in the late 1930s. Beauvoir says they advised that “modern France and French publishing were 
not yet ready to deal with what women thought and felt and wanted; that to publish such a book 
would brand them a subversive publishing house and they couldn’t risk offending all sorts of 
patrons and critics” (p. 103). 
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abandonment of the feminine rituals; however, through this act her body becomes the basis for 
experiencing her subjectivity as being marginally located within patriarchal thinking.  This relates 
to Beauvoir’s idea of the body as a situation in that even though the body is not a thing to the 
subject; in this case for Marguerite, it is a part of the world in general and, as such, the nature of the 
lived experience of the individual is integral to the individual’s understanding of the general world. 
The body is central, because if the body is a situation as Beauvoir claims, then judgments the 
individual makes about her position in the general world will arise here rather than from some 
abstract idea situated outside the body. This does not preclude the intellect, rather it opens up the 
possibility to direct the intellect away from a world naturalised by the propensity of the patriarchy 
to universalise its own preferred experiences, towards the world of direct lived experience of the 
subject. Marguerite’s body, then, is the basis and source of knowledge about her place in the world: 
even in its state of oppression the body itself is a part of the world beyond social, cultural and 
political constraints.  
The first-person retrospective narration by Marguerite lends authority to this account in the 
way it organises these experiences into a logical sequence that concludes with the philosophical 
view that freedom becomes accessible when one is “no longer engaged in merely inward 
revolution” (WTS, p. 202) but instead chooses “outward actions” (ibid.). Marguerite says that all 
that she has “wished to do was to show how I was brought to try to look things straight in the face, 
without accepting oracles or ready-made values” (ibid.). The focus of Beauvoir’s 
descriptions of the effect of everyday cultural life upon Marguerite’s relationship with her 
body draws attention to Beauvoir’s underlying phenomenological approach to the crafting 
of her literature from the outset of her writing. In her essay ‘A Review of The Phenomenology of 
Perception by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’ she argues: 
The role of the body is not limited to projecting into the space that it constitutes qualities 
whose heaviness and opacity would be foreign to it. Sensation is neither a quality nor the 
consciousness of a quality; it is a vital communication with the world, an intentional 
network (2004a, p. 162).  
Marguerite’s responses to the way her culture attempts to develop a predetermined relationship with 
her body should not simply be confined to physical responses that are devoid of existential 
meaning. Every movement constitutes an engagement with the world that forges a presence that 
becomes an intrinsic, yet perhaps hidden, part of the place in the world.  Thinking philosophically 
about how we regard our body through touch, for instance, provides us with an opening to another 
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dimension of experiencing one’s subjectivity as belonging to a broader ambit than the patriarchal 
imaginary allows. In support of Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir argues that our interpretation of the body  
 
is not enclosed in the instant but implies an entire history, and even a prehistory. For 
example, it can situate itself in space only by defining its current milieu in relation to a 
previously given spatial milieu that itself refers to a prior level without ever being able to 
stop at a first level that would not be anchored anywhere (2004a, p. 163). 
 
When Beauvoir speaks about the necessity of the open future in The Second Sex, we must 
imagine that future as one in which metaphysical philosophy and religion no longer determines the 
roadmap. We are compelled to imagine a conceptual void that, in the very act of perceiving its 
existence, demands the initiation of a creative process in order to forge new pathways. This is the 
authentic work of the independent woman: not a choice, but a duty to put her ontological freedom 
into action. The Parisian street serves as a transitionary location in Marguerite’s growing 
understanding of her real capacity for freedom. The street itself rarely changes but Marguerite’s 
perceptions change through her contact with it:  
 
I walked about the streets for hours: my life was transformed—at last it had rediscovered the 
meaning it had lost the day I lost God, and since it was now of use to Denis it was necessary 
once more. Living close to him and sharing his fate meant becoming more than an ordinary 
mortal (p. 186). 
 
Towards the end of the story, Marguerite describes another transformative moment taking place 
through contact with the street, this time it is the realisation of the limitations of her relationship 
with Denis: 
 
I went on walking, feeling strangely moved; the world too was changing—it was as though 
a spell were fading. Suddenly, instead of symbolic scenery, I saw around me a host of 
objects that seemed to exist in their own right. All along the pavement little cafes came into 
being, cafes where Denis had never set foot, and cinemas and popular little dancing places 
that he had never told me about: I could walk into all of them—I had no need of Denis to 
hear what they had to say to me (p. 201).25 																																																								25	In Adrian van den Hoven (2009) ‘Anne, ou quand prime le spirituel: Beauvoir and Sartre 
Interact—from Parody, Satire, and Tragedy to Manifesto of Liberation’, contends that in “terms of 
writing about women, Marguerite’s discovery ranks with Roquentin’s discovery of contingency and 
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In this process of experimentation she enters into a kind of netherworld of discursive flux in which 
the meaning of being a woman is transformed. In particular, Marguerite experiences what it means 
to exist as woman’s body subject to patriarchal laws and customs that claims ownership of that 
body.  
In putting forth the idea of the open future, and, in privileging the intellectual woman writer, 
Beauvoir is suggesting that it is necessary to find the words to describe this new world which 
appears as an alien landscape to the existing patriarchal sensibilities. To be an authentic writer may 
mean making her body alien: that is, not in the sense of being split from the body in a kind of 
mind/body dualism, but to make the body of patriarchal discourse alien to her ontological desire for 
freedom. So she does not disown her body in favour of the mind, but uses the mind to own her 
body. As previously stated, Beauvoir argues in ‘The Independent Woman’ that the “free woman is 
just being born” (p. 751); she then continues: 
 
When she conquers herself, she will perhaps justify Rimbaud’s prophecy: “Poets will be. 
When woman’s infinite servitude is broken, when she lives for her herself and by herself, 
man—abominable until now—giving her freedom, she too will be a poet! Woman will find 
the unknown! Will her worlds of ideas differ from ours? She will find strange, 
unfathomable, repugnant, delicious things, we will take them, we will understand them” (p. 
751). 
 
This world of the unknown, or perhaps more precisely, the opportunity to describe the unknown 
from the perspective of woman’s experience, is a significant feature of woman’s oppression.  In 
staking a claim for freedom, woman must take the opportunity to experience her body in all of its 
strangeness and communicate that experience as evidence of the possibility of the existence of a 
new world. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how the story ‘Marguerite’ assists our understanding of the complexity 
of the ‘Independent Woman’ in The Second Sex. Economic independence is a key concern for 
women seeking to overcome oppression in patriarchal societies, because it is seen to be the first step 
towards making choices about the direction of one’s life. However, as the story ‘Marguerite’ shows, 																																																																																																																																																																																								
his ultimate decision to focus on the abstract and imaginary realm—and in fact goes beyond it in its 
positive affirmation of life and acceptance of reality” (p. 220). 
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patriarchal values such as those deployed through Catholicism, shape the social practices of 
everyday life in the home, the school, in relationships between friends and family members and in 
one’s relationship to one’s own body. For a woman to be independent in the sense that she is 
making a path towards an open future requires her to become conscious of the way oppression 
shapes her life so that she can understand the changes that need to be made. To be free requires 
women to also express their sexualities and this is where oppression is most difficult to escape, 
because patriarchal social customs are invested in fashioning women to appear as idealised images 
to fuel patriarchal desire.  
The next chapter will consider the problem posed by the mother for women seeking 
independence in a patriarchal society.  
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Chapter Three 
Madame Vignon & The Mother 
Introduction 
If a woman in patriarchal society is the embodiment of a fragment of the human subject called man, 
that sense of being a part of something that is wholly other does not emanate from a specifically 
female ontology.  Rather, the woman Beauvoir has in mind plays a part that is legally enforceable. 
She provides a thorough analysis of the effect of French law as it pertains to female reproduction in 
the chapter ‘The Mother’ in The Second Sex. Beauvoir examines the myth of motherhood in 
relationship to the law and concludes that women are condemned to an “enforced maternity” 
because of the limits the law imposes on her capacity to create her own projects and determine her 
own future. While women in all situations are forced, to a lesser or greater extent, to embody 
patriarchal values in their relationships to their own bodies and the bodies of others, it is in the 
realm of choice that Beauvoir exposes the hypocrisy of the law in its territorialising of the female 
body. Beauvoir draws a connection between state law and the law of the Catholic Church that 
establishes a link to a spiritual authority over the domain of woman. In the eyes of the law, woman 
is barely even a biological reality in the realm of the material; rather, she is a mythologised vessel 
through which the word of God is delivered – through which the language construes its necessary 
other – necessary, because the patriarchy requires its authority to be echoed. 
This chapter will consider the figure of the mother through a close reading of Mme Vignon 
in the story ‘Anne’ alongside Beauvoir’s deconstruction of patriarchal laws that prohibit female 
independence in relation to their reproductive bodies. Beauvoir’s key argument in ‘The Mother’ is 
that the form of motherhood dominant in patriarchal society is not the product of a natural maternal 
instinct; but instead belongs to, and is the necessary support for, the patriarchal social structure. The 
myth of the maternal instinct is complicated when we look at how it is operating in Mme Vignon, 
because the mode of care and nurture that is popularly associated with the mother through the 
image of the Virgin Mary, for instance, is exposed as calculating, strategic, and militaristic.  Even 
though it could be argued that Mme Vignon represents the extreme end of the spectrum of maternal 
types ranging from the martyr to the sadistic dominator, Beauvoir shows in The Second Sex that 
these maternal types are deviations from a mythical norm. This norm is enshrined in law and we 
can read that norm through an analysis of what the law prohibits. Beauvoir focuses on the law that 
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prohibits abortion to show how the law regulates and constrains women’s capacity for self-
determined subjectivity.  
3.1 The mother and pregnancy 
When Beauvoir writes about ‘the mother’ in relation to the oppression of women, she is not 
referring to a woman who must overcome the obstacles to freedom that emerge as she assumes her 
biological destiny. That is, oppression does not emerge as a result of a woman becoming pregnant; 
rather, when a woman becomes pregnant oppression is revealed as a constitutive element of her 
situation in a patriarchal society. In writing about the mother, Beauvoir directly challenges one of 
the most commonplace ideas about women in a patriarchal society: that motherhood is a natural 
vocation (TSS, p. 524). Motherhood is enacted through a multiplicity of preconceived ideas about 
what it means to be a mother whereby “a social and artificial morality hides behind this pseudo-
naturalism” (TSS, p. 567). Thinking about the mother with Beauvoir allows for an opportunity to 
consider how the artificiality of the moral construct undermines the woman’s capacity to claim her 
body as her own. The morality is artificial because it is imposed on woman rather than being a 
morality that has emerged out of a community founded on reciprocity between woman and man. 
The myth of motherhood is a mystification that creates the conditions for woman to become 
alienated from her body, that is, the dominant patriarchal narrative of the mother obscures the 
possibility for the development of a future-oriented relationship between woman and her body. 
While the woman may feel she is giving her body to her future projects in producing the child, she 
is actually reproducing the conditions that make the definition of motherhood possible within the 
context of patriarchal capitalism. This narrative is a fiction in the worst sense of the word (that is, 
artificial) because it appeals to woman to accept her immanence as natural; however, to do so 
means the woman surrenders her body as object to the perpetuation of the patriarchal myth. 
Beauvoir argues that reproduction is no longer a matter for biology alone in that methods of 
birth control allow for pregnancy to be a choice (TSS, p. 524). However, to whom the choice 
belongs is not a straightforward matter, given that access to birth control, including abortion, is 
controlled through the law of the patriarchal state:  
There are few subjects on which bourgeois society exhibits more hypocrisy: abortion is a 
repugnant crime to which it is indecent to make allusion. For an author to describe the joys 
and sufferings of a woman giving birth is perfectly fine; if he talks about a woman who has 
an abortion, he is accused of wallowing in filth and describing humanity in an abject light: 
meanwhile, in France every year there are as many abortions as births (TSS, p. 524). 
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Beauvoir’s example here points to the importance she attaches to the role of writing and literature in 
the justification of the denial of access to abortion to women and, concurrently, to deny the lived 
experience of women in language. To publically write about abortion is to cause the myth of 
motherhood to become abject and in this sense, the legal prohibition on women’s reproductive 
choice is premised on how the ‘crime’ may appear to the patriarchal imagination. Beauvoir’s use of 
the literary to frame her philosophical and political argument is a strategy that works to represent 
the taken-for-granted image of the mother as sacred myth from a new perspective. Linda Zerilli in 
‘A process without a subject: Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva on maternity’ (1992) argues 
that Beauvoir’s “dramatisation of the maternal body in process… is a sophisticated and 
underappreciated feminist discursive strategy of defamiliarisation (p. 112)”.  Hence, the mother 
Beauvoir describes is not the flesh and blood of fact, but the image that arises through the 
demystification of the mythical patriarchal mother. Fredrika Scarth writes in The Other Within: 
Ethics, Politics, and the Body in Simone de Beauvoir (2004) that Beauvoir was: 
Writing in France, in 1949, at a time when legislation forbade the buying, selling, or use of 
contraception and even the distribution of information about it… abortion was illegal and 
both laws and mores promoted marriage and childbearing as women’s vocation. What 
Beauvoir gives us as readers of The Second Sex is a dramatic restaging of “normal” 
pregnancy as “enforced maternity” (p. 143). 
In showing pregnancy as a drama, Beauvoir is undermining biological and mythical accounts of the 
“natural instinct” of women to be mothers, revealing in the process the hand of patriarchy in the 
active oppression of the female desire for subjectivity.  
3.2 The mother and abortion 
While the patriarchy makes laws to prohibit writing about procuring access to abortion and 
contraception in France, Beauvoir’s writing about the lived experience of women in The Second Sex 
during the same post-war period, opened a space for an “imagined sisterhood” (Reineke, p.xiv, 
2011). In Beauvoir and Her Sisters: The Politics of Women’s Bodies in France, Reineke argues that 
Beauvoir “made it possible, not just for women but for French society as a whole, to engage in 
discourses about sexuality and reproduction” (ibid.). Beauvoir’s writing on reproduction was not 
necessarily a call to arms in the sense of advocating the rights of women, but her analysis of the 
patriarchal domination of reproductive processes created a foundation for subsequent political 
activism to occur: 
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If, as she (Beauvoir) contested, women’s bodies (and thereby gender) are culturally 
produced and contingent, rather than a biological given, then women need to assume two 
things to reverse gender inequalities: first, subjectivity or selfhood; and second, political 
agency (Reineke 2011, p. 26). 
Feminist political activism is not the subject of this thesis, however, it is important to acknowledge 
the influence of Beauvoir’s work in The Second Sex to the development of political agency for 
women of the future.26 Further, while Beauvoir’s phenomenological method of philosophy opens 
the way to understanding the political basis of women’s oppression through lived experience, her 
method also reveals how women are made historical artefacts within their present situations.  
In Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Lived Experience: Literature and Metaphysics 
(2002), Eleanore Holveck argues that  
Beauvoir’s orientation is towards revealing the values of the past, values which were created 
by others and which form the writer’s present situation. Such an uncovering of meaning 
enables the possibility of authentic communication between the self and others (p. 44). 
This is interesting when thinking about Beauvoir’s focus on anti-abortion laws in France because 
she is able to take one aspect of female oppression, and analyse the law of the day in order to reveal 
a universal condition of the patriarchy: that is, to reveal that the control of women’s bodies is 
fundamental to the maintenance of patriarchal structures. Beauvoir writes about abortion in When 
Things of the Spirit Come First in the story ‘Chantal’. Chantal thinks of herself as a progressive, 
cultured and independent woman teaching at a school in the French provinces. Her romanticised 
vision of herself is challenged when her favourite student, the wealthy Monique becomes pregnant 
and her friend Andrée requests Chantal’s help in procuring an abortion, which Chantal refuses: 
26	There is of course a long history of various kinds of organised feminist activism in pursuit of 
equalities for women in terms of obtaining the franchise, gaining access to the workplace and 
access to safe, effective and freely available methods of birth control as well as abortion. An 
excellent historical account of feminist movements in the twentieth century can be found in Ann 
Taylor (2005), Feminism and Motherhood in Western Europe 1890-1970: The Maternal Dilemma. 
Taylor argues that Beauvoir “broke decisively with earlier feminist theorists and their vision of a 
chosen, enlightened and socially supported “new motherhood.” To be sure, she suggested in her 
conclusion that the position of mothers might be improved in some future socialist state, but such 
utopian visions had lost most of their credibility in the postwar era, and she did not develop this 
idea” (p. 228). 
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The trouble and the look of reprobation that Andrée saw in Plattard’s (Chantal’s) eye froze 
her heart; in a hesitant voice she said, ‘But isn’t there a way of not having babies? Don’t you 
know any? Or people who could tell us?’ 
Plattard looked at her with a kind of horror, ‘God, what filth!’ she said in a deeply shocked 
tone. ‘To think that such an idea can have come into Monique’s head, and into yours 
Andrée. It’s unbelievable!’ (WTS, p. 84) 
Andrée makes a final plea for help from Chantal asking ‘Why is it wicked? Monique can’t have her 
whole life ruined by this nonsense’ to which Chantal replies that the suggestion of the abortion 
lacks “moral sense” and is “monstrous” and refuses her assistance advising that all “Monique has to 
do is to marry as soon as possible; and if her parents have their wits about them the story will never 
be known” (ibid.). 
Holveck argues that the characters in these stories are representations of Beauvoir’s 
confrontations with her own idealist, younger selves: “Each character is a living incarnation of a 
philosophy of the spirit that the young Beauvoir studied, at times accepted, and ultimately rejected” 
(2002, p. 45). Holveck analyses When Things of the Spirit Come First in terms of how Beauvoir 
engages with a range of philosophers who have influenced Beauvoir’s thinking both positively and 
negatively. On the question of abortion in When Things of the Spirit Come First, Holveck writes 
that Beauvoir 
shows in concrete detail how the issue of abortion arises directly from the poor education 
about their own bodies that young women receive from an educational system dedicated to 
the ‘spiritual’ philosophies of Brunschvicg, Maritain, and a whole host of romantic 
philosophers, poets, composers, and painters… (p. 59).  
Beauvoir’s analysis of the effect of the abortion law on the potential for freedom for women 
directly challenges the patriarchal view that an essential maternal instinct is present in every 
woman. The patriarchal view of woman on this account is that she is always in the process of 
waiting to become what she is destined to become. She may thus be characterised as a gestational 
being. However, it is a gestation that is destined to never produce anything other than the 
reproduction of her reproducing self: she is the necessary engine that perpetuates the myth of the 
heroic male. The male is not conceptualised as a becoming because he is presumed to already be 
who he is – for instance, at birth he is popularly referred to as a “little man”. By virtue of his sex 
alone his projects are legitimised by the standards set by his society – the patriarchy has a place for 
man whereas the woman has no legitimated place other than that ordered by man. In discussing the 
62 
difficulty in training or educating a baby to be a socialised adult, Beauvoir argues that the 
experience for the mother differs according to whether the child is a boy or a girl (TSS, p. 560). She 
contends that because of the prestige women attribute to men, and also the privileges they hold 
concretely, many women wish for a son: 
It’s marvellous to bring a man into the world,” they say; as has been seen, they dream of 
giving birth to a “hero”, and the hero is obviously of the male sex. The son will be a chief, a 
leader of men, a soldier, a creator; he will impose his will on the face of the earth, and his 
mother will share in his immortality; the houses she did not build, the countries she did not 
explore, the books she did not read, he will give to her (ibid.)  
Interestingly, even though the woman Beauvoir describes above is acting in bad faith, the scenario 
also shows woman as socialising the male child to be the creator of a world in which she will share. 
In this way, the mother is not only responsible for bringing the child into the world, but also in 
making a man for a world which is conceptually his world according to patriarchal thinking. 
Woman as mother under strict patriarchal law, functions through the womb – the womb is, in effect, 
her designated place, that is, it is her world; conceptually if not always materially.  
When a woman realises she is pregnant, Beauvoir argues “she knows her body has been 
given a destination that transcends it; day after day a polyp born of her flesh and foreign to it is 
going to fatten in her; she is the prey of the species that will impose its mysterious laws on her (TSS 
p. 541). The abortion law means that the decision to be a mother or not once a woman is pregnant,
is literally taken out of her hands. To extend this thought further, we could say that once a woman is
pregnant, her hands are effectively tied and the narrow space for transcendence is driven inwards to
become a site of introspection.  Once pregnant, the woman may unexpectedly find herself, not in
the world of mothers, but at the mercy of the world of fathers, without the option to claim freedom
in her own name.  In Feminist Thinkers and the Demands of Femininity (2006), Lori Jo Marso
reflects that in Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, Beauvoir
fantasised about being a mother only under conditions in which men were completely 
absent. “When we played games, I accepted the role of mother only if I were allowed to 
disregard its nursing aspects…I accepted the discreet collaboration of my sister whom I 
high-handedly assisted in the bringing up of her own children. But I refused to allow a man 
come between me and my maternal responsibilities: our husbands were always abroad” (p. 
154). 
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Marso argues that in The Second Sex Beauvoir “emphasized that freedom cannot be gained through 
personal choice but only through a process of complex social transformations” (2006, p. 151). 
When the patriarch mandates a particular outcome for the pregnancy, women are also restricted as a 
collective from determining other futures because their activity in this respect bears a taint of 
criminality. 
Beauvoir does not specify the mother in any positive way; instead she describes women 
occupying the role of the mother in terms of the way the role ties her hands away from the pursuit 
of freedom. She argues that social support of women attempting to both work and care for their 
children in a way that does not sap the strength of the woman is a 
social neglect: but it is a sophism to justify it by pretending that a law was written in heaven 
or in the bowels of the earth that requires that the mother and child belong to each other 
exclusively; this mutual belonging in reality only constitutes a double and harmful 
oppression (TSS, p. 569) 
During pregnancy when the presence of the womb is most apparent, Beauvoir argues that woman 
experiences 
 it both as an enrichment and a mutilation; the fetus is part of her body, and it is a parasite 
exploiting her; she possesses it, and she is possessed by it; it encapsulates the whole future, 
and in carrying it, she feels as vast as the world; but this very richness annihilates her, she 
has the impression of not being anything else (TSS, p. 538). 
Pregnancy, viewed from the perspective of freedom, reveals woman to be an “ambivalent reality” 
(TSS, p. 539). The law extends a mystical reach into the site of the womb thus forcing woman to see 
her projects emanate from an inner directed realm. However, in reality, this is the effect of the 
embodiment of the law establishing itself through its masking effect as ideology within the disguise 
of maternal instinct thus creating a point of origin for the patriarchal conception of woman. The 
fetus, then, is steered from its ontological path towards freedom according to gender. The fetus is a 
kind of prosthetic instrument that focuses women’s ambivalence towards duty: women may 
struggle with different kinds and competing duties, but the fetus nonetheless commands the duty 
towards its fleshy development as a woman’s first duty. Beauvoir writes: 
Alienated in her body and her social dignity, the mother has the pacifying illusion of feeling 
she is a being in itself, a ready-made value… But this is only an illusion. Because she does 
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not really make the child: it is made in her; her flesh only engenders flesh: she is incapable 
of founding an existence that will have to found itself; creations that spring from freedom 
posit the object as a value and endow it with necessity: in the maternal breast, the child is 
unjustified, it is still only a gratuitous proliferation, a raw fact whose contingence is 
symmetrical with that of death (TSS, p. 539 emphasis in original). 
The presence of the foetus effectively transforms the woman’s body into an illusory site of 
permanence in that the woman takes the autonomous work of her body to create the flesh of another 
body to be the same as the autonomy that should result from being for itself. However, in reality, 
the embodiment of this kind of misplaced maternal duty is a transitory event that stands in for a 
permanent destiny.  Therefore, in terms of the duty imposed on woman to accept her destiny as 
mother with all its attendant constraints, the presence of the child itself does not warrant such an 
outcome. Beauvoir goes on to argue that while the mother may have her own reasons for the 
existence of the child, those reasons do not found the existential being of the particular child (ibid.). 
Those reasons evaporate at the birth of the child, which also means the end of the illusion of the 
being-for-itself: that is, once the child is born the sense that being a thing in the world is the natural 
expression of “maternal instinct” fades and woman is awakened still grasping for that elusive 
freedom pregnancy is meant to provide promised by the patriarchal narrative of woman’s natural 
destiny to be a mother.  
3.3 Madame Vignon and bad faith 
The story ‘Anne’ imagines a relationship between mother and daughter that is built from the desire 
of Mme Vignon to shape and control the future of her daughter Anne.  Mme Vignon actively 
prevents Anne from continuing the relationship she is beginning to establish with Pascale, the man 
she loves, and we follow her descent toward death through the disassembly of her physical, mental 
and emotional being. This story began as an attempt by Beauvoir to understand the death of her 
beloved childhood friend Elisabeth Lacoin.27 In her biography of Beauvoir, Deidre Bair (1991) 
relates how in 1931 Beauvoir, “became obsessed with trying to understand what had happened, 
constructing various scenarios in her mind, listing things she might have done to help her friend and 
also listing what she called ‘sins and crimes against ZaZa by her family and others’ (p. 175). Given 
the effect of Zaza’s death in the development of Beauvoir’s philosophical outlook,28 it would seem 
27 Elisabeth Lacoin (1907-1929) is also known as Elisabeth “Zaza” Mabille in Beauvoir’s Memoirs 
of a Dutiful Daughter. 
28 In the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (1997), for instance, Jeffner Allen argues that it is 
important to think about Beauvoir’s existential phenomenology as a rejection of “falsely 
universalising forms of philosophy” because “Beauvoir’s critique of myth—whereby once a single 
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to offer a point of origin for Beauvoir’s challenge to the veracity of representations of the mythic 
mother enshrined in the image of the Virgin Mary. In ‘Simone de Beauvoir and the demystification 
of motherhood’ (1986), Yolanda Patterson argues: 
In the characters Simone de Beauvoir created, she explored the extremes of varying 
approaches to the raising of children. She worked through her ambivalence about the 
mixture of love and domination with which her own mother brought her up as well as her 
rage at the manipulative possessiveness of Zaza Mabille’s supposedly well-intentioned 
mother (p. 105). 
 In the story ‘Anne’, Mme Vignon is an exceedingly, is somewhat comic, devout Catholic 
woman intent upon fulfilling her duty as a mother by ensuring that the interests of her daughters 
are, above all, fulfilled to the letter of the law. The problem that arises here is that her daughters’ 
actual interests do not interest Mme Vignon.  The law under consideration here is the law of 
Catholicism as interpreted and mandated by Mme Vignon. While the story ostensibly takes place in 
post-Revolutionary France, the situation for girls in the family home is not constituted out of 
revolutionary ideals of egalitarianism and liberty. Rather, the experience of the home for Anne is 
akin to a total imprisonment. This kind of imprisonment is not only physical in that she is 
physically confined to only those places approved by her mother, but also an imprisonment imposed 
through her mother’s omnipresent gaze that seeks to penetrate and control Anne’s subjectivity. 
When Mme Vignon bans Anne from any communication with her male friend Pascale, for example, 
Mme Vignon tells her that, “My decision is irrevocable. I wish you to break with that whole 
intellectual circle. When term begins, you will leave for England and you will stay there for a year. 
It will do you a great deal of good to be alone with your conscience” (WTS, p. 121). But does this 
conscience actually belong to Anne in the sense that she will occupy a freely chosen position in 
which to reflect morally on her situation?  
The answer to this question is that it is not; rather the conscience to which Mme Vignon 
banishes Anne is a solitary confinement built upon a mandated absence of desire. In The Ethics of 
Ambiguity (1976) Beauvoir argues:  
myth is touched, all myths are in danger—shows that nothing, not even the most commonplace of 
beliefs, is essential or natural, and in so doing liberates a dynamic sense of becoming through which 
we take up our lives. Her insistence that it is in the knowledge of the conditions of our lives, in their 
ambiguity and multiplicity, that we draw our strength to live and our reasons for acting, makes 
women and groups marginalised by much of philosophy emerge as a topic of discourse in 
phenomenology” (p. 49). 
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Moral choice is free, and therefore unforeseeable. The child does not contain the man he 
will become. Yet, it is always on the basis of what he has been that a man decides upon what 
he wants to be. He draws the motivations of his moral attitude from within the character 
which he has given himself and from within the universe which is its correlative (p. 40). 
This means the potential for the embodiment of Anne’s desire is dematerialised through the 
oppressive force of Mme Vignon’s imposition that Anne cultivate a readymade conscience for 
herself. Eleanor Holveck (2002) argues that Beauvoir “wrote in 1979, when the stories were first 
published, that she wanted to present her “conversion to the real world,” i.e., her choice against “la 
mauvaise foi,” the bad faith, of “le spiritualisme” (p. 45, italics in the original). In relation to the 
story ‘Anne’, Holveck argues that it “best reflects the political implications of a spiritual point of 
view” (p. 47) that works as a critique of the political philosophy of Catholic philosopher Jacques 
Maritain. In attempting to be seen as the good Christian mother Mme Vignon  
urges her daughters to obey their Christian duty which is, apparently, to marry the rich older 
men she has chosen for them, so that they might have many children, fulfil crushing social 
obligations, and spend their husbands’ money on items of conspicuous consumption. Thus 
the “primacy of the spirit” is used as an excuse for maintaining bourgeois economic power, 
which requires women to reproduce sons to inherit the power (Holveck 2002, p. 48). 
Through an analysis of the hypocrisy displayed by Mme Vignon, we can begin to see how the 
interrogative gaze of the mother that denies the subjectivity of the daughter allows for the economic 
interplay between the state, the church and capitalism to function to protect and maintain the 
interests of the patriarch. 
On an initial reading of Mme Vignon as a character, it would appear that she is the 
archetypal mother acting in bad faith: that is, she is acting in bad faith as a mother because she 
claims that her actions are directed by her devotion to the patriarchal teachings of the Catholic 
church. She allows doctrine to override any recourse to negotiation within the conflict of desires 
between herself and her daughters. In the ‘prayer’ that opens the story, Mme Vignon engages an 
abstract god through an interior monologue to legitimate a proposed action to betray Anne’s trust: 
This is the first time she has ever had a secret from her mother. What can he have to say to 
her, in those fat envelopes? When it is a question of her daughter’s soul, a mother has the 
right to commit an impropriety; but even using steam it is hard not to leave a trace; I have 
never opened my children’s letters—it is an abuse of authority and it is so clumsy. It is 
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absurd that she has not yet spoken to me of her own free will: I have been too weak with 
her: Lord, give me strength to be hard. Thou didst not spare Thy own Son!  (p. 111, italics in 
the original). 
When thinking about bad faith, there is a tendency to think about the woman as being a victim in 
that she is forced into a subordinate position because the weight of her circumstances makes it 
difficult for her to act in good faith.29 However, in this example, Mme Vignon is shown to be 
negotiating with herself through the device of the prayer as a process of lying to herself that the 
wrong thing she proposes to do is in fact the right thing to do in the circumstances because the form 
of the prayer acts as a sanction for her behaviour. This refusal to recognise that she possesses an 
authentic freedom that does not require the permission of any higher power to act can be thought 
about in the light of the category of the “serious man” found in Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity 
(1976). The serious man 
gets rid of his freedom by claiming to subordinate it to values which would be 
unconditioned. He imagines that the accession to these values likewise permanently confers 
value upon himself. Shielded with “rights,” he fulfils himself as a being who is escaping 
from the stress of existence. The serious is not defined by the nature of the ends pursued. A 
frivolous lady of fashion can have this mentality of the serious as well as an engineer. There 
is the serious from the moment that freedom denies itself to the advantage of ends which 
one claims are absolute (p. 46). 
Mme Vignon’s version of being a mother can be seen as being at a vast distance from the 
idea put forth by Sarah Fishwick in The Body in the Work of Simone de Beauvoir (2002) where she 
argues that in The Second Sex, Beauvoir uses some examples of women that do not coherently 
challenge the patriarchal mythologies of women. Fishwick argues that Beauvoir is  
29	An example of this may be found in criticism of the way Sartre attributes the notion of bad faith 
in Being and Nothingness to the individual choice. Michele Le Dœuff in Hipparchia’s Choice 
(1991), for instance, is critical of the way Sartre uses females as examples of bad faith: “To the best 
of my knowledge, nowhere did Sartre put forward a theory of woman’s being or of sexual 
difference (…) In his philosophical writings, I have nowhere come across a woman in an historical 
situation (the war or the Resistance, for example), nor even in a workplace scene (in the fashion of, 
for example, the café waiter). Woman is always seen only as a body, and a sexed body” (p. 62). 
Beauvoir’s characterisation of Mme Vignon, while vehemently critical of the morality of her 
actions, seems to also be exploring territory that potentially exists outside the binary between 
individually determined action and collectively determined action in the realm of moral 
responsibility. 
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hindered by the fact that a number of her invocations of the female body reproduce, and fail 
to question, women based on cultural stereotypes founded upon the assumption that the 
female reproductive body is an immanent body; an assumption that her account of the 
construction of gendered corporeality must dismantle if it is to avoid the trap of biological 
determinism” (p. 77, italics in the original).30 
Fishwick accounts for some of Beauvoir’s descriptions of her apparent disgust for the female 
reproductive body such as those found in the chapter ‘The Girl’ that deal with the onset of 
menstruation by claiming that Beauvoir is using the literary technique style indirect libre31 to 
produce an “ironic effect” (p. 72) to “mock those bodily stereotypes that, her narrative implicitly 
suggests, inform the young girl’s angst-ridden induction into womanhood” (ibid.). However, 
Beauvoir’s use of literary technique in The Second Sex also allows for the creation of a character 
within the text that is situated within the patriarchal discourse of the mythic woman, such as when 
Beauvoir accounts for the “maternal body as it is signified in mythological discourse, then, the 
maternal feminine is tied to a series of negative and mutually reinforcing concepts, such as 
darkness, chaos, water, earth and nothingness (of matter)” (Fishwick 2002, p.70). To put the 
problem of authentically representing the female body into a situated character extends the 
parameters of the debate beyond the critical binary found between biological determinism and 
social constructivism. Mme Vignon is not easily situated within that binary; the ambiguities 
inherent to her character call for another approach to thinking about Beauvoir’s theorisation of the 
female reproductive body.  
In The Ethics of Ambiguity (1976) Beauvoir argues “Being and Nothingness is in large part a 
description of the serious man and his universe” (p.46). Beauvoir is writing When Things of the 
Spirit Come First prior to Sartre’s writing of Being and Nothingness in 1940-41 while he was 
detained in a prisoner of war camp. It is therefore of interest to examine Mme Vignon in relation to 
Sartre’s ideas about bad faith, because it shows that Beauvoir is already thinking about the 
constitution of the mother in terms of being a problematic irreconcilably divided subjectivity. 
Notably, this subjectivity is represented as being an outcome of Mme Vignon’s lived experience 
within her particular milieu.  Sartre’s discussion of bad faith is found in Being and Nothingness 
(2003), where he claims that bad faith involves deception of oneself in the sense of it being a “lie to 
oneself, on the condition that we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general” (p. 71). 
30	This point will be taken up in more detail in the second part of this chapter as it relates to 
Beauvoir’s conception of ‘The Mother’ in The Second Sex. For now it is enough to flag that her 
characterisation of Mme Vignon challenges the view of Fishwick that Beauvoir argues that woman 
is immanent because of her reproductive biology.	
31 Also known as free indirect discourse that I will discuss in further detail later in this chapter. 
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However, for Sartre it is not as simple as saying that one deceives oneself by being mistaken about 
the basis of the lie, that is, it is not enough to say that the self to whom one lies is not aware that it is 
a lie. Rather, bad faith in Sartre’s conception of it as a paradox means that while the self is aware 
that the lie is a lie, or, in other words, the self is aware of the truth it is also necessary that the self is 
at the same time not aware of the truth and is hence deceived by oneself: 
One does not undergo his bad faith; one is not infected with it; it is not a state. But 
consciousness affects itself with bad faith. There must be an original intention and a project 
of bad faith; this project implies a comprehension of bad faith as such and a pre-reflective 
apprehension (of) consciousness as affecting itself with bad faith. It follows first that the one 
to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which means I 
must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in the capacity as 
the one deceived (p. 72) 
In Mme Vignon’s stream of consciousness we see bad faith operating along Sartre’s lines through a 
performance of a dialogue between different conceptions of herself: that is, she is both the dutiful 
Christian mother and also the individual woman capable of reflection on her own experience of 
girlhood. 
In the preface to When Things of the Spirit Come First, Beauvoir describes the essence of 
bad faith as being a “distance between a person and himself” (p. 8) from which Elizabeth Fallaize 
(1988) argues that bad faith as self deception “in the stories tips the balance towards complicity and 
away from victimisation” (p. 145). Mme Vignon displays that distance between herself through the 
switch between the first and third person voice in conveying the substance of the lie that constitutes 
her bad faith. She refers to herself as an “I” and a “me” but also as “the mother”. There is also 
instances of free indirect discourse in this passage such as “it is an abuse of authority and it is so 
clumsy” which complicate our reading of the character. Baldick (2008) defines free indirect 
discourse as a “manner of presenting the thoughts or utterances of a fictional character as if from 
that character’s point of view by combining grammatical and other features of the character’s 
‘direct speech’ with features of the narrator’s ‘indirect’ report” Fallaize describes Beauvoir’s 
narrative strategies as including “free indirect speech which inevitably involves an element of 
distancing from the characters and from what they can be supposed to have actually said or 
thought” (1988, p. 27). In this example, we are not fully apprised of Mme Vignon’s thoughts 
because we are not sure if she is telling us the whole story even though we are presumably privy to 
her inner dialogue. This is the effect of the free indirect discourse because it suggests that Mme 
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Vignon holds some aspect of herself at a distance and it is to that hidden region revealed through 
free indirect discourse that Mme Vignon effectively lies.  
In Hipparchia’s Choice (1991), Michèle le Dœuff contrasts Sartre’s position on bad faith 
with Beauvoir’s lack of interest in it as a category of analysis of relations of dominance in The 
Second Sex, arguing that Sartre is arrogant in “always identifying himself with the dominating 
element: he is a man in relation to a woman, teacher in relation to the student, free thinker in 
relation to a Jesuit and white European in relation to all imaginable exotica” (pp. 93-4). Beauvoir, 
on the other hand, according to Le Dœuff, assumes the perspective of the writer which  
seems more linked to the pursuit of a quite original project of understanding: in trying to 
understand what people say, she seeks to analyse the situation reflected in their speech and 
then to explain why this situation is not directly transparent to the people involved (p. 94). 
On Sartre’s use of female characters as examples of bad faith (and as examples of his own sense of 
superiority over women)—for example, the woman on a date—Le Dœuff is particularly outraged 
over his presumption that he “considers the female characters to be transparent” (1991, p. 73).  The 
dispute raised by Le Dœuff here points the way to appreciating the subtlety of Beauvoir’s rendering 
of bad faith in the figure of Mme Vignon. Beauvoir’s use of the diverse range of narrative 
strategies, conveys her as resistant to a singular reading, that is, Mme Vignon does not conform to a 
simple one-to-one translation of Sartre’s theory of bad faith even though her character reflects 
elements of it. Therefore, it would be reasonable to argue that in this early work of Beauvoir’s we 
find evidence that shows that her thinking on bad faith diverged from Sartre’s well before she wrote 
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1976).  
In The Ethics of Ambiguity (1976), Beauvoir thinks that the root of bad faith can be found in 
the way children are shielded from the rigours of assuming the anguish of freedom by their parents 
and society in general: 
The child’s situation is characterised by his finding himself cast into a universe which he has 
not helped to establish, which has been fashioned without him as an absolute to which he 
can only submit. In his eyes, human inventions, words, customs, and values are given facts, 
as inevitable as the sky and trees (p. 35). 
In her prayer, Mme Vignon develops her plans for marrying off her oldest daughter Lucette and 
devising ways to keep Anne a virgin by keeping her away from the clutches of the intellectuals 
represented by Anne’s friend Chantal. Mme Vignon despises Chantal because she represents herself 
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as an independent woman who earns her own money as a school teacher and because Chantal is 
intent on introducing Anne to a more liberal section of French society: 
Anne is weak; she is too sensitive, as I was at her age; it is my duty to be strong for her: I 
shall not let her be contaminated by contact with the ungodly. Chantal shall not set foot in 
the house this year: an unbeliever, an adventuress. She was nicer when she was young, but 
Mme Plattard did not know how to bring her up, poor little woman—she was overwhelmed. 
[…] All the difficulties come from this pretentious little intellectual, a girl who hangs about 
cafés with men, who has no family, and who does not believe in God or the Devil, and who 
has lost her social position… (p. 112, italics in the original). 
Mme Vignon’s attitude towards intellectuals and intellectual activity appears childish, obsessive, 
unreasonable and irrational because she identifies it as the primary threat to her ability to exert 
control over the direction of her daughter’s lives. In this sense, Mme Vignon’s mission is to ensure 
that Anne does not have a mind of her own. 
Within the framework of Beauvoir’s argument on bad faith in The Ethics of Ambiguity, we 
can think about Mme Vignon’s behaviour and attitudes as infantile because, as with slavery, many 
women “can only submit to the laws, the gods, the customs, and the truths created by the males. 
Even today in western countries, among women who have not had in their work an apprenticeship 
of freedom, there are still many who take shelter in the shadow of men” (p. 37).  That said, it does 
not follow that Mme Vignon is harmless simply because she appears to be ridiculous and infantile, 
rather it will be shown that she is complicit in accepting her position. Beauvoir argues that when 
judging those women who appear in a guise of charming complicity with the world of men it is  
a mistake to be astonished, once the structure which shelters them seems to be in danger, to 
see sensitive, ingenuous, and light-minded women show themselves harder, more bitter, and 
even more furious or cruel than their masters. It is then that we discover the difference 
which distinguishes them from an actual child: the child’s situation is imposed on him, 
whereas the woman (I mean the western woman of today) chooses it or at least consents to it 
(1976, p. 38, my italics). 
Beauvoir shows Mme Vignon as a ridiculous hypocrite similarly to the way she reveals the 
hypocrisy of the priests in ‘Marguerite’. Far from being merely a figure of fun in the weakest sense, 
the mother in her incarnation through the interior monologue of Mme Vignon is revealed to possess 
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enormous power to fend off the danger posed by intellectual incursion into the carefully constructed 
world of belief and faith. 
The next section will begin to consider the way the law, particularly in its function as a 
controlling authority, attempts to assert sovereignty over women through the maintenance of the 
conditions of bad faith. 
3.4 Madame Vignon and law 
Beauvoir’s representation of Mme Vignon is fiercely satirical and appears to arise out of genuine 
anger. The vehemence underpinning the portrayal of Mme Vignon leads to the question as to 
whether Beauvoir considers her to be representative of all mothers, or whether she is representative 
of only this mother in this particular situation. Deborah MacKeefe (1983) in ‘Zaza Mabille: mission 
and motive in Simone de Beauvoir’s “Mémoires”’ argues that Zaza exerted a “powerful formative 
force in the early life” (p. 204) of Beauvoir and that she became for Beauvoir “both a mission and 
motive” (p. 205).  In Simone de Beauvoir: A Life of Freedom (1981) Carol Ascher (1981) finds the 
ending of Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter to be “profoundly disturbing” (Ascher 1981, p. 187) 
because the “entire volume has been about de Beauvoir’s growth toward freedom, yet she ends it 
with the final belief that this movement has been paid for by the death of another” (ibid.). The 
passage that disturbs Ascher - “We had fought together against the revolting fate that had lain ahead 
of us, and for a long time I believed that I had paid for my own freedom with her death” (Beauvoir 
quoted in Ascher 1981, p. 187). MacKeefe argues that in the story ‘Anne’, Beauvoir “blames Mme. 
Vignon and Pascal for Anne’s death; in Mémoires, she herself bears the blame” (1983, p. 219). 
There is approximately twenty years that separate the writing of these two texts and in the middle is 
the publication of The Second Sex (1949) in which Beauvoir writes extensively about the 
philosophical significance of the mother in relation to the oppression of women in a patriarchal 
society. Mme Vignon is the representation of the extreme limit of the elusive figure of a mother that 
defies even Beauvoir’s enormous powers of description. The friendship with Zaza may be a 
powerful motivating force in Beauvoir’s writing, but the triangular relationship between Beauvoir, 
Zaza and her mother Mme Mabille, is a revelation about the ambiguity of relationships between 
mothers and daughters that is revealed through the embodiment of the conflict in the death of 
Zaza/Anne. 
In Catherine Portuges’ (1986) psychoanalytic reading of the first volume of Beauvoir’s 
autobiography The Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter in her article ‘Attachment and separation in The 
Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter’, she relates that “Beauvoir has said that she wrote the book in part 
to set down the odyssey of her initiation as writer, as well as to repay the obligation she felt she 
owed to Elisabeth Mabille (Zaza), the cherished friend of her youth” (p. 109). Portuges, relying on 
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the theories of psychoanalyst Margaret Mahler,32 argues that Beauvoir’s motivation in writing the 
memoir was to disentangle her ambiguous feelings towards her relationship with her mother and 
other significant females: 
The overall movement of the book may indeed be seen as a working toward the writer’s 
detachment from her early relationship perceived as both omnipotent and symbiotic, and as 
a struggle to come to terms with the double, paradoxical impulse of attachment and 
individuation. It is, after all, the text of a woman writer, a feminist intellectual impelled by 
the desire to define herself both in relation to and separate from the mother and her 
“introjects”” (p. 114). 
This point is of interest to this thesis because it begins to show the connection between the 
embodiment of the patriarchal law and the figure of the mother.  Portuges argues that Beauvoir is a 
“pioneer among contemporary French women writers” (p. 107) in exploring the implications of the 
discourse surrounding the mother-daughter relationship and the problems it creates for women 
seeking to write and be read as women (ibid.). Portuges offers the following quote from the second 
volume of Beauvoir’s autobiography, La Force des Choses, to suggest that Beauvoir had always 
felt her own life would be an exemplar for women who follow (p. 108): 
“I have always had the secret fantasy,” she writes, “that my life was being recorded, down to 
the tiniest detail, on some giant tape recorder, and that the day would come when I should 
play back the whole of my past.” (Beauvoir quoted in Portuges, p. 108). 
Beauvoir expresses a curious sense of detachment in this “fantasy” that in some ways contradicts 
the notion of the phenomenological lived experience and suggests the thought that even the life 
lived with the existential open future in mind is not free from a watchful, monitoring eye. Portuges 
later identifies a passage in the Memoirs in which Beauvoir reflects on what Portuges argues is the 
“all-powerful symbiosis” (p. 115) that defines the mother-child relationship: 
Any reproach made by my mother, and even her slightest frown, was a threat to my security: 
without her approval, I no longer felt I had any right to live… At every instant of the day 
she was present, even in the most secret recesses of my soul, and I made no distinction 
32 Portuges focuses on the Freudian pre-Oedipal stage in her analysis of Beauvoir’s Memoirs of a 
Dutiful Daughter through the work of Margaret Mahler in The Selected Papers of Margaret S. 
Mahler, vols. 1 & 2 (New York: Jason Aronson, 1979). 
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between her all-seeing wisdom and the eye of God himself (Beauvoir, quoted in Portuges p. 
115). 
In the terrifying passage quoted above, Beauvoir is describing her experience of her mother 
as an omnipresent force that in effect constitutes Beauvoir’s sense of her own self-worth. Winning 
approval from her mother ensures the continuation of her existence, so Beauvoir’s existence is 
contingent on how she goes about extracting that approval. In Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter 
(1982) Beauvoir writes that she lived with her mother  
in a kind of symbiosis. Without striving to imitate her, I was conditioned by her. She 
inculcated in me a sense of duty as well as teaching me unselfishness and austerity. My 
father was not averse to the limelight, but I learnt from Mama to keep in the background, to 
control my tongue, to moderate my desires, to say and do exactly what ought to be said and 
done. I made no demands on life, and I was afraid to do anything on my own initiative (p. 
41). 
The key to thinking about the effect of the mother on Beauvoir’s early formative years is to focus 
on the fear she engendered in Beauvoir: a fear that a close look at the language she uses reveals 
itself as being a fear of annihilation. Beauvoir describes this in terms of requiring her mother’s 
approval to feel she had “a right to live” and her thinking here will be useful in trying to understand 
the relationship between Mme Vignon and her account of the mother in The Second Sex. Beauvoir’s 
writing on the mother across these texts provides an opportunity to think about how the concept of 
bad faith is complicated through her point of view as a daughter. 
Mme Vignon is a character for whom the question of her own freedom is a moot point in 
that she is infused with a sense of freedom and authority through her belief that she exists to carry 
out the will of God. The story ‘Anne’ opens with her prayer to God as follows: 
Lord, I return Thee thanks for having descended upon me, humblest of Thy servants. Behold 
me prostrate at Thy feet and accept the worship and love of Thy most unworthy child. I give 
myself up entirely to Thy guidance, oh God: Thou hast entrusted me with the care of these 
souls and one day Thou wilt call me to account (WTS, p. 111, italics in original). 
While Beauvoir effectively discloses the hypocrisy of Mme Vignon’s devotion in its annihilation of 
any other kind of freedom for her daughters, the character Mme Vignon also raises questions about 
the relationship between bad faith and false consciousness. I am using the notion of false 
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consciousness in the sense that it is not a consciousness that belongs to the individual as such, rather 
it relates to the sense that Louis Althusser (2008) depicts it in ‘Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses’ in that it belongs to the structure of the social world in which the individual exists. 
Althusser seeks to extend the classic Marxist theory of the State as a repressive force to include 
‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ which includes the Church and the family (pp. 15-17). These 
institutions, among others, are instrumental in the production and, importantly, the reproduction of 
the social state necessary for capitalist production to persist: 
For the relations of production are first reproduced by the materiality of the processes of 
production and circulation. But it should not be forgotten that ideological relations are 
immediately present in these same processes (Althusser 2008, p. 22 footnote 12). 
In arguing that Mme Vignon’s actions and beliefs demonstrate something other than, or, something 
in addition to bad faith, how then do we account for the brutality of her position as a mother that 
enforces a kind of slavery upon her daughters? Is she an exceptional ‘monster’, or is she a ‘typical’ 
mother whose characteristics Beauvoir has exaggerated to reveal the brutality at the core of such 
typical mothers? Or perhaps can we view Mme Vignon as an instrument, but also a stage or a 
process, in the production of reality through patriarchal capitalist relations? Rather than thinking 
about bad faith solely as a moral fault in Beauvoir’s view, or even an intellectual fault in Sartre’s 
view, we can think of it as a kind of limit to the possibilities for action that is imposed by 
patriarchal capitalist social structures. Bad faith, then, can be thought of as a symptom of an 
oppressive society. 
So, while Mme Vignon may appear as a representative of a specific kind of mother, in this 
instance she appears in the guise of the ‘bad mother’ (TSS, p. 557), in Beauvoir’s satire of the 
dutiful mother, Mme Vignon becomes a gothic representation of the expectation that all mothers 
perform their duty according to the law of the patriarch. The actions of Mme Vignon towards her 
daughters expose the horror of the law.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the way the situation of mothers is shaped by the law and thus the 
choices women have available to them with regard to becoming mothers is also limited by the 
nature of the law. While laws governing human reproduction may appear to operate in the 
background of women’s lives, only becoming apparent when the question of pregnancy enters the 
situation, the law is always present in the shape of women’s particular situation. This means that 
when women think about becoming mothers, that thinking occurs within a terrain already 
76 
designated by the law and, as such, circumscribes the kind of mother a woman can imagine 
becoming.  So choice is not strictly limited to whether abortion is legally available or not, it is also 
limited to the way motherhood can be expressed by the woman. This is particularly the case when a 
woman attempts to express her total freedom because the state and religion have already legislated 
for ownership of the foetus and the child. The story of Mme Vignon reveals what is repressed in the 
law. Mme Vignon is more than an example of a type of mother that can be imagined. While she 
may appear to be a mother that we can choose to become or not become, this choice is illusory 
because she is the representation of a patriarchal mother taken to its logical limit. Mme Vignon is 
the exemplar of the self-denying mother who relies on the authority of the patriarchy to determine 
the meaning of freedom within her situation. Her actions towards her daughters are determined in 
bad faith render her complicit in their oppression.  She denies her own freedom to fulfil the 
patriarchal myth of the mother and this is what is amplified when reading this fiction alongside 
‘The Mother’ in The Second Sex. Mme Vignon is both the voice and the enforcer of the patriarchal 
law in her relationships with her daughters. However, strip away the accoutrements of the self-
sacrificial saintliness Mme Vignon’s hears through her utterances of the words of god, and we hear 
the abnegation of humanity for future women. 
In the final chapter, we reverse the positions of the mother and daughter and focus on the 
complexities of the daughter’s position within the patriarchal family, and how she is constantly 
guided into a complicit relationship with oppressive patriarchal values at the direction of her 
mother. 
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Chapter Four 
Anne and The Mystic 
Introduction 
It may seem strange to conclude this thesis with a chapter about representations of female 
embodiment of ecstatic experiences that seemingly have no basis in concrete experience: that are 
the experience of fantasy, imagination, or a deviating psyche. Surely, it would make more sense to 
have reversed the chapter order to conclude the thesis with a discussion about the independent 
woman in order to think through how she may succeed in overcoming the obstacles presented to her 
concrete existence in the patriarchal state.  To conclude with a discussion of the female mystic 
suggests there has been a reversal of a familiar narrative where the heroine is shown to overcome 
these obstacles to become the independent woman.  This would then be the story with a positive 
ending that many women long to see. Many of the criticisms of Beauvoir concern her apparent lack 
of a “solution” to the problems faced by women, and perhaps this is why there seems to be a lack of 
detailed reference to Beauvoir and The Second Sex in contemporary feminist writing despite the fact 
that her work is foundational to modern feminist thinking.33 However, than searching for the happy 
ending in The Second Sex in order to speak to this perceived lack in Beauvoir’s work, this thesis has 
sought to explore the independent woman as if her representation is a part of the problem and not 
the absolute solution to the matter of woman’s freedom in a patriarchal world.  
As we have seen in various guises throughout this thesis thus far, the representation of the 
body is central to Beauvoir’s existential phenomenology because it provides the foundation for the 
experience of woman’s subjectivity. However, in this struggle for subjectivity through embodied 
experience, the woman must also struggle against being made object by the other and hence must 
also struggle for that hard-won subjectivity through always being at threat of being diminished 
through objectification by the other.  In the chapter ‘The Mystic’, Beauvoir writes about the 
problem of describing the experience of female transcendence because even though it is essentially 
an experience of the embodiment of the woman, it can only be represented through the language of 
the erotic that suggests it is an ecstatic union of self and other.  In the story ‘Anne’, Anne struggles 
to represent her experience of the erotic in terms other than those that belong to the language of the 
33 See Linda Zerilli, ‘Feminism without Solace’ (2012) for a wide-ranging discussion of the 
difficulties many feminists have in finding a strategy for the correction of women’s oppression in 
The Second Sex. For example, Zerilli argues, “Our rhetorical productions of the good (feminist) 
Beauvoir versus the bad (not so feminist or not the right kind of feminist) Beauvoir are 
symptomatic of our reluctance to accept a feminist theory without solace, by which I mean a 
feminist theory that refuses to yield the identities of victim and victor, oppressed and oppressor, 
and, consequently, a feminist theory that resists our understandable but also potentially dangerous 
desire for directives in the face of social injustice” (p. 1). 
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spirit. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Beauvoir argues that economic independence is 
necessary for independence; however, it is only a first step. In Chapter 3, I discussed how the 
positioning of the mother in patriarchal society is a central problem to the gaining of independence. 
In this chapter the problem of the mother is further explored but from the point of view of the 
daughter struggling to define herself through her own embodied experience but lacking a language 
of her own to do so.  This chapter begins to unravel the relationship between the mother and 
daughter through a reading of ‘The Mystic’ that is focused on the problem which faith presents to 
the development of a language of freedom in the face of the patriarchal mother.  
The question of faith is at the heart of Beauvoir’s existentialist project because it is 
ultimately her own rejection of the belief in God that has brought her to her materialist analysis of 
the lived experience of women. In this chapter I will argue that Beauvoir’s representation of the 
embodied women of faith reveals how the effect of patriarchal oppression is implicated in women’s 
core of belief as to who and what she can love. In the first part of the chapter, we will look at how 
love becomes pathological in the ‘The Mystic’. In the second part of the chapter, the pathological 
embodiment of love’s doomed choices will be examined through the social milieu experienced by 
the character Anne in the story ‘Anne’. 
4.1 The mystic and the justification of love 
The chapter ‘The Mystic’ is located in the section ‘Justifications’, arriving after ‘The Narcissist’ 
and ‘The Woman in Love’.  ‘Justifications’ immediately precedes ‘The Independent Woman’, thus 
through the discussion of the mystic and spiritual transcendence Beauvoir leads us ultimately 
towards the consideration of a different kind of transcendence required by the independent woman 
in addition to economic independence. A closer look at Beauvoir’s mystic will reveal that the 
problem of transcendence is not dissimilar in each case of the women in this section. The 
‘Justifications’ section is concerned with the problem of love because “all love demands the duality 
of a subject and an object” (TSS, p. 667).  The problem for woman is that she must overcome her 
status as the inessential other where she is always object in circumstances that do not allow her to 
become the subject that can command the necessary recognition required to experience love in (and 
of) freedom. Beauvoir argues that a man “who acts necessarily confronts himself. Inefficient and 
separated, woman can neither situate herself nor assess herself; she gives herself sovereign 
importance because no important object is accessible to her” (TSS, p. 667). For a man, to take action 
is to transcend his facticity; it is a future-orientated act towards making his ontological freedom a 
concrete reality in the world through his projects. However, for the woman trapped in narcissistic 
love, freedom is grasped through the mirror whereby the: 
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Whole future is concentrated in this rectangle of light, and its frame makes a universe; 
outside these narrow limits, things are no more than disorganised chaos; the world is 
reduced to this piece of glass where one image shines: the One and Only. Every woman 
drowned in her reflection reigns over space and time, alone, sovereign; she has total 
rights over men, fortune, glory, and sensual pleasure (TSS, p. 669). 
The inability to locate the important object is central to her desire for recognition and this is why 
love and sexuality is key to the overcoming of the material and structural obstacles to woman’s 
freedom. 
Firstly, let us take a brief look at the way the narcissist and the woman in love differ from 
each other before we take a closer look at the mystic. The relationship between these women is 
centred on love for one’s self in various forms. Beauvoir argues that it “is not possible to be for self 
positively Other and grasp oneself as object in the light of consciousness” (TSS, p. 668, italics in 
original) The narcissist makes herself sovereign over her self through the objectification of her self. 
Beauvoir argues that narcissism is “a well-defined process of alienation: the self is posited as an 
absolute end, and the subject escapes itself into it” (TSS, p. 667). She tries to overcome the subject-
object problem by making herself both an object and a subject but this fails because this process 
does not connect her to others in the reciprocal relationship that is required to make a meaningful 
contribution to the material world.  
In contrast, the woman in love surrenders herself to the notion of “becoming one, of fusing 
with the sovereign subject; there is no other way out for her than losing herself body and soul in the 
one designated to her as the absolute, as the essential” (TSS, p. 684). The goal of the woman in love, 
then, is to dissolve herself as a subject in the process of becoming the object to man. Beauvoir 
argues, “love has been assigned to woman as her supreme vocation” (TSS, p. 709). However, 
Beauvoir argues that the ascendant path taken by the mystic begins when the woman seeks the 
divine in an ordinary man and it is only upon failing to find (or recognise) the possibility of divine 
love in the human man that she transfers her search upwards towards the possibility of being 
captured by God (ibid.). Therefore, in the absence of a man the notion of a vocation suggests the 
mystic woman is engaged in essential work that will establish her subjectivity.34 This idea thus ties 
34 See Debra Bergoffen (2002), ‘Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre: Woman, Man and the 
Desire to be God’ for a discussion of the differences between Beauvoir and Sartre on the desire of 
consciousness for absoluteness: “Employing the logic of the either/or, Sartre assails the bad faith of 
the desire to be God. Invoking the logic of ambiguity, Beauvoir embraces the failure of desire. 
According to The Ethics of Ambiguity, our vain attempt to be God makes us human. It is also a 
source of joy” (Bergoffen 2002, p. 409). 
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her identity to that of the independent woman who seeks sovereignty through economic 
independence from man.   
 Beauvoir relies on well-documented examples of female mystics such as Saint Teresa of 
Avila, Angela of Foligno, and Jeanne Guyon to not only draw a distinction between the narcissist 
and the woman in love, but to also show how the experience of being object is different in each 
phase of love. However, Beauvoir frames this discussion with her use of a testimony from a patient 
of psychiatrist Gaston Ferdière.35  This testimony will be discussed in detail in the next section of 
this chapter. Beauvoir uses this speech to draw a connection between erotomania36 and the female 
mystical experience. Therefore Beauvoir begins her argument by drawing a parallel between a 
“pathological” (TSS, p.710) condition and the experience of God claimed as authentic by the female 
mystics. Given the existential phenomenological framework within which Beauvoir works, the 
claim to an experience of the existence of a transcendent God cannot be accounted for in terms 
other than those pertaining to concrete lived embodied experience. Therefore, Beauvoir’s approach 
to analysing the descriptions of the experiences of the mystics is phenomenological rather than 
logical. That her approach is phenomenological, means that she will consider the mystic’s 
experience within the context of the whole situation within which it occurs. This means she will not 
limit her analysis to the experience of the mystic herself, nor only to the relationship of the mystic 
to the Catholic Church, but she will consider these elements within the context of patriarchy itself. 
In other words, Beauvoir does not allow that women have access to special “spiritual” powers for 
transcendence outside their social milieu. This means that the mystical powers attributed to faith 
must be accounted for within the context of the whole situation. This situation allows for a material 
analysis of the way the constraints imposed by the Church deny women their ontological freedom.  
It is important to recognise that Beauvoir’s atheism drives the way she frames her 
understanding of how women are oppressed.  It is worth remembering that prior to the naming of 
her philosophy as “existentialist” or even “feminist”, Beauvoir formulated her philosophical view of 
the world through her loss of faith.37  In Sensible Ecstasy (2002), Amy Hollywood reminds us that  
 
Beauvoir insists (…) on the primacy of metaphysical issues to her developing 
consciousness, writing the story of her childhood and adolescence as a narrative of 																																																								
35 French psychiatrist (1907-1990). Ferdière wrote L'Erotomanie, Illusion délirante d'être aimé  in 
1937 and maintained a close association with Surrealists such as Antonin Artaud, Hans Bellmer and 
Unica Zürn. See entry Ferdière, Gaston in Keith Aspley, Historical Dictionary of Surrealism, edited 
by Keith Aspley,  
36 “‘Erotomania’ is currently defined by DSM-IV as: ‘a delusion that another person, usually of 
higher social status, is in love with the patient” (Berrios & Kennedy 2002, p. 381).  37	I have discussed Beauvoir’s loss of faith in relation to the story ‘Marguerite’ in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. Upon not believing in the existence of God, Marguerite experiences the world as a void. 
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childhood faith in the beliefs handed down by her parents, followed by growing 
metaphysical questions, doubts, and anguish, and the gradual resolution of some of those 
questions through study, thought and action (p. 123). 
 
The dropping of the mystical veil imposed on her as a devout female of the church leaves her with a 
problem to resolve: how is she to reconcile the meaning of her existence within this material flow in 
which she now experiences herself as belonging with that of the contradictory realm of the church. 
While she will develop a philosophical response to the material flow as being one of ambiguity in 
The Ethics of Ambiguity, this does not extend to the inclusion of God as belonging to the realm of 
the possible: rather the removal of God creates the ambiguity, an ambiguity that is experienced 
between self and his or her situation in the world, but not ambiguity between self and God because 
God does not exist in Beauvoir’s analytic framework.38  
In ‘Feminists, Philosophers, and Mystics’, Grace Jantzen (1994) argues that the question of 
mysticism is bound together with the question of power (p. 186). She says the 
 
Connection of questions of power to questions of mysticism is obvious as soon as one stops 
to consider that a person who was acknowledged to have direct access to God would be in a 
position to challenge any form of authority, whether doctrinal or political, which she saw as 
incompatible with the divine will (p. 186). 
 
While Jantzen does not cite Beauvoir, her feminist research in this paper speaks to Beauvoir’s 
concerns about the position of women in The Second Sex, in that it responds to the view that “the 
philosophical study of mysticism, with its assumption that the mystical experience is essentially a 
private, subjective matter which, as such, does not connect with issues of social justice” (1994, p. 
199). Beauvoir’s chapter ‘The Mystic’ does indeed challenge this view by connecting the desire for 
the mystical union with God as being structurally related, if not actually generated from, the desire 
to become one with a man (or with an object; an absolute; an ideal). It must be remembered that 
Beauvoir’s overall project in The Second Sex is to demystify these desires that are promulgated 
through the spiritualist philosophies of Catholicism. For example, in ‘The Woman in Love’ chapter, 
Beauvoir argues that in “all religions, the adoration of God is a part of the devotee’s desire for his 
own salvation; by giving herself up entirely to the idol, the woman hopes he will give her 
																																																								
38 In The Ethics of Ambiguity (1976), Beauvoir argues that from the perspective of existentialism, 
ethics only obtains meaning when there is a possibility for human failure: “One does not offer an 
ethics to a God” (p. 10). 
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possession both of herself and of the universe contained in him” (p. 587).39 As Bergoffen (2002) 
argues, The Second Sex represents Beauvoir’s move into a “political-ethical frame” (p. 409) through 
which she “attends to the ways in which the embodied desire to be is lured by particular images of 
woman and man. She is particularly concerned with the ways in which the image and myth of 
woman marks the embodied consciousness of women” (ibid.).  Embodied consciousness of image 
and myth is accessed and experienced through language, so let us now move to an examination of 
the words of Ferdière’s patient in her guise as an erotomaniac and the connection Beauvoir draws 
to support her analysis of the mystic.   
 
4.2 The mystic and erotomania  
Ferdière’s female patient describes how she has read and responded to the words of certain high 
profile men as if they are mystical directions to her. The patient refers to her experience reading the 
work of a journalist writing on morality and her experience with a doctor in the Clermont mental 
institution in which she is eventually placed.  Reading the journalist’s articles she believed he was 
directly communicating with her and trying to help her solve her problems. She eventually sent him 
a series of love letters that led to her being institutionalised. At the institution, her need for an object 
of devotion is satisfied in the head doctor. The patient’s account begins in 1923 when she 
corresponds with  
 
A journalist from La Presse; every day I read his articles about morality. I read between the 
lines; it seemed to me he was answering me, giving me advice; I wrote him love letters; I 
wrote to him a lot… In 1924, it suddenly came to me: it seemed to me that God was looking 
for a woman, that he was going to come and speak to me; I had the impression he had given 
me a mission, chosen me to found a temple; I believed myself to be the center of a big 
complex where doctors would take care of women… (TSS, p. 710). 
 
She is eventually placed in a mental hospital and there “becomes fixated on Dr. D” (ibid.) whom 
she believes is in love with her when he “looked at (her) insistently in an incredible way… he saw 																																																								
39 For a discussion of the historical differences between the female and male mystic, see Marie-
Florine Bruneau’s Women Mystics Confront the Modern World (1998) where she argues that even 
though the male mystics “ adopted a poetical or metaphorical position of loving submission to God 
the Father… (this) did not prevent them from occupying a position of hierarchical power in relation 
to women, for whom they served as spiritual directors, preachers, or confessors. Female mystics, to 
the contrary, held a social position of powerlessness, regardless of their social class. Furthermore, 
male mystics were more often legitimised through canonisation even though female mystics were 
more numerous. Finally, male mystics may have been submissive to God, but they nevertheless 
wrote for the edification of women from a position of knowledge and authority that was accepted 
by both the world and the church” (p. 17). 
		 83 
the effect that produced all the while speaking to another woman patient and he smiled…” (ibid.).  
She maintains a long-term relationship with him by writing him letters and making appointments to 
see him even though she wants to be rid of him: “For more than twelve years I have been having 
mental conversations with him… I wanted to forget him, he reappeared…” (ibid.). Her main 
transgression appears to be her desire to make her presence felt as a knowing receiver of these 
communications and given that as a woman she is positioned as the inessential other to the man as 
absolute, the actions of the erotomaniac exposes a glimpse of a limit to the way women are 
oppressed through language in that women are restricted in the way they can express their 
experiences through language.40  
Could it not be argued that she is merely assuming the role already conceived for her in the 
structure of patriarchal language itself? Interestingly, she is the material face of the absolute nature 
of the patriarchal control of language because, as she responds to the absolute authority she discerns 
in the language with the devotion reserved for the absolute in the form of God, she unsettles the 
patriarchy by forcing it to assume a view of itself from her perspective. While not necessarily 
intentional on the woman’s part, the effect of the erotomania could be seen in terms articulated by 
Luce Irigaray in The Sex Which is Not One (1985b) where she proposes the use of mimicry as an  
 
An interim strategy for dealing with the realm of discourse (where the speaking subject is 
posited as masculine), in which the woman deliberately assumes the feminine style and 
posture assigned to her within this discourse in order to uncover the mechanisms by which it 
exploits her (p. 220). 
 
Thinking about it through Irigaray’s argument above, it is possible to think about how men too, are 
blind to the operation of the language they are privileged to speak. For example, Ferdière’s patient 
recounts some of the way she interacts with the head hospital doctor Dr D who was: 
 
Like a god; I really felt there was something when he came near my bed; he looked at me as 
if to say: I am all yours. He really loved me: one day, he looked at me in a truly 
extraordinary way… his green eyes became blue as the sky; they widened intensely in an 																																																								40	In The Speculum of the Other Woman (1985a), Luce Irigaray argues that it “is not that she lacks 
some ‘master signifier’ or that none is imposed upon her, but rather that access to a signifying 
economy, to the coining of signifiers, is difficult or even impossible for her because she remains an 
outside, herself (a) subject to their norms. She borrows signifiers but cannot make her mark, or re-
mark upon them. Which all surely keeps her deficient, empty, lacking, in a way that could be 
labeled ‘psychotic’: a latent but not actual psychosis, for want of a practical signifying system” (p. 
71, emphasis in the original). 	
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incredible way… he saw the effect that produced all the while speaking to another woman 
and he smiled… and I thus remained fixated, fixated on Dr D.” (TSS, p. 710). 
 
This gives some indication of the circumstances that prompt the patient’s psychotic response to the 
presence of a figure of masculine authority that appears to invite trust and adoration through 
occupying the position of a doctor. It is as if the image of the doctor has a performative life of its 
own and it is to this image that the patient desires a relationship. The relation between the doctor (or 
other male occupying a position of remote authority) and the patient can be read as mimicking the 
relationship between the devotee and God.  
We will now turn to a consideration of Cristina Mazzoni’s critique of Beauvoir’s conception 
of the mystic in her text Saint Hysteria (1996) because the issues she raises around scientific 
discourse tend to challenge feminist arguments in the area of religion.  In this book, Mazzoni’s aim 
is to conduct “an analysis of some of the ways in which metaphors of hysteria have been used and 
abused to explain a different, yet sometimes analogous phenomenon: the mystical experience of 
women” (1996, p. 3).  She is primarily concerned with challenging the scientific definitions of 
hysteria while exploring alternative readings of the words, writing and speech of mystical women. 
Mazzoni objects to Beauvoir’s connection of the mystic woman with narcissism. Mazzoni’s critique 
is important because we can use her argument to highlight the radical nature of Beauvoir’s atheism.  
In defining her use of the concept of mysticism, Mazzoni argues “the word mysticism is equally 
complex and polysemic” as is the word hysteria (1996, p. 6). As such, Mazzoni justifies her use of 
the word as follows: 
 
Mysticism was a rejection of science and rationality, a diffuse religious faith, and a focus on 
the soul, and it occasionally enters my discussion, however it is not the mysticism that 
interests me here. In line with the turn-of-the-century writers and doctors I analyse, I am 
rather narrowly defining mystical discourse here as the Brautmystik, or affective mysticism, 
that explicitly or implicitly describes the mystical union of Christ and the soul in terms of 
the marriage or even the sexual encounter between bride and bridegroom” (p. 6). 
 
Mazzoni argues from a theological perspective in that while she is challenging scientific definitions 
of the mystical experience, she also challenges the basis of Beauvoir’s feminism. Mazzoni criticises 
Beauvoir for the evidence she uses as the basis for her argument:   
 
It is symptomatic that the very first example in “The Mystic”, which is also by far the 
longest quotation in the chapter, is taken not from a mystical text but rather from a doctor’s 
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pathographic reproduction of an erotomaniac’s journal. Beauvoir takes this case of mental 
illness as exemplary of many a devout woman’s experience (p. 50). 
 
The case used by Beauvoir in “The Mystic” is only one example of several she uses in The Second 
Sex to illustrate her argument about narcissism and love. Beauvoir does not shy away from 
describing the behaviour of the patient as pathological because she does not accept the theological 
argument. I will discuss this point in more detail in the section on the story ‘Anne’ later in this 
chapter. 
Mazzoni is also critical of Beauvoir for what she argues is her reduction of the religious 
experience of the mystic to the scientific (psychoanalytic) discourse on the hysteric: 
 
There is a dubious component to Simone de Beauvoir’s argument, for in her discussion of 
women mystics, she wants to have her (materialist) cake and eat it, too. That is to say, she 
wants to deny the epistemic validity of the mystical experience (because of her explicit 
atheism and existentialist ethic), while appropriating great figures such as Teresa of Avila 
and Catherine of Siena for women’s history (p. 52).  
 
In the quote above, Mazzoni reveals that her real irritation is with Beauvoir’s atheist and existential 
ethics, and thus raises the question whether her argument against Beauvoir’s writing on the female 
mystic is a veil for an ad hominen attack on Beauvoir’s character.  Mazzoni appears to suggest that 
Beauvoir has no authority to judge the mystics against the standards of other women because she is 
an atheist; thus further suggesting that the female mystic is something other than the ordinary 
everyday woman and that Beauvoir should recognise this as such.    
Another major point of contention Mazzoni raises against Beauvoir is that she ranks women 
mystics into categories based on their status as intellectuals within the church (Teresa and Catherine 
are doctors of the church/theologians, for instance). This approach “is the very process (…) which 
makes her ideological move collude with the patriarchal order she is seeking to overthrow” (p. 53). 
She then concludes that  
 
Beauvoir’s materialist critique, very much tied to a utilitarian bourgeois ideology, takes 
precedence over her feminist undertaking, and with a rhetorical “pincer movement” women 
mystics are not only criticised for being the mouthpieces of a patriarchal religious 
establishment but also, ironically, for their lack of masculine attributes (ibid.). 
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Mazzoni is clearly drawing on numerous scholarly arguments that have been levelled against 
Beauvoir: that she is a masculinist thinker; that she is blinded by a middle class view of the world; 
and that she relies on a patriarchal discourse of science as her methodology.41  
To respond to Mazzoni’s criticism of Beauvoir’s reliance on the “pathogenic” writing of 
psychiatrist Ferdiere’s patient as the central piece of evidence for her (Beauvoir’s) argument that 
the mystic is essentially an ordinary woman, I will firstly refer to Michèle Le Dœuff’s discussion of 
Beauvoir’s use of the Austrian psychiatrist Wilhelm Stekel.42 In Hipparchia’s Choice (1991), Le 
Dœuff argues “what we ask of a culture is precisely that it should teach us to analyse what is said 
and notably to interpret the way in which people retransmit another’s thought or thought which is 
not theirs” (p. 66).  While framing the patient’s speech as pathological, Beauvoir nevertheless 
allows the woman’s words to speak for themselves and, as such, allows for this speech to reveal a 
certain authority for the truth of her experience. Le Dœuff argues that Beauvoir uses Stekel for its 
“exploratory value: because of his job, Stekel had access to a world which Beauvoir visits with 
him” (1991, p. 66). So, when Mazzoni argues that Beauvoir’s critique is “very much tied to a 
utilitarian bourgeois ideology (that), takes precedence over her feminist undertaking” (1996, p. 53) 
she fails to take into consideration the kind of views expressed by Le Dœuff above, in that 
Beauvoir’s phenomenological method will impel her to investigate the conditions of women’s lived 
experience in a particular situation. In ‘The Mystic’ she does not deny the female patient her voice 
because it is classed as a “mental illness” as Mazzoni would have it, because Beauvoir is committed 
to the phenomenological process that methodologically relies on the first-person account. At this 
point, it will be useful to recall that in Utilitarianism (2001), John Stuart Mill argues that those most 
competent to judge the differences between higher and lower pleasures are those who have 
experienced both (p. 11). Mill argues, “there can be no appeal” (ibid.) to his view that: 
 
On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of 
existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its 
																																																								
41 See, Toril Moi (1990), Feminist theory and Simone de Beauvoir where she discusses and 
dismantles various ad hominen attacks dressed up as critical responses in her chapter ‘Politics and 
the Intellectual Woman: Clichés in the Reception of Simone de Beauvoir’s Work’. For example, 
Moi argues that a familiar critical strategy is the “use of the patriarchal cliché of the ‘unfeminine 
woman’. Beauvoir is regularly represented as cold, selfish, egocentric and uncaring, and above all 
as non-maternal. ‘She is totally devoid of the triple instinct with which woman is endowed’, a 
Catholic comments in 1984; ‘the maternal instinct, the nurturing instinct, and the nest building 
instinct’" (p. 33). 
42 See W Stekel, 1868-1940 <	https://www.worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n80-117214/> for a 
comprehensive list of his works. 
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consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they 
differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final (ibid.). 
 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to recall at this point, how Beauvoir has had her own powerful mystical 
experiences that she recounts in Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter and When Things of the Spirit 
Come First that were discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis that affords her the authority to speak on 
this topic. That is, her authority extends beyond the authority conferred through her middle class 
background of which Mazzoni is critical.  
Beauvoir uses erotomania to describe the way a singular preoccupation with love as the 
justification for one’s existence as a woman is predicated on a blurred distinction between reality 
and illusion. Through this discussion, she reveals that there is a tendency for women to retreat into 
the illusory when reality proves to be an impenetrable wall to an open future. For instance, 
Beauvoir argues this is most likely to occur when a woman ages because “she discovers no goals in 
the world toward which she could project herself in a free and effective movement” (p. 621).  She 
argues that the mystic and the erotomaniac hold in common the desire to strive to obtain “the 
supreme source of values” (p. 711). Beauvoir describes the characteristics common to both in this 
way: 
 
the erotomaniac feels glorified by the love of a sovereign being; he is the one who takes the 
initiative in the love relationship, he loves more passionately than he is loved; he makes his 
feelings known by clear but secret signs; he is jealous and irritated by the chosen woman’s 
lack of fervor: he does not hesitate then to punish her; he almost never manifests himself in 
a carnal and concrete form. All these characteristics are found in mystics; in particular, God 
cherishes for all eternity the soul he inflames with his love, he shed his blood for her, he 
prepares splendid apotheoses for her; the only thing she can do is abandon herself to his 
flames without resistance (ibid.).  
 
In other words, the woman for whom love becomes a singular state of fervency will create the 
object in order that the fervent state persists and thus continue as the justification for the woman’s 
existence. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of erotomania is that it reveals to an observer a woman in 
love with an image apparently of her own making. The similarity with the mystic is stark; however, 
as we have seen through Mazzoni’s objection to this comparison, the similarity depends upon the 
position taken by the observer. For Mazzoni the mystic cannot be compared to the erotomaniac on 
Beauvoir’s terms, because Beauvoir is an atheist and as such she is effectively blind to other 
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dimensions of the woman’s experience of love. In Lovers and Livers: Disease Concepts in History 
(2005), Jacalyn Duffin argues that first and foremost, a disease is a concept and as a concept a 
disease has a history that is “intimately related to culture and philosophy of knowledge in any time 
and place” (p. 3).  Duffin compares the practice of searching for signs of disease through symptoms 
with the practice of the literary critic reading for signs in literary texts (p. 19). Duffin argues 
“diseases do not have to have symptoms… a disease can exist without an illness” (ibid.). 
Essentially, the disease becomes known as such when an observer interprets certain conditions as 
signs. Duffin explains that:  
 
Signs are objective indicators of a problem that are detectable to an outsider. Like the signs 
on the highway, they point to either a diagnosis or a prognosis. The distinction between 
symptom and sign is the difference between what is subjective (felt by the patient) and what 
is objective (visible to the observer) (ibid.). 
 
Applying Duffin’s argument to Beauvoir and Mazzoni, they each interpret the love experienced by 
the mystic through different signs: for Beauvoir she sees this love as derived through a delusional 
relationship with an unreal world; for Mazzoni, she sees this love as derived from a relationship of 
faith to a world that is not visible to those without faith. The mystic can be a sign of an embodied 
illness, or she can be a sign of the embodiment of faith. However, even though these positions 
appear to be irreconcilable, they hold in common the practice that in order to identify the mystic, 
the behaviour of the mystic must be capable of being read. In other words, the mystic is capable of 
being understood within the framework of human language.   
 Beauvoir’s position essentially differs from Mazzoni’s because Beauvoir believes that the 
behaviour of women can be understood and explained by attending to their lived experience in the 
material world. Beauvoir demystifies the reported experiences of the mystic to show how such 
experiences can be explained with reference to the oppression of women by the patriarchy.  She 
does not deny the experience of the patient is deviant; however she does not attribute it to evidence 
of a supernatural source. Beauvoir’s argument reveals the pervasiveness of patriarchal oppression in 
the way it is even capable of structuring the way women interpret their innermost feelings. The 
following part of this chapter will continue this idea through thinking about the story ‘Anne’.  
 
4.3 Anne and sacrifice 
This thesis has previously discussed how the character Anne is based upon Beauvoir’s experience 
of her relationship with her friend Zaza and this section will continue to highlight that relationship 
and its importance to the development of the character Anne. Beauvoir’s relationship with Zaza is 
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important here, because it is thinking about this friendship through this story that opens the way for 
Beauvoir to develop her views about the pathological nature of oppression by linking narcissism to 
the mystic in The Second Sex as discussed in the previous section. It will be remembered that in 
Chapter 3, I focused on Anne’s mother Mme Vignon in the story ‘Anne’; however, in this chapter, 
the focus shifts to Anne and her role as the daughter of Mme Vignon. In this part we shall find that 
narcissism is a shared experience that creates a mirage that the mother and daughter are a unified 
‘natural’ coupling.43 Beauvoir challenges the way society sanctions the extreme and dangerous 
behaviours that characterise this relationship by focussing on the way that religion operates within 
the context of everyday family life. That family life is relegated to the domain of the domestic and, 
therefore, the private domain of social life, means that troubled relationships such as that between 
Anne and her mother are not necessarily considered to be of interest to the state. That this concerns 
the relationship between women within the context of the patriarchal family is of even less concern 
to the patriarchal state because women are not considered to be full ethical citizens due to their 
reproductive duties and thus their emotional and intellectual wellbeing is deemed a private matter.44 
 
The story ‘Anne’ does not cover the entire scope of the friendship between Beauvoir and 
Zaza, nor is it a literal representation; rather we can think of this story as Beauvoir’s critical account 
of the conditions contributing to Zaza’s untimely death. Deborah MacKeefe argues that because 
Beauvoir “considers Zaza’s death a spiritual crime, it must be understood that she places blame on 
religion and its dogma for pulling Zaza in what atheistic Simone would consider an inauthentic 
direction based on accepting pre-established values” (1983, p. 213). Quite clearly Zaza’s death was 
a traumatic event in Beauvoir’s life and its effect sharpened Beauvoir’s desire to locate its root 
cause beyond any medical explanation. Let us remember that Beauvoir ends Memoirs of a Dutiful 
Daughter with a meditation on Zaza’s death: 
 
																																																								
43 See Adrienne Rich’s chapter ‘Motherhood and Daughterhood’ in On Woman Born: Motherhood 
as Experience and Institution (1986) for a wide-ranging discussion about the social basis for the 
conflict and dissatisfactions within these relationships: “Few women growing up in patriarchal 
society can feel mothered enough; the power of our mothers, whatever their love for us and their 
struggles on our behalf, is too restricted. And it is the mother through whom patriarchy early 
teaches the small female her proper expectations” (p. 243). 
44 See Genevieve Lloyd’s chapter ‘The Public and the Private’ in The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and 
‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (1984) for her excellent discussion of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
and the relationship of the domestic sphere to the state. Lloyd’s interpretation of Hegel here is 
relevant to the situation in ‘Anne’, “A man can thus treat his family relationships as entirely 
particular without sacrificing his ethical life. But a woman can have the ethical life only to the 
extent that she can transform the particularity of family relationships into ethical, universal 
concerns—for Husband and Children as such, rather than for these particular people” (p. 82). 
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The doctors called it meningitis, encephalitis; no one was quite sure. Had it been a 
contagious disease, or an accident? She has often appeared to me at night, her face all 
yellow under a pink sun-bonnet, and seeming to gaze reproachfully at me. We had fought 
together against the revolting fate that had lain ahead of us, and for a long time I believed 
that I had paid for my own freedom with her death (1982, p. 360). 
 
Beauvoir’s thoughts here are resonant of the struggle she envisages takes place in ‘Anne’ in that it 
is the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of Zaza’s death and the problem as to who is 
responsible for it that are relevant.45  
It is also worth reiterating here that given Beauvoir’s phenomenological literary method, we 
should remember that everything she writes in her story is intentional in that every detail is selected 
to contribute to the overall philosophical meaning of the text.46 While Beauvoir is giving voice to 
her own situation through all of the stories in When Things of the Spirit Come First, she is not doing 
this for the purpose of imposing an idealised autobiography on her readers. In keeping with her 
existential philosophical commitment, she is concerned with showing how existence precedes 
essence by not simply representing her own lived experience as if it is a static historical moment in 
time, but issuing an invitation to her readers to read her text through an embodied connection 
between author and reader. In other words, to read the text is an embodied lived experience in itself 
situated within a social world illuminated through Beauvoir’s text. Beauvoir thinks the world 
inhabited by Anne is a world we all inhabit and when we engage with the text philosophically, we 
come to experience the forces of oppression that structure such a world.  
While Anne is not a mystic in the sense used in The Second Sex, that is, she has not reached 
sainthood nor does she make claims to a mystical union with god: she is nonetheless characterised 																																																								
45 See Deirdre Bair, Simone de Beauvoir: A Biography (1991) for a discussion of the biographical 
circumstances of Zaza’s death. Even though Beauvoir was not aware of the full story as to why 
Zaza could not marry Merleau-Ponty (Pascal) at the time of writing When Things of the Spirit Come 
First, I think the general opaqueness surrounding the original events is captured by Beauvoir. 46	See Ulrika Björk ‘Reconstituting experience: Beauvoir’s philosophical conception of literature’ 
(2012), where she argues that for Beauvoir the “novel does not say things directly [dire], but 
presents the contradictions, difficulties and ambiguities of situations and objects that do not speak 
[parler]” (p. 89). In her chapter ‘Beauvoir as Literary Writer’ (2017), Meryl Altman argues “Quand 
prime was, I believe, a self-conscious, self-educated attempt to mobilize fictions’s technical 
resources against its most damaging social scripts. In contrast with her other uses of the same 
autobiographical material (Zaza’s death, the stagey unreliability of cousin Jacques), it is steeped in 
corrosive irony, created through narrative distance. This is unsurprising. Since its nineteenth-
century origins in attacks on the bourgeoisie by its own sons (Stendhal, Flaubert, Balzac), the novel 
is almost always an ironic proving ground for bad faith and games of self-deception, particularly 
games of gender and class” (p. 345). 
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as belonging to the milieu that produces the mystic. Beauvoir represents her as being a saint in 
training under the heavy-handed guidance of her mother. Religious authority of course dominates 
this milieu and Beauvoir thinks it is responsible for creating the conditions through which women 
are oppressed through its support for the concept of the mystical woman. Within Beauvoir’s 
overarching argument about the causes of women’s oppression in The Second Sex, she singles out 
the myth of the eternal feminine as a powerful generator of social reproduction: encapsulated in her 
famous pronouncement that “one is not born a woman, but rather becomes, a woman” (TSS, p. 283). 
The role of the mystic is, perhaps, the logical outcome for the woman who commits herself totally 
to the responsibilities demanded by (bad) faith to an imaginary transcendent god. Anne does not 
pursue the path of the mystic of her own volition; however, it is a path that her mother desires on 
her behalf. She both believes in God and believes in her mother’s authority to determine her future, 
so these twin beliefs may appear to offer a conflict; however, for Anne the intensity of conflict 
arises when she is unable to obtain her mother’s approval for her own choices. This struggle can be 
seen in the following exchange between Anne and her friend and would-be saviour Chantal. Anne 
has revealed that she has decided to follow her mother’s command that she spend a year in England 
that is designed to force her to break from Pascal and Chantal. Chantal begins: 
 
“I don’t take your decision seriously. You will come out of this fatalistic crisis; you 
have come through plenty of others.” 
“This is not fatalism,” said Anne. “It is resignation. God will do what He wishes 
with me.” 
“Even from the Christian point of view passiveness and inertia have never been 
virtues,” said Chantal. “You have told me yourself that this total submission to the divine 
will is often only a cover for laziness and cowardice. Your resignation is in fact a definite 
choice: you choose peace. How do you know that God does not require of you the very 
thing that is hardest, not renouncement but resistance, not refusing to live but life itself?” 
“Don’t torment me,” said Anne in an agonised voice. She hid her face in her hands 
and remained silent for a long while; the blow had gone home. “How can one tell?” she said 
unsteadily. “I’ve never stopped struggling these last three years; I’ve struggled for every 
book, for every thought, for every time I wanted to go out. I swore I would never, never hurt 
Mama and I have never stopped torturing her. When I gave way to her I felt contemptible: 
when I resisted I hated myself. And I’ve never known how God wanted me to behave. I 
can’t bear it any longer, Chantal.” (WTS, p. 132). 
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This passage provides a sense of how Anne feels her situation is impossible and unwinnable no 
matter which path she chooses. This is because her situation only allows for a limited number of 
choices for a woman in her position and these choices appear to be interchangeable because they 
are premised on bad faith. 
The representation of the narcissistic woman of faith differs in the story ‘Anne’ from the 
account given through ‘The Mystic’. The story reveals that the absence of freedom for the women 
blurs the distinction between the identities of mother and daughter and this relationship represents a 
confluence of interests for the patriarchal and religious authority. In ‘The Mystic’ the woman is 
removed from everyday family and social existence and she is discussed in terms of freedom, or its 
lack thereof: that is, the nature of her particular existence raises the question whether her faith is, or 
can be, a source of autonomy. As we have already seen in the previous part of this chapter, 
Beauvoir thinks that the mystic’s devotion to an absolute ideal God renders her incapable of 
achieving freedom, and thus subjectivity, through this course of action. What becomes clear 
through the story ‘Anne’ is how the role of the mystic is created out of a complex web of concrete 
social relations that lead, as Beauvoir suggests in the The Second Sex concerning narcissistic love, 
to a pathological relationship to one’s own subjectivity. The story ‘Anne’ reveals another dimension 
to that representation by showing how the nature of the mother-daughter relationship can be a 
precursor to such a pathological relationship with love. The narcissistic mother reproduces the 
social relations of the so-called private sphere of domesticity through her control of the course of 
her daughter’s destiny. This is an important point, because it situates the dynamics of the mother-
daughter relation as belonging within, and as subject to, the forces of social relations as a whole. In 
other words, the mother-daughter relation is not necessarily an inherently spiritual relationship that 
transcends the shaping forces of the social world.47 
 
4.4 Anne and silence 
In Simone de Beauvoir’s Fiction: A Psychoanalytic Rereading (2003), Genevieve Shepherd refers 
to Anne as being “utterly voiceless” (p. 74) arguing that although “Anne without doubt forms the 
heart of her own story, it is significant that the three influences which tear her apart are permitted to 
tell their own tales of self-justification. Anne herself is granted no chance to defend herself by 
Beauvoir” (Footnote 22, p. 74). The three influencers referred to by Shepherd are Mme Vignon, 
Chantal and Pascal: each character idealises Anne to maintain their own narcissistic desires. While I 
agree with Shepherd on the point that Anne is voiceless in the text in the sense that the narration is 																																																								47 See Adrienne Rich’s chapter ‘The “Sacred Calling”’ in Of Woman Born: Motherhood as 
Experience and Institution (1986). Here she argues that the “institution of motherhood is not 
identical with bearing and caring for children, any more than the institution of heterosexuality is 
identical with intimacy and sexual love” (p. 42). 
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not focalised through her, I nevertheless disagree with the underlying suggestion that Beauvoir has 
contributed to the silencing of Anne by not allowing her narrative agency through the text. Rather, 
“the presentation of Anne entirely from other people’s points of view” (Fallaize 1998, p. 151), 
produces a character that defies easy and conclusive analysis because it is important within the 
context of Beauvoir’s project to represent the lived experience of the social situation. That we are 
not afforded the opportunity to fully access Anne’s experience of her world says something 
significant about that world in itself. That Anne’s presence in the world can only be marked through 
the expression of others can be read as an indication of the degree to which her life is cloistered: 
that is, a situation that is actually constituted by Anne’s voicelessness. So, where Shepherd above 
refers to Anne being torn apart by her trio of significant influences, I would instead argue that we 
are being shown by Beauvoir how narratives premised on bad faith will fail to recognise the 
subjectivity of others. 
In her chapter ‘The Omnipotent Mother: A Psychoanalytic Study of Fantasy and Reality’ 
(1995), Jessica Benjamin discusses the concept of the omnipotence of the mother as she may appear 
to the child. She does this through positing the idea that the experience of omnipotence can be 
connected to the experience of intersubjectivity when viewed through the binary logic produced 
through fantasy and reality. The point here is not to take Benjamin’s psychological theory as a 
whole and apply it to explain the relationship between Mme Vignon and Anne; rather I am using 
Benjamin to support the view I offer in this chapter, that this relationship needs to be seen as a 
product of its social relations. Benjamin argues “psychoanalytic theory has thus been largely unable 
to conceptualise the mother as a separate subject, to see the mother-child relationship from the 
viewpoint of both subjects” (p. 88). Adding to my response to Shepherd in the preceding paragraph, 
then, I think that Beauvoir does represent Mme Vignon as an omnipotent mother to some extent. To 
the reader, she may appear exaggerated and slightly ridiculous given Beauvoir’s satire (as I have 
previously argued in chapter 3). However, her omnipotence is undoubtedly meant to appear as real 
to Anne given the abject terror Mme Vignon inspires in her daughter. Taking Benjamin’s point 
about the failure of psychoanalytic theory to recognise the intersubjectivity between the mother and 
daughter, Beauvoir’s representation of it can be read as depicting the narrative fantasy the 
patriarchal world constructs to justify its power to control all aspects of the lives of the women it 
most values: that is, women in the middle classes.48 Therefore, Beauvoir is not saying this is the 
way the mother-daughter relationship is in reality; she is saying that the patriarchal fantasy of the 
																																																								
48 This is not to argue that working-class women have more freedom than those from the working 
class per se, but I would argue that working-class women perhaps suffer an added layer of 
oppression through the idealisation of the middle-class woman and its disciplining effect on how 
working class women express their freedom. 
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relationship can produce pathological outcomes for some women when they are unable to separate 
the fantasy from reality.  
Beauvoir makes this distinction between reality and fantasy through the literary technique 
used to construct the text. The story is at the same time both real in the sense that we can envisage 
this situation occurring in everyday life, but it is also fantastic in that the situation between Mme 
Vignon and Anne seems exaggerated and, to some extent, melodramatic. Beauvoir’s language 
creates a scenario infused with gothic imagery that evokes a sense of horror at the seemingly 
unstoppable trajectory of the relationship.49  For example, the presence of Chantal creates a sense of 
an inside and outside to Anne’s life which raises questions about Anne’s inner life. This can also be 
said about Mme Vignon and Pascal because they too are presented with a domain of experience that 
unsettles and disturbs their own senses of inner life. Troubled by the need to make a choice between 
Mme Vignon and Pascal, Anne becomes increasingly distant to Chantal’s attempts to be her mentor 
and worldly friend: 
 
In her turn Anne sat down at the piano. She began playing and all at once a kind of 
uneasiness came over Chantal; all she could see of Anne was the back of her neck, leaning 
over, and a profile that had grown hard, almost ugly. Anne was no longer anything like the 
white-clothed figure that had been shining in the dim old drawing-room a few minutes ago; 
nor was she a child in distress willing to let herself be saved; she was a fierce, solitary, 
frightening being unknown to Chantal (p. 128). 
 
Beauvoir uses multiple points of view in the story through free indirect discourse and 
provides access to the interiority of the characters, thus placing the reader in an uncomfortable 
position of being both within the situation and outside the situation.50 This experience in itself can 
raise feelings of uncanniness because fiction is meant to be ‘not real’, yet to experience 
metaphysical fiction is to experience a truthful reality. In this way, the world becomes for the reader 
a space of uncertainty, doubt and questioning. Freud argues in ‘The ‘Uncanny’’ (1956) that the 
uncanny  																																																								
49 See Alison T. Holland (2003) in ‘Identity in Crisis: The Gothic Textual Space in Beauvoir’s 
‘L’Invitée’’ where she argues, “In the Gothic mode, feeling and emotion exceed reason. 
Ambivalence and ambiguity prevail and suspense and uncertainty are fostered. Typically, Gothic 
texts are concerned with the nature of language, its limits and its power, and they are characterised 
by a concomitant fear of representation. Gothic texts tend to be preoccupied with identity and the 
dissolution of the self” (p. 328). 50	In ‘Beauvoir as Literary Writer’ (2017), Meryl Altman argues that Beauvoir’s aim is to “convey 
the concrete thickness of the world, the texture and weight of “lived experience,” what is real in the 
world as well as what is true of the world” (p. 341, italics in the original) 
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as it is depicted in literature, in stories and imaginative productions, merits in truth a 
separate discussion. Above all, it is a much more fertile province than the uncanny in real 
life, for it contains the whole of the latter and something more besides, something that 
cannot be found in real life. The contrast between what has been repressed and what has 
been surmounted cannot be transposed on to the uncanny in fiction without profound 
modification; for the realm of phantasy depends for its effect on the fact that its content is 
not submitted to reality-testing (p. 249, italics in the original). 
 
When the reader experiences themselves as being outside of the situation represented through the 
text, the content of the text is in fact “reality-tested” as referenced by Freud, because the affect of 
the content remains with the reader in their ordinary everyday life. We can think of the gothic 
representation of the relationship between Mme Vignon and Anne in Freudian terms in that it is a 
kind of ‘return of the repressed’.  For the reader, it is an eruption into consciousness of the socially 
repressed, nastier elements of the mother-daughter relationship and as such, the gothic mode of 
representation is a demystifying performance. So while Anne may be read as lacking autonomy, the 
intention here is not to suggest that this is an oversight on Beauvoir’s part, because she is showing 
us how Anne’s social reality sublimates her desire for freedom in that it transforms, reconstitutes 
and legitimates that desire into the socially useful role of the obedient daughter. Instead of reading 
Anne as lacking a voice, we could think about the horror that emanates from the gothic setting, as 
being the point of view of the situation from Anne’s perspective. As with the absence of appropriate 
language to accurately describe the ecstatic state of the mystic as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
Anne’s world of disempowered isolation resists direct description. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have connected Beauvoir’s work on ‘The Mystic’ in The Second Sex with the story 
‘Anne’ in When Things of the Spirit Come First by focusing on the way Beauvoir situates spiritual 
life within the context of the everyday situations of women. In the story ‘Anne’ she shows how 
daughters are alienated from the pursuit of self-determined freedom by their relationship to the 
mother in middle-class family life.  Beauvoir shows the mother to be both an object of devotion and 
an object that causes terror in the daughter’s life. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir thinks about the 
mystic in the public realm in relation to everyday life. She portrays the faith of the female mystic as 
a pathological response to oppression and thinks the uncritical acceptance of faith is dangerous to 
the physical, emotional and intellectual wellbeing of women. To give one’s faith to an imaginary 
deity is not only a denial of the responsibility of her possession of ontological freedom, but also has 
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negative ramifications for the social milieu within which all women reside. The maintenance of 
networks of faith in patriarchal idols and ideals by dutiful women, result in a reproduction of 
patriarchal power at the expense of women’s expression of freedom. The inter-textual reading in 
this chapter has highlighted how the path towards mysticism is not an authentic path to freedom, 
because to believe in an absolute is to provide a major plank for the legitimacy of the patriarchal 
social structure.   
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Conclusion 	
An experience is not a series of facts, and I did not envisage to compose a chronicle. I have already 
explained what is for me one of the essential roles of literature, to make manifest the ambiguous, 
separate, contradictory truths which do not form a totality at any moment, either outside of me or in 
me; in certain cases one can only succeed in bringing them all together by inscribing them within 
the unity of an imaginary object.  
(Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance). 
 
I will now provide a brief summing up of the thesis before proceeding to a discussion about some of 
the implications raised by the central issues in this thesis. In chapter one I argued that Beauvoir’s 
philosophy both emerges from, and informs her writing practice and this process is the basis of her 
political action. For Beauvoir, writing is a political act that allows for communication between 
diverse situations for the purpose of engendering consciousness of the lived experience of freedom 
and oppression between individuals. In chapter two I argue that economic independence can only 
deliver women a partial access to freedom, because the patriarchal structure of the workplace and 
public life more generally, intervenes and legislates for limited ways in which women may express 
their sexuality. Chapter three argues that the patriarchal mother who acts in bad faith is key to the 
maintenance of the distinction between public and domestic spaces for the purpose of training her 
daughters to ‘know their place’ so to speak. As shown in chapter two, the public space of the 
workplace also functions to exclude the full range of female expressions of their freedom through 
patriarchal control over the way women appear in public. To be a mother in a patriarchal society is 
to be confronted with the choice to pursue the open future or to yield to adopting and disseminating 
patriarchal social, political and cultural values. And finally, in chapter four I argue that daughters 
face multiple obstacles to developing and expressing their freedom, because they must confront not 
only their devotion to their patriarchal mothers, but also their faith in the patriarchal order that is 
represented in absolute terms by their patriarchal mothers. 
At the heart of this thesis is the concern that there is more to be learned about the affect of 
Beauvoir’s work on our understanding of women’s oppression. This thesis has taken the approach 
of examining the nexus between the philosophical and literary by looking at the inter-textual 
relationship between The Second Sex and When Things of the Spirit Come First. This thesis has 
shown that this nexus is the place where Beauvoir’s voice is heard most clearly because it is a place 
where questions about her status as either a philosopher or writer are constantly being generated. 
This question is thus always open to be answered, that is, it is a perpetually open-ended question 
that draws attention to the ambiguity of Beauvoir’s speaking position. Of course, to describe 
Beauvoir in terms of ambiguity is to also refer to the core principal of her philosophical approach to 
understanding the world: that there can be no absolute, fixed, totalised reality. Thinking through the 
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ambiguity that characterises Beauvoir’s philosophical and literary work is shown to be productive 
in recognising the value of literary fiction in bringing the universalist and exclusionary tendencies 
of philosophy to light. Rather than thinking about Beauvoir’s use of literature in terms of a 
hierarchical relationship with philosophy, this thesis has viewed her literary writing as philosophical 
writing that transgresses canonical European philosophy in its focus on writing the truth of the lived 
experience of women. 
Beauvoir’s development of a phenomenological method of writing that privileges the lived 
experience of women has effectively subverts the disciplinary boundaries borne out of oppressive 
epistemological regimes of power. She transposes the literary into the philosophical and the 
philosophical into the literary. This means that the reader is unable to rely upon the reading 
conventions of either discipline and as such is denied the connection of the conventional narrative: 
for example, the independent woman is not the career woman who has sacrificed children to be 
successful; the mother is not the saint who sacrifices her independence for her children. Beauvoir’s 
writing on women reveals that these simple formulations of the lived experience of women are 
ideological constructions that disguise the extent of the patriarchal intervention into women’s 
exercise of their freedom. For Beauvoir, writing is an action and a communication that surpasses the 
separation of individuals in the world: it is an action of recalling and retelling the stories of 
experience and has been the way Beauvoir has made herself capable of being heard in the world. It 
is not enough to speak to be heard, so Beauvoir has made her world large through writing and, in 
doing so, has created the conditions through which she can be heard in the philosophical world of 
her making. And we, the readers, are drawn into that philosophical world as if it is our world and 
we hear her voice as if it is our voice too. 
This thesis has examined the philosophical worlds predicated on three familiar female 
experiences: that of the independent woman, the mother and the daughter. While these worlds have 
largely been explored in this thesis as worlds distinct from each other, this is largely due to the 
method of analysis employed that has sought to examine these experiences in depth. Looking at 
these experiences from a distance, this thesis has shown how women are caught in a web of 
connections created through patriarchal control of social relations that bind them in fixed relations 
with each other that are difficult to surpass. This highlights that the obstacles that women face in 
exercising their ontological freedom can be found in their relationships with each other as well as 
the more obvious manifestations of patriarchal dominance such as the laws that prevent access to 
equal opportunity and so on. 
If there is a common location where women are inextricably connected, it is in the domestic 
domain of the middle class family. This is where patriarchy builds its foundation for its legitimation 
through instilling respect for relationships built on bad faith thus authorising the oppressive social 
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relations that characterise patriarchal society. For women to achieve true freedom, they must first 
recognise and then challenge the ideological basis of their role in the family structure. Marguerite 
does this by actively seeking independence away from the home and family and, while this course 
of action does not in itself reward her with freedom, it nevertheless facilitates a process of 
consciousness-raising that enables her to understand how her belief in the patriarchal God denies 
her freedom. While Mme Vignon at times doubts her course of action towards her daughters as a 
result of remembering her own experience as a daughter, she persists with her belief in the word of 
the patriarchal God regardless of the disastrous consequences of that belief. For Mme Vignon, there 
is virtue in her actions to deny her daughters the opportunity for self-determination. Paradoxically, 
for Anne, there is virtue in not denying her mother the wish that she be a saint and Anne suffers 
unto death accordingly. Quite clearly, for Beauvoir, the middle class home is not a place of respite 
from the patriarchal fray; rather it is the location from which women must work hardest to 
transcend. 
Beauvoir shows how the family in its guise as a feminised domestic domain is essentially a 
regulated space through which women are expected to perform their social roles obediently while 
tending to the maintenance of the patriarchal limits. If women are to set create futures of their own 
making, then Beauvoir defines a difficult, seemingly insurmountable obstacle that must be 
overcome. In effect, women are being charged with the responsibility to take responsibility for their 
own freedom. This is not to say that the patriarchy is not responsible and therefore not oppressive, 
rather it is to say that women have the capacity to begin (or to continue) to unravel and redefine the 
bonds that bind them. This approach advocates a change from below so that the foundational 
support for the patriarchal edifice is weakened.  
While many contemporary women enjoy what appear to be greater freedoms in terms of 
having access to an independent income compared with women at the time Beauvoir was writing, 
the problems women encounter when expressing an authentic freedom, nonetheless remains 
unresolved. In addition to the ongoing struggle for equal opportunities in the public realm—
including the struggle for legislative change in relation to abortion—there also needs to be more 
recognition that oppression is also situated with the site of family. There needs to be recognition 
that the roles of mother and daughter, for instance, essentialise women’s identities in patriarchal 
society. Given that the mother is central to the formation and maintenance of the patriarchal family 
structure, and given the family is central to patriarchal social values, women have the opportunity to 
change patriarchal social structure by reimagining the function and operation of the mother-
daughter relationship as well as other significant relationships between women that are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. In seeking to reimagine social relations between women, we would do well to 
recognise the revolutionary potential of Beauvoir’s philosophy to carve out productive 
		 100 
communication strategies to bypass patriarchal policing and surveillance of female relationships 
with each other. 
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